26.12.2015 Views

NRO-MOL_2015

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

Chapter VIII - THE <strong>MOL</strong> PROGRAM DECISION 25 August 1965<br />

75<br />

McNamara Recommends <strong>MOL</strong><br />

Program Approval<br />

Having coordinated with all key individuals and<br />

agencies, Dr. Brown and Colonel Battle put the finishing<br />

touches to McNamara’s memo to the President. The<br />

Defense Secretary reviewed the final draft on 24 August,<br />

made several minor language changes, and that<br />

same day carried it over to the White House where he<br />

recommended to the President that they proceed with<br />

<strong>MOL</strong> project definition beginning in fiscal year 1966. 14<br />

McNamara noted that Congress was currently in<br />

process of appropriating $150 million for the program<br />

(requested the previous January) and that he had<br />

previously indicated he would defer release of funds<br />

until such time as studies of the nature and value of the<br />

problem were satisfactorily completed. These studies, he<br />

told the President, had been completed and—based on<br />

his review of their conclusions—he now recommended<br />

release of the $150 million, initiation of a contract<br />

definition phase, and that the program proceed toward<br />

the following goals:<br />

a. Semi-operational use beginning in<br />

late 1968 to secure photographs of<br />

{better than one foot} resolutions<br />

of significant targets. This is<br />

{significantly} better than the best<br />

satellite photography we are now<br />

obtaining, and {largely} better<br />

than the best U-2 photographs or<br />

the G3 satellite system, now under<br />

development, from which we expect<br />

photographs in about 15 months.<br />

b. Development of high-resolution<br />

optical technology and systems for<br />

either manned or unmanned use. This<br />

technology will provide the {target}<br />

resolution and be aimed at ultimately<br />

even better resolution {than the<br />

initial target resolution}.<br />

c. Provision of a facility for the<br />

development, test and use of other<br />

potential military applications<br />

such as SIGINT collection, radar<br />

observation and ocean surveillance,<br />

as the utility and feasibility of such<br />

applications became established.<br />

d. Provision of an experimental program<br />

for determination of man’s ability in<br />

assembling large structures, and in<br />

adjusting, maintaining and processing<br />

the output from complex military<br />

equipment in space. 15<br />

McNamara recommended that the <strong>MOL</strong> program be<br />

operated under the <strong>NRO</strong> security guidelines which<br />

already existed for military space projects. The idea, he<br />

said, was “to help avoid provocation in the international<br />

arena, and to forestall initiation of international action<br />

that might prevent the United States from using satellites<br />

for reconnaissance.” He reported that DoD planned<br />

to pursue a modest and low key public information<br />

program and that the announced mission of <strong>MOL</strong> would<br />

continue to be expressed solely as “the investigation<br />

and development of orbital capabilities, manned and<br />

unmanned, associated with national defense.”<br />

The Defense Secretary advised the President that<br />

he had received the concurrence of Secretary Rusk,<br />

Admiral Raborn, Dr. Hornig, and Mr. Webb, and that<br />

Vice President Humphrey also endorsed program goahead.<br />

The Director of the Bureau of the Budget, he<br />

reported, had withdrawn his original objection, subject<br />

to a future program reappraisal of costs. McNamara<br />

said further that, in his view, there was a vital national<br />

need for reconnaissance photography with resolutions of<br />

{the planned resolution} or better. He noted that during<br />

the Cuban crisis the United States had made a special<br />

reconnaissance effort “to acquire pictures having the<br />

detail and the credibility that were necessary to verify and<br />

to convince others of the nature of the military activity in<br />

Cuba.” In other future situations, he thought it might be<br />

important to accomplish these same ends. With {target}<br />

resolution, the nation also would be able to assess such<br />

military factors as the {...} nature of various Russian antimissile<br />

deployments. 16<br />

The defense chief advised that he had incorporated<br />

several of Dr. Hornig’s suggestions concerning an<br />

unmanned system and that designs of the new devices<br />

needed for the unmanned operational mode would be<br />

pursued. He said:<br />

It is my intention that the system<br />

will be designed so that it can<br />

operate without a man. It will<br />

operate somewhat differently,<br />

however, (and with improved overall<br />

effectiveness) with a man. Whether<br />

Dr. Hornig met with Dr. Brown on 23 August and the two men agreed<br />

that the Air Force would pursue development of the automatic system<br />

simultaneously with the manned <strong>MOL</strong>.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!