NRO-MOL_2015

108 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Compendium of the NRO’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory Documents
Sensor Development Slippage
The Systems Office’s costing exercises had scarcely
gotten under way when MOL officials received more bad
news. On 9 December, the Eastman Kodak Company,
the DORIAN sensor contractor, dispatched a letter to
Gen. Martin advising that the firm would be unable to
fulfill its original commitment to deliver the first optical
sensor in January 1969 for a planned April 1969 first
manned launch ‡ . Company officials stated they would
require a 10-month extension, with delivery of the first
flight optics taking place about 15 October 1969 and the
first manned launch slipping to mid-January 1970.
This unexpected development was discussed at a West
Coast management review meeting on 20 December
1965, attended by Foster, Flax, Schriever, Evans,
Martin, and other officials. They decided that General
Martin should immediately initiate an investigation and
review of the Eastman Kodak schedule, while Dr. Foster
made arrangements to travel to Rochester, N.Y. (on
22 December) to discuss the problem with company
executives. 7 General Schriever’s reaction was that the
Air Force should not accept the new Eastman Kodak
schedule “at this time.” On 30 December he suggested
to Berg and Martin that, in drawing up their plans, they
continue to aim for a late 1969 launch. 8
They agreed, pending a detailed review of Eastman
Kodak’s schedule and costs, not to accept as final the
proposed schedule slippage, although Berg noted that a
lengthy schedule slip would have at least one beneficial
effect of nearly fitting “the constraint of FY 67 expenditures
of approximately $230 million.” 9 Meanwhile, General
Martin organized a committee of Special Projects
officers who proceeded to Rochester (5-8 January
1966) to review in some detail the company’s schedule
information, the reasoning and philosophy behind it, and
its physical and personnel resources. The information
collected was subsequently compared with the Special
Project Directorate’s several year’s experience in
acquiring several unmanned reconnaissance systems.
Among other things, they noted that the development time
for three unmanned systems—with sensors substantially
smaller than the planned DORIAN optics—ranged from
19 to 33 months (from time of program go-ahead to the
first fight), whereas the proposed new Eastman Kodak
schedule would require 51 months (from the October
1965 contract signing to the first flight in January 1970). 10
On 20 January, after being briefed on the above
review, Dr. Flax also travelled to Rochester to discuss
the MOL sensor schedule with company officials and
‡ These dates were agreed upon in July 1965 during discussions between
company officials and Dr. McMillan.
examine ways of compressing it to achieve an earlier
launch. 11 During his conversations with these officials,
Flax suggested that they consider a less conservative
approach. On his return to Washington, the NRO
Director wired General Martin requesting he prepare at
least two DORIAN schedules—one for the “baseline”
Eastman Kodak proposal and the other a compressed
schedule which would provide a launch “at least six
months earlier.” 12
On 28 January, in response to Flax’s suggestion,
Eastman Kodak submitted a new DORIAN development
schedule to the Directorate of Special Projects,
designated Plan B. It would eliminate the prototype
compatibility model flight article and accelerate delivery
of the qualification model even before the latter had
been completely qualified. § By taking this approach, the
company stated it could deliver the first Flight Model (FM-
1) in April 1969 as opposed to October 1969. However,
Special Projects considered this plan undesirable from
the viewpoint of “quality assurance” and it asked the firm
to take another look at the schedule problem. 13
Whereupon, Eastman Kodak prepared and submitted a
third alternate proposal (Plan C) on 9 February. It called
for delivery of FM-1 in July 1969 while still retaining
the compatibility model and completing qualification
model testing prior to the launch of the first flight sensor.
Applying the normal delivery-to-launch time span of three
months, this meant that the first “all-up” DORIAN sensor
could be launched in October 1969. Company officials
warned, however, that they required a prompt go-ahead
on construction of essential new facilities to maintain
this schedule. On 15 March, after further meetings and
discussions with Special Projects personnel, the firm
submitted a revised schedule which called for delivery
of a Camera Optical Assembly (COA) at Rochester 37
months from the day the Air Force authorized new facility
construction . 14
Several weeks later, however—at the MOL monthly
management review meeting on 2 April 1966—Mr. John
Sewell of Eastman Kodak advised there would be a new
two-month slip in the delivery of the FM-1 optical system,
from 15 July to 15 September 1969. He attributed this to
Air Force delay in authorizing construction of facilities, the
problem of acquisition of long lead items of equipment,
§ The compatibility model, integrated with the Mission Module forward
section and the Laboratory Vehicle, was to be used to check out interfaces and
system operation. The purpose of the qualification model was to demonstrate
the system’s ability to meet performance requirements in a simulated space
environment.
These facilities included a new steel frame building and a masonry building
about 141,200 square feet to house several test chambers, plus various
items of equipment. Total estimated costs of facilities and equipment was
$32,500,000. [See Memo for Record (TS-DORIAN), prep by Col R. C. Randall,
25 Mar 66, subj: Status on DORIAN Facilities and ASE Requirements]