NRO-MOL_2015

148 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Compendium of the NRO’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory Documents
However, scarcely had this agreement been reached than
Secretary McNamara—the very next day, 9 December—
dispatched a memorandum to Brown inquiring as to the
feasibility of completing the program, at least in the first
phase, “without a man” and limiting funding in fiscal year
1969 to $400 million. This astounding memorandum
quickly doused Air Force hopes. On 15 December, Dr.
Brown forwarded to McNamara a lengthy reply, in which
he listed and discussed four alternative programs which
might be adopted. They ranged from the current program
to dropping man, to a severe stretchout of the MOL
schedule. After examining each in some detail, Brown
stated it was his opinion that they should proceed with
the program ‘’as presently constituted.” He said:
I believe the present MOL Program
approach is worth the cost in terms of
assurance of meeting the resolution
goal and returning a worthwhile
product at the earliest reasonable
date, plus the verification and
exploration of additional manned
reconnaissance contributions such
as target verification, target
selection, weather avoidance, etc.
I therefore recommend, as a first
option, that we fund the present
program in FY 69 at not less
than $600 million. If that is not
possible, then the program should
be funded at not less than $520
million...in FY 69 and the resulting
5-6 month additional stretchout and
increased total cost of the program
be reluctantly accepted. We should
do the latter only if we are willing
to accept the $600 million cost in FY
70 and perhaps that much in FY 71. If
we are not, we should terminate the
MOL Program except for the Eastman
Kodak and General Electric efforts
and define a new unmanned system...
In that situation approximately $400
million should be budgeted in the
black for FY 69. 21
Brown’s first option—$600 million—was accepted by
McNamara and incorporated into the President’s budget,
submitted to Congress in January 1968. However, it
would not stand up during the new year, an election
year, which found the United States beset by more grim
events than it had experienced in several decades. First,
on 24 January 1968, a bellicose North Korea seized
the U.S. intelligence ship, USS Pueblo, off the coast of
Wonsan in the Sea of Japan, generating an international
crisis leading the President to call up of the Air Force
Reserve. More importantly, in Vietnam at month’s end,
the communists launched a powerful Tet offensive which
carried North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops into the
heart of the country’s major cities, including Saigon.
Also, before a half year was out, President Johnson
would announce his intention not to run for reelection,
Sen. Robert Kennedy and the civil rights leader, Martin
Luther King, would be assassinated, and riots would hit
a dozen American cities.
All these events would eventually affect MOL directly
or indirectly. It was, perhaps, just coincidence which
led General Stewart; on 30 January 1968, to write to
the Comptroller of the Air Force about MOL program
cancellation costs. He advised that all available funds
would, by the end of June, either have been spent or be
needed legally “to cover noncancellable commitments
made on the part of the MOL contractors.” He reported
special termination cost clauses had been included in all
MOL contracts and that—if the program was cancelled
late in the fiscal year—certain funds would have to be
provided by the Air Force from sources outside the program
He estimated such costs would total $46.7 million if the
program was cancelled late in the fiscal year. He further
advised that, while ‘’no such action is contemplated,” his
memorandum’s purpose was “merely to apprise you of
the possible impact of MOL on administratively reserved
funds should termination take place.” 22
The Director of the Budget, Maj. Gen. Duward L. Crow,
subsequently replied that the Air Force had no specific
administrative reserve of funds for special termination
costs. If additional funds were needed, he said, “adequate
unobligated funds would be available within the
applicable appropriation, even though reprogramming
from other approved programs might be necessary.” 23
CIA and State Department Opposition
In early 1968 a new factor entered the MOL picture—
the growing opposition to the program of the CIA and
State Department. On 14 February, during a meeting of
the National Space Council—chaired by Vice President
Humphrey—Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen of the State
Department asked whether MOL was worth $2.4 billion.
He noted that the government had spent ‘’some $722
million on this project” and he suggested that a committee
be set; up to “study the need before we go any further.”
He added that the system had never “been approved
by USIB.” Dr. Foster responded that it was not the role
of the U.S. Intelligence Board to approve programs,