NRO-MOL_2015
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
Chapter XIII - AIR FORCE/NASA COORDINATION<br />
133<br />
turnover of NASA Gemini equipment to the Air Force<br />
ceased to be an issue and, by the end of 1966, an<br />
estimated $50 million in space agency hardware had<br />
been transferred, or was scheduled for transfer, to the<br />
<strong>MOL</strong> program. 21<br />
DoD/NASA Gemini Experiments<br />
When NASA’s Gemini program was completed with<br />
the splashdown of Gemini 12 on 15 November 1966,<br />
USAF Program 631A—a series of military experiments<br />
performed during the flights—also ended. This program<br />
had origins in the McNamara-Webb agreement of<br />
January 1963 which established the Gemini Program<br />
Planning Board, whose mission was “to avoid duplication<br />
of effort in the field of manned space flight’’ between<br />
NASA and DoD. ** In March 1963 the Board formed an<br />
ad hoc study group to review and recommend military<br />
experiments for inclusion in the Gemini flight program. It<br />
subsequently proposed a series of Air Force and Navy<br />
experiments and, on 25 August, an AFSC Field Office<br />
(Detachment 2, SSD) was established at Houston to<br />
manage their integration into the Gemini program. A<br />
technical development plan covering these Program<br />
631A experiments was submitted to DDR&E and<br />
approved by him on 7 February 1964. Funding for the<br />
experiments totaled $16.1 million. 22<br />
Integration of the experiments was done to<br />
specifications developed by the Air Force and Navy<br />
experiment sponsors and SSD personnel as approved<br />
by the Gemini Program Office. Statements of work for<br />
the “Experiments Orders,” written by SSD personnel,<br />
were submitted to the Gemini Program Office. Training,<br />
mission planning, test operations, and data collection<br />
were responsibilities of the Manned Spacecraft Center,<br />
assisted and supported by Detachment 2. However,<br />
in actual practice the detachment’s project officer<br />
performed the dual role of experiment management for<br />
both the Manned Spacecraft Center and the Air Force. 23<br />
One of the most difficult management problems that<br />
emerged after the military experiments began flying—<br />
beginning with the GT-4 mission on 3 June 1965—<br />
concerned NASA’s public information policy. According<br />
to the original ad hoc study group report which set up<br />
the program, military experiments were to be flown with<br />
the understanding that the results would be handled<br />
as classified information. However, prior to the flight<br />
of Gemini 5—which was scheduled to carry a number<br />
of photographic experiments—word was received in<br />
Washington that Houston officials had decided not<br />
to withhold information from the news media about<br />
** See pp. 19-20.<br />
them. Whereupon, a team of USAF officers—including<br />
Major Robert Hermann of the <strong>MOL</strong> Program Office—<br />
visited the Manned Spacecraft Center to review<br />
NASA’s information planning for the flight. They found<br />
space agency officials determined not to compromise<br />
NASA’s information policy of full disclosure. Although<br />
MSC officials agreed to provide for special handling of<br />
photographs produced by the military experiments, this<br />
arrangement was never implemented.<br />
The result was an upsurge of public criticism during<br />
the flight of Gemini 5 on 21-29 August 1965. When<br />
information was released on the DoD photographic<br />
experiments, “a hue and cry about NASA’s peaceful<br />
image vs the military spy-in-the-sky implications” arose. ††<br />
Part of the trouble according to Lt Col Wallace C. Fry,<br />
chief of the Space Experiments Office, Headquarters<br />
AFSC, was Detachment 2’s failure to brief the<br />
astronauts on security aspects of the experiments. “As<br />
it developed,” he said, “the crew of Gemini 5 apparently<br />
was not cautioned, and the astronaut who operated<br />
the D-6 lens made comments over the space-ground<br />
radio about the superb view and definition through the<br />
Questar telephoto lens. Also, post-flight handling of the<br />
film was open to suspicion and speculation [on the part<br />
of the news media] probably due to poor planning on our<br />
part.” It did not take the Soviet Union very long to react<br />
and to accuse the United States of using Gemini 5 “to<br />
carry out reconnaissance from space.” One result of the<br />
outcry was the withdrawal of the D-6 experiment from its<br />
second planned flight. 24 (For a complete list of the DoD<br />
experiments, see Chart on the next page.)<br />
†† See pp. 134-137.<br />
Figure 53. Gemini 12 Recovery<br />
Source: CSNR Reference Collection