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Chapter XIII - AIR FORCE/NASA COORDINATION<br />

133<br />

turnover of NASA Gemini equipment to the Air Force<br />

ceased to be an issue and, by the end of 1966, an<br />

estimated $50 million in space agency hardware had<br />

been transferred, or was scheduled for transfer, to the<br />

<strong>MOL</strong> program. 21<br />

DoD/NASA Gemini Experiments<br />

When NASA’s Gemini program was completed with<br />

the splashdown of Gemini 12 on 15 November 1966,<br />

USAF Program 631A—a series of military experiments<br />

performed during the flights—also ended. This program<br />

had origins in the McNamara-Webb agreement of<br />

January 1963 which established the Gemini Program<br />

Planning Board, whose mission was “to avoid duplication<br />

of effort in the field of manned space flight’’ between<br />

NASA and DoD. ** In March 1963 the Board formed an<br />

ad hoc study group to review and recommend military<br />

experiments for inclusion in the Gemini flight program. It<br />

subsequently proposed a series of Air Force and Navy<br />

experiments and, on 25 August, an AFSC Field Office<br />

(Detachment 2, SSD) was established at Houston to<br />

manage their integration into the Gemini program. A<br />

technical development plan covering these Program<br />

631A experiments was submitted to DDR&E and<br />

approved by him on 7 February 1964. Funding for the<br />

experiments totaled $16.1 million. 22<br />

Integration of the experiments was done to<br />

specifications developed by the Air Force and Navy<br />

experiment sponsors and SSD personnel as approved<br />

by the Gemini Program Office. Statements of work for<br />

the “Experiments Orders,” written by SSD personnel,<br />

were submitted to the Gemini Program Office. Training,<br />

mission planning, test operations, and data collection<br />

were responsibilities of the Manned Spacecraft Center,<br />

assisted and supported by Detachment 2. However,<br />

in actual practice the detachment’s project officer<br />

performed the dual role of experiment management for<br />

both the Manned Spacecraft Center and the Air Force. 23<br />

One of the most difficult management problems that<br />

emerged after the military experiments began flying—<br />

beginning with the GT-4 mission on 3 June 1965—<br />

concerned NASA’s public information policy. According<br />

to the original ad hoc study group report which set up<br />

the program, military experiments were to be flown with<br />

the understanding that the results would be handled<br />

as classified information. However, prior to the flight<br />

of Gemini 5—which was scheduled to carry a number<br />

of photographic experiments—word was received in<br />

Washington that Houston officials had decided not<br />

to withhold information from the news media about<br />

** See pp. 19-20.<br />

them. Whereupon, a team of USAF officers—including<br />

Major Robert Hermann of the <strong>MOL</strong> Program Office—<br />

visited the Manned Spacecraft Center to review<br />

NASA’s information planning for the flight. They found<br />

space agency officials determined not to compromise<br />

NASA’s information policy of full disclosure. Although<br />

MSC officials agreed to provide for special handling of<br />

photographs produced by the military experiments, this<br />

arrangement was never implemented.<br />

The result was an upsurge of public criticism during<br />

the flight of Gemini 5 on 21-29 August 1965. When<br />

information was released on the DoD photographic<br />

experiments, “a hue and cry about NASA’s peaceful<br />

image vs the military spy-in-the-sky implications” arose. ††<br />

Part of the trouble according to Lt Col Wallace C. Fry,<br />

chief of the Space Experiments Office, Headquarters<br />

AFSC, was Detachment 2’s failure to brief the<br />

astronauts on security aspects of the experiments. “As<br />

it developed,” he said, “the crew of Gemini 5 apparently<br />

was not cautioned, and the astronaut who operated<br />

the D-6 lens made comments over the space-ground<br />

radio about the superb view and definition through the<br />

Questar telephoto lens. Also, post-flight handling of the<br />

film was open to suspicion and speculation [on the part<br />

of the news media] probably due to poor planning on our<br />

part.” It did not take the Soviet Union very long to react<br />

and to accuse the United States of using Gemini 5 “to<br />

carry out reconnaissance from space.” One result of the<br />

outcry was the withdrawal of the D-6 experiment from its<br />

second planned flight. 24 (For a complete list of the DoD<br />

experiments, see Chart on the next page.)<br />

†† See pp. 134-137.<br />

Figure 53. Gemini 12 Recovery<br />

Source: CSNR Reference Collection

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