NRO-MOL_2015

Chapter III - DYNA-SOAR KILLED, MOL APPROVED
25
DYNA-SOAR KILLED, MOL APPROVED
As noted earlier, about the time of the signing of the
January 1963 Gemini agreement, McNamara asked his
staff to review and compare the Air Force’s Dyna-Soar
(X-20) with Gemini. This unexpected review troubled
USAF officials since only a year before the Secretary
had authorized the Air Force to drop its suborbital flight
plan (approved by OSD in April 1959)and go directly
to an orbital flight test program. The Air Force was
strongly committed to Dyna-Soar—a piloted orbital
space glider which could effect a controlled landing in a
conventional manner at a selected landing site—as its
best hope for achieving an operational space capability
by the late 1960s.
But despite the earlier approval, the Secretary of
Defense apparently retained many doubts about Dyna-
Soar, as he made clear in remarks before a congressional
committee in February 1963:
I personally believe that rather
substantial changes lie ahead of
us in the Dyna-Soar program, but we
are not prepared to recommend them
to you yet. I say this, in part,
because of the Gemini development.
Gemini is a competitive development
with Dyna-Soar in the sense that
each of them are designed to provide
low earth orbit manned flight with
controlled re-entry. Dyna-Soar does
it one way, and with flexibility, and
Gemini another.
We are very much interested...in
the Gemini project. When we become
more familiar with it and understand
better its potential I suspect it
will have a great influence on the
future of Dyna-Soar...
The real question is: What do we have
when we finish (Dyna-Soar)? It will
cost to complete, in total, including
funds spent to date, something on
the order of $800 million to $1
billion. The question is: Do we
meet a rather ill- defined military
requirement better by proceeding
down that track, or do we meet it
better by modifying Gemini in some
joint project with NASA?” 1
The Dyna-Soar/Gemini Review
With these questions in mind, on 18 January 1963,
McNamara requested DDR&E to undertake the review.
Specifically, he asked to be provided information on the
extent to which Dyna-Soar would provide “a valuable
military capability” not provided by Gemini, as well
as the extent to which NASA’s spacecraft “as then
conceived, could meet military requirements.” A few
days later the Air Force was directed to submit a paper
detailing its position. 2
The task of preparing the USAF position paper was
assigned to Maj Gen Richard D. Curtin, Director of
Development Plans, who was assisted by AFSC and
Air Staff representatives. Completed on 26 February,
the paper proclaimed Dyna-Soar as “the single most
important USAF development project,” and “fundamental
to the preservation of the image of the Air Force for the
future.” The project was fully justified on the grounds it
was expanding the nation’s reservoir of scientific and
technological knowledge. The Air Force argued that
Dyna-Soar was not competitive with Gemini and was a
logical extension of the X-15 type of research vehicle. 3
While the Curtin paper was being coordinated within
the Headquarters, General LeMay voiced concern over
the latest “crisis” and he suggested that it might have
resulted from the Air Force’s enthusiasm and efforts
to obtain a role in the Gemini project. On 2 March he
urged Secretary Zuckert to clarify the USAF viewpoint
with OSD. He said the Air Force might have inadvertently
given the Secretary of Defense the impression that
Figure 21. X-15 Research Aircraft
Source: CSNR Reference Collection