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60 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Compendium of the NRO’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory Documents Worries Over MOL Security When NRO officials in Washington and Special Projects personnel on the West Coast read Dr. Brown’s 4 January memorandum, they were startled by its reference to acquiring a MOL reconnaissance capability. Twelve months before, in January 1964, the Director of the NRO Staff had expressed concern over the breakdown of security discipline resulting from widespread MOL discussions at that time. Subsequently, the NRO devised and established Project DORIAN as a means of controlling all information relating to satellite reconnaissance activities. Now, in January 1965, General Martin * bluntly informed Dr. McMillan that Brown’s memorandum constituted a violation of NRO security. He said its implication, although it did not explicitly use the word “reconnaissance,” was obvious. “The overall impression created in the minds of unwitting people involved,” he said, “has been that MOL has finally been assigned a reconnaissance mission.” He emphasized the need for prompt security decisions before any further MOL correspondence was issued, pointing to the following dangers if no action was taken: The security of MOL reconnaissance aspects is inescapably tied to the security of the unmanned satellite reconnaissance program. Exposure of MOL reconnaissance capability to anyone outside the BYEMAN system automatically will provoke pressure for disclosure of unmanned reconnaissance data. Such personnel will want to know how the MOL capability compares with the unmanned satellite reconnaissance capability. 5 As a consequence of this situation, a working group which included General Greer’s special assistant, Col Ralph J. Ford, and Col Paul E. Worthman of the NRO Staff, was formed to prepare recommendations on the security aspects of the MOL program. The group proposed a basic approach which would provide for “an absolutely clear and separate division between reconnaissance oriented tasks (DORIAN/BYEMAN) and non-reconnaissance related tasks in MOL.” General Greer endorsed this approach and on 30 January 1965 recommended to Dr. McMillan that all payload studies and. development of passive-in-nature Sigint and terrestrial (of the earth) image forming sensors, “having * At this time General Martin, former Director of the NRO Staff, was understudying General Greer, who was scheduled to retire on 1 July 1965. practical intelligence collection application,” be controlled by the Director of NRO under Project DORIAN and within the BYEMAN security system. Studies and work not involving reconnaissance payloads, i.e., such as those concerned with general experiments to determine man’s usefulness in space, would be subject to normal security restrictions, such as those contained in DoD Directive 520012 and AFR 205-3. 6 Dr. McMillan approved these recommendations and, on 5 February, he issued a paper titled “Special Security Procedures for the Department of Defense Manned Orbiting Laboratory,” a copy of which he sent to Dr. Brown. He advised the Defense Research Director that it had become clear from detailed analysis of work statements, procedures and methodology, “that the only practical recourse is to keep any reconnaissance, including active sensor work, black.” He said he thought this could be handled in a manner “which does not detract from the efficiency of the current activities nor will it hamper the DoD-NASA exchange of information...” 7 Seven weeks later McMillan also issued additional guidance and security policies to govern MOL study and developmental activity. He emphasized that all payload study and other work would have to be cleared by him to insure appropriate security controls. 8 A Revised MOL Management Structure Dr. Brown’s redirection of the program on 4 January was followed by important changes in the MOL management structure. As noted earlier, General Schriever during 1964 had urged that a strong central management office be set up in the Washington area. McMillan, however, decided that an Air Staff coordination office, which in mid-1964 was organized as the Office of the Assistant for MOL † , would be sufficient for the time being. General Schriever objected to this arrangement as inadequate. He said the new office simply could not provide the leadership, channels, and direction needed for the program. On 18 August 1964, he once more strongly urged the Air Force Under Secretary to establish “a single integrated office.” 9 In response to General Schriever’s criticism, Dr. McMillan on 3 September met with Colonel Schultz, the Assistant for MOL, and Mr. Frank Ross, of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research and Development, to discuss the management question. Afterwards, he asked them to prepare working papers on MOL management † Redesignated on 9 November 1964 as the Assistant for Manned Flight, to take into account its other responsibilities including the NASA Gemini experiments project and certain coordination activities involving the space agency.
Chapter VII - THE LABORATORY VEHICLE DESIGN COMPETITION January-June 1965 61 alternatives and advised he was thinking of establishing a “MOL Policy Management Committee” to help oversee the program. The committee, which would consist of himself, Dr. Flax, Generals Schriever and Ferguson, and a Secretariat, would enable “the principals in the decisionmaking chain’’ to meet at regular intervals “to facilitate agreement on major policy matters.” Colonel Schultz and Mr. Ross subsequently submitted several alternative management proposals to the Under Secretary which, in general, incorporated some of the ideas contained in AFSC’s original 1964 plan. 10 While these activities were under way, General Schriever undertook to strengthen his own management structure. He designated Brig Gen Harry L. Evans, who was nearing the end of a two-year tour of duty with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), as his Assistant Deputy Commander for Space for MOL. Evans, who had previously worked under General Schriever at the Ballistic Systems Division, had had major responsibilities for a number of early USAF satellite systems. On 30 October 1964 the AFSC Commander informed Dr. McMillan that he planned to bring General Evans into his headquarters; he again urged him to provide the toplevel management needed to insure program success. 11 In early January 1965 the AFSC commander’s yearlong campaign for better MOL management began to produce some results. Dr. McMillan decided that General Evans could be of great help in the: Office of the Secretary of the Air Force in overseeing the new MOL studies. He directed Dr. Flax to seek General Evans’ immediate release from the JCS. Since his tour was to end 1 February 1965, this proved to be no problem. General Evans promptly reported in and was provided temporary office space in the conference room of the NRO staff, then under the direction of Brig Gen James T. Stewart ‡ . 12 Meanwhile, McMillan discussed his MOL management plan— the establishment of a management committee and the post of Special Assistant for MOL (Evans’ title)— with Cyrus Vance, the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Vance agreed that management would be a “dominant factor” in ensuring successful implementation of studies leading to a MOL decision. “The objective, of course,” Vance wrote McMillan on 7 January, “is the creation of a system which will allow the exercise of firm control which will unquestionably be needed to prevent the program from becoming prohibitively complex and costly, and at the same time to deal effectively with the many governmental elements that are involved in such a large program, particularly during the early stages.” 13 ‡ Gen Stewart succeeded Gen Martin, who was at this time understudying Gen Greer at the Directorate of Special Projects. On 18 January Secretary Zuckert, approving McMillan’s management plan, issued a formal order establishing a “Special Assistant for the Manned Orbiting Laboratory.” He was to report directly to the Under Secretary and “be primarily responsible for assisting the Office of the Secretary in managing the MOL Program.” In addition, he was made responsible for maintaining liaison with and providing MOL program status information to OSD and other interested government agencies, in particular to NASA. 14 McMillan described General Evans’ new assignment as being “in addition” to his assigned duty as Schriever’s Assistant Deputy Commander for MOL. In the latter capacity, Dr. McMillan said, “General Evans will be responsible, under General Schriever, for fieldlevel management of the program. His straddling of both Secretarial and working-level positions in the management structure provides him with an ideal vantage point from which to effect the important exchange of program information” with NASA. This arrangement was considered an interim organizational structure “for the study phase conducted between January and June 1965.” 15 Simultaneous with the announcement of establishment of the Office of Special Assistant, Secretary Zuckert approved formation of a MOL Policy Committee. Designated as official members of this “key policy body” were the: Secretary of the Air Force, Chairman; Under Secretary; Chief of Staff; Commander of AFSC; Assistant Secretary for Research and Development; and Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and Development. The committee was responsible for reviewing and making recommendations on all MOL matters, including program objectives, plans, programs, schedules, and milestones. The Special Assistant was to provide the committee secretariat. 16 In notifying the Air Staff of these new management arrangements, Secretary Zuckert stressed that the success of the MOL program would depend “on how well we execute our mandate in the next few months... how rapidly we can implement this unique management concept.” He expressed belief that the MOL Policy Committee would permit “most rapid application of the broadest level of Air Force support to the program, and will insure that we have applied our best judgment and experience to MOL policies and guidance.” 17 After reviewing the new management arrangements, Secretary Vance informed McMillan that OSD had no objections to them and he advised that DDR&E was prepared to participate to the extent the Air Force considered desirable as problems arose. (Endnote 18)
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The DORIAN Files Revealed: A Compen
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Center for the Study of National Re
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Contents v Contents Foreword.......
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Contents vii Chapter XII: Congress,
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Foreword ix I am pleased to see the
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Preface xi The Dorian Files Reveale
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Introduction xiii President Lyndon
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Introduction xv as determining the
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Chapter I - Early Space Station Pla
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Chapter XI - BUDGET, DEVELOPMENTAL,
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Chapter XI - BUDGET, DEVELOPMENTAL,
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Chapter XII: CONGRESS, MOL SECURITY
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Chapter XV: THE PROJECT TERMINATED
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Chapter XVI: POST-MORTEM
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Supplemental Documents InDeX
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