NRO-MOL_2015
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Chapter VIII - THE <strong>MOL</strong> PROGRAM DECISION 25 August 1965<br />
75<br />
McNamara Recommends <strong>MOL</strong><br />
Program Approval<br />
Having coordinated with all key individuals and<br />
agencies, Dr. Brown and Colonel Battle put the finishing<br />
touches to McNamara’s memo to the President. The<br />
Defense Secretary reviewed the final draft on 24 August,<br />
made several minor language changes, and that<br />
same day carried it over to the White House where he<br />
recommended to the President that they proceed with<br />
<strong>MOL</strong> project definition beginning in fiscal year 1966. 14<br />
McNamara noted that Congress was currently in<br />
process of appropriating $150 million for the program<br />
(requested the previous January) and that he had<br />
previously indicated he would defer release of funds<br />
until such time as studies of the nature and value of the<br />
problem were satisfactorily completed. These studies, he<br />
told the President, had been completed and—based on<br />
his review of their conclusions—he now recommended<br />
release of the $150 million, initiation of a contract<br />
definition phase, and that the program proceed toward<br />
the following goals:<br />
a. Semi-operational use beginning in<br />
late 1968 to secure photographs of<br />
{better than one foot} resolutions<br />
of significant targets. This is<br />
{significantly} better than the best<br />
satellite photography we are now<br />
obtaining, and {largely} better<br />
than the best U-2 photographs or<br />
the G3 satellite system, now under<br />
development, from which we expect<br />
photographs in about 15 months.<br />
b. Development of high-resolution<br />
optical technology and systems for<br />
either manned or unmanned use. This<br />
technology will provide the {target}<br />
resolution and be aimed at ultimately<br />
even better resolution {than the<br />
initial target resolution}.<br />
c. Provision of a facility for the<br />
development, test and use of other<br />
potential military applications<br />
such as SIGINT collection, radar<br />
observation and ocean surveillance,<br />
as the utility and feasibility of such<br />
applications became established.<br />
d. Provision of an experimental program<br />
for determination of man’s ability in<br />
assembling large structures, and in<br />
adjusting, maintaining and processing<br />
the output from complex military<br />
equipment in space. 15<br />
McNamara recommended that the <strong>MOL</strong> program be<br />
operated under the <strong>NRO</strong> security guidelines which<br />
already existed for military space projects. The idea, he<br />
said, was “to help avoid provocation in the international<br />
arena, and to forestall initiation of international action<br />
that might prevent the United States from using satellites<br />
for reconnaissance.” He reported that DoD planned<br />
to pursue a modest and low key public information<br />
program and that the announced mission of <strong>MOL</strong> would<br />
continue to be expressed solely as “the investigation<br />
and development of orbital capabilities, manned and<br />
unmanned, associated with national defense.”<br />
The Defense Secretary advised the President that<br />
he had received the concurrence of Secretary Rusk,<br />
Admiral Raborn, Dr. Hornig, and Mr. Webb, and that<br />
Vice President Humphrey also endorsed program goahead.<br />
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget, he<br />
reported, had withdrawn his original objection, subject<br />
to a future program reappraisal of costs. McNamara<br />
said further that, in his view, there was a vital national<br />
need for reconnaissance photography with resolutions of<br />
{the planned resolution} or better. He noted that during<br />
the Cuban crisis the United States had made a special<br />
reconnaissance effort “to acquire pictures having the<br />
detail and the credibility that were necessary to verify and<br />
to convince others of the nature of the military activity in<br />
Cuba.” In other future situations, he thought it might be<br />
important to accomplish these same ends. With {target}<br />
resolution, the nation also would be able to assess such<br />
military factors as the {...} nature of various Russian antimissile<br />
deployments. 16<br />
The defense chief advised that he had incorporated<br />
several of Dr. Hornig’s suggestions concerning an<br />
unmanned system and that designs of the new devices<br />
needed for the unmanned operational mode would be<br />
pursued. He said:<br />
It is my intention that the system<br />
will be designed so that it can<br />
operate without a man. It will<br />
operate somewhat differently,<br />
however, (and with improved overall<br />
effectiveness) with a man. Whether<br />
Dr. Hornig met with Dr. Brown on 23 August and the two men agreed<br />
that the Air Force would pursue development of the automatic system<br />
simultaneously with the manned <strong>MOL</strong>.