NRO-MOL_2015

Chapter IX - ORGANIZING FOR CONTRACT DEFINITION
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Organizing for Contract Definition
On 29 April 1965, some four months before the
President’s announcement, Dr. McMillan met with
Generals Schriever and Martin to discuss the kind of
management organization the Air Force should establish
for the next MOL phase—contract definition * . At this
meeting on the West Coast, the three men tentatively
agreed that a strong autonomous system office should
be organized there, supported by an appropriate AFSC
structure. Subsequently, however, when Evans and
Schriever undertook to put down on paper the details of
a permanent MOL organization as they saw it, they found
themselves embroiled in a major disagreement with
General Martin. This issue concerned how the “black”
and “white” aspects of the program should be managed. 1
During the spring and early summer of 1965,
General Evans’ staff undertook to draft a paper on the
proposed USAF management structure. It proposed the
creation of a “strong, autonomous, integrated program
implementation office” on the West Coast, headed by a
general officer to be known as the Deputy Director, MOL.
He would report to the MOL Program Director (General
Schriever), who would be responsible to the Secretary of
the Air Force, the Under Secretary, and the Director, NRC,
for “total program direction.’’ The Deputy Director, MOL,
would be given “full procurement authority necessary to
conduct both ‘black’ and ‘white’ procurement of the MOL
program from funds provided him from higher authority.” 2
General Martin strongly disagreed with this plan.
In a message to Dr. McMillan on 8 July, he declared
that in view of his responsibilities to the NRO, it was
essential that he control not only the development of all
reconnaissance payloads, the reconnaissance payload
section, and integration of all payloads into this section,
but also all “black” contracts and “white” contracts
affected by “black” contracts. He recommended that
the responsibilities of the Deputy Director, MOL, be
limited to “all non-reconnaissance and non-BYEMAN
aspects” of the program, such as the laboratory section,
Gemini capsule, boosters, launch facilities, etc. To insure
essential coordination and “interface,” he proposed
* Originally known as project definition. Contract definition was defined as
“that phase during which preliminary design and engineering are verified or
accomplished, and firm contract and management planning are performed.”
The overall objective of contract definition was “to determine whether the
conditional decision to proceed with Engineering Development should be
ratified.” (DoD Directive 3200.9, dated 1 July 1965.)
creating a “MOL payload office,” which would be
physically located adjacent to the office of the Deputy
Director, MOL, to handle all black-related matters. 3
General Schriever, however, felt that the above approach
would fragment MOL management and was contrary to
all the basic management principles AFSC had learned
in the ballistic missile program. Writing to Dr. McMillan in
early August, he argued that the management problem
of dealing with the Directorate of Special Projects was
“amenable to proven solutions from other programs that
were no less complex than MOL.” He urged that the final
MOL management plan, which OSD had requested prior
to program approval, provide for a “clear single channel
of direction and responsibility” linking the Secretary of the
Air Force or Director, NRO, and Director, MOL and the
West Coast organization. There should be, he insisted,
“unequivocal MOL program policy guidance from or
through the Director, MOL, for all aspects of the program.”
(Endnote 4) The AFSC commander acknowledged that
security was important but also noted that ‘’The MOL is
too big, and the image is too well established, to hide.” In
a second letter to Dr. McMillan, he reiterated his concern
over “unnecessary fragmentation of the management
authority of the Director, MOL, and the existence of
multiple channels of direction and responsibility for MOL
system acquisition.” 5
The New MOL Structure: Two
Management Channels
As the Director, NRO, however, McMillan’s views
were influenced by the “black” environment which had
produced the highly successful U. S. unmanned satellite
reconnaissance system. The conservative approach
was to support General Martin’s position, which he did † .
Thus, the final MOL management plan sent to OSD
on 24 August 1965—while it accepted the principle
of “single, clear line of direction to a full” coordinated
MOL program”—provided for two distinct management
channels. The plan stated that since MOL would meet
some of the NRO’s proposed long-range objectives, the
direction of it “should be responsive to policy, guidance,
and approval of the Secretary of the Air Force with
assistance and advice from DNRO.” 6
† Dr. McMillan wished to maintain tight control over the “black” environment,
from which the Air Staff and many other USAF agencies had been excluded.