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156 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Compendium of the NRO’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory Documents After key members of the Nixon Administration were sworn in—among them were the new, Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. Robert S. Seamans, Jr. and the new Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Robert P. Mayo— they were scheduled for a series of briefings on various defense programs. In the case of MOL, Air Force officials originally were allotted only 20 to 30 minutes to brief Deputy Secretary Packard. One of his staff members, Dr. Ivan Selin of OSD’s Office of Systems Analysis (a holdover from the Johnson Administration) advised the new defense official that he did not believe MOL photography was very significant to the Defense Department or, if it was, there were far cheaper ways to get it. When they learned of this statement, Drs. Foster and Flax † recommended to Mr. Packard that he give them an opportunity to provide him a separate and more in-depth MOL review. He agreed and the briefing was scheduled for Saturday, 8 February 1969. 7 The presentation on 8 February was made by General Stewart. Sitting in on the briefing were Drs. Brown, Foster, Flax, and Selin; Mr. Moot and General Carroll of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Both during Stewart’s presentation and the ensuing discussion, Foster, Brown, Flax, and Carroll expressed favorable opinions on the value to DoD of the information “derivable from very high resolution photography” and strongly supported the existing MOL program for that purpose. They concurred that very high resolution photography ‘’is of significant value to DoD in [making] multi-billion dollar R&D and force structure decisions.’’ Stewart said that MOL was the best way to have a VHR photographic capability at an early date and that the Air Force had proceeded very deliberately to insure very high confidence in an operational system. He said that the program was ‘’strictly dollar-paced” and that its status was such that “sizable dollars must be invested in FY 70 and 71 to avoid gross stretch-out, inefficiency and waste.” Packard’s reaction to this briefing was later reported to MOL officials as being “reasonably favorable.” 8 However, two other important agencies—the CIA and BOB—came forward with generally unfavorable or anti- MOL views. Based on information obtained from the CIA, Mr. Mayo on 13 February 1969 submitted a lengthy paper to Packard in which he questioned the value of MOL photography. He argued that other unmanned systems— such as GAMBIT-3 and SIGINT satellites—were or soon would be providing all the necessary information needed by DoD to make essential force decisions. He noted that the Director of Central Intelligence had “seriously questioned the benefits or value of the MOL’s {anticipated resolution} photography “compared to that of the present † Dr. Foster was retained by Mr. Nixon as DDR&E. Dr. Flax departed to join the Institute of Defense Analysis. {better than 12 inch} photography of the G-3. ‡ ” Mayo stated that improvements in the resolution and orbital life of the “proficient G- 3” made it “highly questionable that the MOL’s marginal improvement beyond an already impressive capability is worth the huge cost.” 9 Assisted by the staff of the MOL Program Office, CSD officials were given an opportunity to critique the Mayo paper and counter its arguments. They remarked that, on a comparable basis, MOL would be far superior to the G-3 satellites in detecting aircraft, missiles, submarines, defense missiles, armed vehicles, and other enemy equipment. They also stated that MOL photography would make a significant contribution to policing an arms limitation agreement, that it had the potential to obtain VHR photos of targets and areas during periods of international crisis and tension, and that it would contribute to decisions on future force structures. 10 The Fight to Save the Program Secretary Laird, meanwhile, had been scrutinizing the last defense budget (totaling $80.6 billion) submitted by President Johnson, with the idea of reducing it by at least $3 billion. In the case of MOL, he tentatively decided to drop the unmanned vehicles 6 and 7 and replace them with an additional manned vehicle. This was expected to produce an estimated saving of $20 million. On 19 February 1969, Stewart forwarded information on Laird’s decision—subsequently made firm—to Bleymaier. 11 The same day this message went out, OSD/BOB officials met to review Mayo’s paper on MOL and GAMBIT-3. Afterwards, Packard asked the Air Force for additional information on MOL. Specifically, he wanted financial data on various alternative MOL programs, including one consisting of only three manned flights, and a “sustaining program which would minimize FY 1970 funding.” A week later, on 26 February, Secretary Seamans forwarded information to Packard on four alternative MOL programs. In the case of the “minimum sustaining’’ one, he noted that: ‡ The tendency of officials to speak of a projected design capability in the present-tense was a familiar problem. During a briefing at Eastman Kodak in May 1969 given to a visiting group, when a project manager spoke of a GAMBIT-3 resolution of {better than 9”} without qualifications, Lt. Col. Daniel Lycan of the MOL Program Office objected. Based on his complaint to the briefer, an informal poll was taken of various members of the visiting group “to see what they understood would be the resolution..They answered {a resolution better than 12 inches} and then {and even better resolution.} The briefer then attempted to clarify the point that G-3 “was not now getting {the desired resolution}, but this figure was the design goal.” Colonel Lycan, however, felt his statement was not “a sufficient qualifier.” [Memo for the Record by Col Lycan, 26 May 69, subj: Visit of EXTRAND Gp to EKC.]
Chapter XV - THE PROJECT TERMINATED 157 A program to minimize FY 70 funding might entail a 50 percent reduction in [the] work force § , new material purchases, etc. Approximately $275- 400 million would be required in FY 70 to maintain personnel competency and fast readiness. A delay of more than one year in development prior to the first manned flight would result and total program costs would increase more than $360 million. In order to maintain a capability to pick up the present program pace at the beginning of FY 71, a smaller work force reduction would be appropriate, new material purchases limited, etc. Approximately $360 million would be required in FY 1970 for this alternative. The impact would be a one year stretchout in development prior to the first manned flight and a total program cost increase of approximately $260 million. 12 As an alternative to the existing programs, Air Force officials recommended a four manned vehicle program (dropping the unmanned vehicles as already decided by Laird). Citing it as a “more clearly desirable” approach, Seamans said the four manned MOL program would protect until December 1970—with minimum commitment of funds—”a continuing very high resolution operational reconnaissance capability in the 1970s, provide time in which to carefully assess other options, and sustain a minimum cost development program leading to manned or unmanned operational systems.” If this course of action were to be adopted, Seamans suggested that OSD fund the program “at no less than $556 million” in fiscal year 1970. 13 OSD responded favorably, apparently influenced by former Congressman Laird, who had previously criticized one of his predecessors Secretary McNamara, for not putting enough resources into the MOL program. On 6 March 1969 Packard directed Foster to proceed with the four manned MOL program as recommended, with funding of $556 million in FY 1970. The first manned launch would take place in February 1972 and the fourth in September 1973. This program was expected to reduce total MOL development costs by approximately $200 million. 14 However, the decision did not stand up, due in part to a growing revolt in Congress-fed by critics in the press and university communities—against the “military-industrial complex”. Thus, a local publication, The Washington Monthly, published a lengthy article by a former DoD employee, Mr. Robert S. Benson , titled “How the Pentagon Can Save $9 Billion.” His article was placed into the Congressional Record on 26 February 1969 by a vociferous critic of military spending, Representative John Brademas (D-Ind). Benson’s article led off with an attack on MOL, which he declared “receives a half a billion dollars a year and ought to rank dead last on any rational scale of national priorities.” The program he declared, was “a carbon copy” of NASA’s spacecraft operation and the only reason it was in the budget was “because the Air Force wants a piece of the extraterrestrial action, with its glamor and glory, and Congress has been only too happy to oblige.” Benson recommended the program be terminated, thus saving the nation $576 million in fiscal year 1970. 15 In addition to this public attack on MOL, the critics were out in full cry against President Nixon’s decision to proceed with development of a modified version of the Army’s Sentinel anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system. On 1 March he told a televised news conference that, instead of deploying ABM batteries around the nation’s cities as originally proposed by the Johnson Administration, he had decided that the defensive missiles should be located to defend the Air Force’s missile retaliatory force. This revised ABM program renamed Safeguard, became the focus of much anti-Pentagon sentiment in and out of Congress. Members of the President’s own party vowed to fight passage of the authorization bill in the Senate. Although the growing ABM debate dominated the news, General Stewart—who had been briefing key members of the House and Senate on MOL during February and March—soon was made aware that it was not being ignored by the critics. Thus, during a 5 March 1969 DORIAN briefing of Congressman Durward Hall (Rep., Mo.), the Representative urged him to release more information on the program. He expressed concern about the comments from Congressmen “who have not been completely informed on the MOL Program” and thought it might be “judged unfavorably by those who did not know its specific purpose.” 16 This unrest also reached certain important staff members, such as John R. Blandford of the House Armed Services Committee, previously considered sympathetic. When Stewart during a briefing told him the cost of MOL would increase to $3 billion by fiscal year 1973, Blandford remarked that the § There were about 15,000 Associate Contractor personnel aboard at this time, about 85 percent of the expected peak work force. Benson served in the OSD Comptroller Office.
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The DORIAN Files Revealed: A Compen
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Center for the Study of National Re
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Contents v Contents Foreword.......
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Contents vii Chapter XII: Congress,
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Foreword ix I am pleased to see the
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Preface xi The Dorian Files Reveale
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Introduction xiii President Lyndon
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Introduction xv as determining the
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Chapter I - Early Space Station Pla
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Chapter II - A National Space Stati
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Chapter III - DYNA-SOAR KILLED, MOL
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Chapter IV: PLANNING THE MANNED ORB
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Chapter V: EVOLUTION OF THE MOL MAN
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Chapter VI: RESULTS OF THE PRE-PHAS
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Chapter VII: THE LABORATORY VEHICLE
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Chapter VIII: THE MOL PROGRAM DECIS
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Chapter IX: ORGANIZING FOR CONTRACT
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