NRO-MOL_2015

Chapter X - THE MANNED/UNMANNED SYSTEM STUDIES 1965 - 1966
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a weather avoidance function and
having the option of photographing
pre-designated alternate targets,
can be expected to successfully
photograph 18 to 20 percent more
targets than the unmanned system. 28
In late August an overall final report on “Manned/
Unmanned Comparisons in the MOL”—which included
data submitted by General Berg’s staff and a summary of
the wholly unmanned DORIAN system investigations—
was forwarded to Dr. Foster as the formal Air Force
response to his memorandum of 6 April 1966. Fortyseven
pages in length, this consisted of a covering
memorandum from Dr. Brown and four major sections,
which answered in detail the major points which Foster
had requested the Air Force consider.
In his memorandum, Brown repeated the earlier
conclusion that either the automatic version of MOL or
a completely unmanned configuration potentially could
give the same resolution as a manned system. On the
other hand, he noted that many of the automatic devices
had never before been used in an orbital reconnaissance
system, and while it was believed they ultimately could
be made to perform reliably, there was uncertainty
how long it might take. For this reason, the Air Force
was convinced that the risk against early achievement
of {better than one foot} resolution was “considerably
greater with an unmanned vehicle”; that is, to the extent
that man’s participation in the development proved
effective, “the {better than one foot} resolution unmanned
capability should be achieved earlier in the automatic
mode of MOL.” 29
The recent studies, he said further, had considered
an unmanned DORIAN system flown on both a 30-day
and 60-day mission. He agreed that the latter would
be more economical—provided that the component
reliability could be developed to acceptable levels. In
either case, he said that the absence of man increased
the development risk. Citing the various new features
which were planned for automatic operation during both
manned and unmanned flights, he noted that man would
be able to override or compensate for most of the failure
modes envisioned for this equipment. However, any
“out-of-specification performance” in automatic functions
could defeat the {better than one foot} resolution
objective, whereas retaining man during the orbital
development period “not only will enable us to increase
the output and quality of reconnaissance data acquired
in this period but will assist in identification and correction
of equipment deficiencies.
Figure 49. MOL Vehicle
Source: CSNR Reference Collection
Brown reported that the latest estimated development
cost of the 7-launch MOL program was $1.818 billion.
On completion of the development, the system could be
operated manned or unmanned (automatic mode), with
the latter able to perform in orbit for 60 days, subject
to the same qualifications on reliability stated above for
the wholly unmanned system. The development cost of
the unmanned (automatic) MOL was estimated at $1.50
billion. When compared in this manner, the difference
in development cost for including a manned operating
mode and a manned development program was
estimated at $318 million. This difference, the Secretary
said, would be “almost entirely offset” if the manned
system’s weather compensation potential proved to be
only 20 percent, since it would result in an increased
photographic “take” during the development cycle.