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150 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Compendium of the NRO’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory Documents Trouble on the Congressional Front The CIA’s arguments reinforced Bohlen’s doubts and opposition from the Bureau of the Budget, which had been unenthusiastic about MOL from the start. In addition, Air Force officials saw the program undermined somewhat, perhaps inadvertently, before key members of Congress. This occurred during an NRO briefing on 21 March 1968 for Chairman Mahon of the House Appropriations Committee and Congressmen Frank T. Bow and Glennard P. Lipscomb. Representing DoD were Drs. Foster and Flax,{ a NRO finance official}, and Col. David Carter of the Office of Space Systems, who made the formal presentation. Also in attendance were three CIA representatives. During his presentation, Carter referred at one point to the development of GAMBIT 3 and declared that its design goal was {better than one foot} ground resolution. The system’s current performance, he said, was at the 13 to 15 inch level. At this point, Chairman Mahon remarked that the products looked so good that “we ought to be able to slip the MOL.” 28 After Carter concluded his briefing, Dr. Foster sought to allay any doubts raised about MOL by the presentation. He explained to the Congressmen that he had begun the November-December budget “scrubdown” with the intent of reducing MOL funds to the $400 million level in fiscal year 1969, which he had thought was feasible. However, he had finally become convinced that $600 million was the lowest level at which the DoD could have a viable program. Concerning the resolution question, he reiterated his belief that there was a need for MOL, that the {anticipated best resolution} product would greatly add to U.S. knowledge of many facets of Soviet and Chinese military capabilities. He also cited McNamara’s view that the MOL system would be extremely useful in an arms agreement role. 29 On 25 March, at a follow-up NRO program review with selected members of the Mahon committee, Mr. Robert L. Michaels, the chief staff assistant to the chairman, asked whether the intelligence community had “indicated a requirement” for the MOL program. Dr. Flax, the NRO Director and a strong MOL supporter, replied it had initially, but that there had been a change with the change of the top leadership in CIA and OSD. He said that when Mr. McNamara left office several weeks earlier, he had been convinced “that there was a vital need for the MOL system and the resolution that it will provide...” The MOL Program, Flax argued, was the only one ‘’in which a high resolution reconnaissance system is being developed.” Further, he believed that “the present resolution obtained from the GAMBIT 3 system is not sufficient to do the complete analysis of the Tallinn Missile Systen.” When Michaels pointed out that the MOL system would not be available for some time, Flax countered by saying that the United States would be facing “other Tallinn’s in the future.” At this point, Chairman Mahon specifically asked Foster and Flax if they were in favor of the MOL system. Both answered “Yes.” 30 Turning to the CIA representative, Mr. Carl Duckett, Mahon asked about the agency’s views. Duckett replied that Director Helms had reservations “with respect to the value of the very high resolution in - view of the cost of the system,” that he was not opposed to MOL, but felt the time had come to study the system again to confirm the value of its product versus the cost of acquisition. (The conclusions of this review, completed in May, have been noted above.) Toward the close of the meeting, when the discussion turned to MOL’s fiscal year 1969 fund requirements, Dr. Foster remarked that the program was “not the softest spot in the DoD budget.” 31 Unfortunately, the financial pressures on the defense budget continued to increase and directly affect MOL. In the spring of 1968, before Congress agreed to pass the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act (the surtax) as requested by President Johnson, it required him to cut $6 billion from fiscal year 1969 government disbursements. Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, McNamara’s successor, subsequently established a special project aimed at getting the Department of Defense to absorb $3 billion of the reduction. DoD’s cost-reduction effort seems to have stimulated the Congressional Quarterly, a private publication which covered the activities of Congress, to print an article on 28 June 1968 which declared that there was $10.8 billion in ‘’fat” in the defense budget. Specifically, the Quarterly homed in on the MOL program as an area “ripe for cuts,” and declared the time had come “in this period of revaluation of national priorities and objectives” to raise questions about that Air Force program. 32 Greatly concerned about possible severe program cuts, General Stewart in early July 1968 met with a staff member of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Mr. William W. Woodruff. The Vice Director explained he had no doubt that MOL would have to make its contribution to the general defense budgetary cuts. However, he feared the amount of the cut might seriously affect the schedule and total program costs. He reviewed the extensive reprogramming exercise which had been conducted in December 1967 and stated that, if the FY 1969 NOA was cut to $400 million, it would be necessary “to publicly terminate the program and continue payload development in the black.” In his view, he said, $520 million would be the minimum figure at which the
Chapter XIV - NEW FINANCIAL AND SCHEDULE PROBLEMS 1967-1968 151 program “could remain viable.” Stewart also expressed particular concern over the possible “double jeopardy” the program faced with regard to a Senate cut, followed by an OSD cut, to meet the $3 billion reduction goal. In response, Woodruff assured him the Senate cuts would be applied to the DoD quota and that Senator Russell could probably hold the committee “to a reasonable reduction in MOL.” 33 Subsequently, Congress authorized an FY 1969 MOL appropriation of $515 million, a figure acceptable to Foster, Brown, Flax, and Stewart. Months before the bill was passed, the MOL Systems Office was directed to restructure the program “based on a NOA of $515 million in FY 1969 and $600 million in FY 1970,” which would require another slip in the launch schedule. On 15 July the MOL Systems Office convened a four-day conference of the associate contractors to once again readjust the program and schedule to fit the reduced funding. An observer, Lt Col Bertram Kemp, of the MOL Program Office, noted ‘’a considerable amount of demurral” from the contractors over the schedule adjustments, which they apparently had not expected. In the end, they agreed to change the flight schedule to slip the first manned launch from August to December 1971. No changes were made in the program’s technical content. The revised schedule was reaffirmed on 25 July at a meeting of contractor program managers at Valley Forge, Pa. 34 By year’s end, Air Force officials had successfully navigated MOL through the financial shoals of 1968 and still had a program which they considered viable. At this time, they were watching with interest the activities of the new President-elect, Richard M. Nixon, as he undertook to organize his administration. They were hopeful they would receive the DORIAN support of the new Chief Executive, whose campaign literature had pledged a strengthened military space program. At year’s end General Stewart and his staff were making plans to brief the new defense chief and his aides and other officials who would take office in early 1969.
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The DORIAN Files Revealed: A Compen
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Center for the Study of National Re
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Contents v Contents Foreword.......
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Contents vii Chapter XII: Congress,
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Foreword ix I am pleased to see the
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Preface xi The Dorian Files Reveale
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Introduction xiii President Lyndon
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Introduction xv as determining the
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Chapter I - Early Space Station Pla
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Chapter II - A National Space Stati
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Chapter III - DYNA-SOAR KILLED, MOL
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Chapter IV: PLANNING THE MANNED ORB
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Chapter V: EVOLUTION OF THE MOL MAN
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Chapter VI: RESULTS OF THE PRE-PHAS
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Chapter VII: THE LABORATORY VEHICLE
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Chapter VIII: THE MOL PROGRAM DECIS
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Chapter IX: ORGANIZING FOR CONTRACT
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Chapter X - THE MANNED/UNMANNED SYS
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