NRO-MOL_2015

Chapter VIII - THE MOL PROGRAM DECISION 25 August 1965
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the paper argued, “is bound to arouse international
suspicions and alarms, particularly since the flights will
be over Soviet territory.” 19
Some 45 private citizens expressed their opposition to
the decision in letters they wrote to various administration
officials, including the President, Secretaries McNamara
and Rusk, and Administrator Webb. Their general theme
was that the MOL would extend the arms race into space,
in contradiction to U.S. policy favoring the use of space
for peaceful purposes. A number of Congressmen also
objected. Two feared that MOL might encourage a military
space race, five argued that the project should be given
to NASA, and another complained that it would lead to
duplication of manned launch facilities on both coasts. 20
Not all editorial comment (aside from the technical and
professional journals: which generally approved the
MOL announcement) was negative. For example, The
New Republic, saw a positive aspect to the program:
It is possible that MOL will
demonstrate the feasibility of a
few American and Soviet space men
in their respective spacecraft
operating a continuous space watch.
If it does, and if both nations
exercise restraint, it could have a
stabilizing effect, as have our mutual
unmanned reconnaissance satellites.
If man can be an efficient observer in
orbit for extended periods, the time
may come when the U.S. should invite
the United. Nations to maintain a
continuous space control, with a
multinational crew to warn of any
impending or surprise attack. 21
The Soviet reaction, as expected, was critical. Tass,
the Russian news agency, commented pointedly that
some of the orbiting laboratories would be launched
from Vandenberg AFB, the firing site, it said, “for hushhush
spy satellites that fly over the territories of socialist
countries several times a day.” On 9 September Reuters
reported the remarks of Col Gen Vladimir Tolubko,
Deputy Commander-in -Chief of Soviet Strategic Rocket
Forces. Echoing a West German news account which
speculated that MOL would be able to bombard the earth
with nuclear weapons, General Tolubko declared: “Now
the Pentagon wants to use space laboratories not only for
espionage but also to accomplish direct combat tasks.”
Several weeks later, Izvestia published a lengthy
article by Col M. Golyshev, not further identified, who
attacked not only MOL but NASA’s Gemini program. He
reported that Astronauts Cooper and Conrad in Gemini
5 had carried out 17 military experiments, photographed
missile launchings from Vandenberg, and performed
“visual observations” of ground installations, in particular,
the White Sands Proving Ground. He complained
that Gemini 5 was used to check out “the possibilities
of intercepting artificial earth satellites and carrying
on reconnaissance from space.” Colonel Golyshev
concluded that MOL would be suitable “for creating
command posts in space, intercepting foreign satellites
and making reconnaissance. Such a wide range of
combat capabilities gladdens the Pentagon strategists.” 22
To the distress of the U. S. Information Agency
(USIA), the foreign press for the first time began to ask
critical quest ions about the peaceful orientation of the
American space program. Previously, the Mercury and
Gemini flights had produced highly favorable publicity
for the United States. The State Department, somewhat
disturbed by the change in tone, dispatched an airgram
in early September 1965 to all diplomatic posts. It
included a copy of the President’s MOL statement and
emphasized that the new project had no “weapons in
space” or “bombs in orbit” aspect whatever, and was
neither illegal nor different in motivation and purpose
from other defense research projects. 23
On 7 September the Department also convened a meeting
of an interagency committee (attended by State, DoD,
CIA, and USIA representatives) to discuss the overseas
reaction to Gemini 5 and the President’s announcement.
The Defense Department was represented by Lt Col
Daniel C. Mahoney and Maj Robert Hermann †† . The latter
had been assigned as an information advisor to General
Evans several months earlier.
The USIA official summarized for the committee the
world press reaction to the military implications of the
Gemini 5 flight and the MOL program, and he suggested
a high policy statement was needed to counteract
the unfavorable news coverage. In response, Major
Hermann summarized DoD’s public affairs policy for
the military space program and noted that the National
Space Act of 1958 had placed specific responsibility for
military space activities on the Department of Defense.
The MOL, he continued, did not represent a new policy by
the U.S. government but was a logical step in providing
for defense of the nation. As for countering unfavorable
news coverage, he noted that Dr. Edward C. Welsh,
executive secretary of the Space Council, had made a
number of widely publicized speeches which possibly
might satisfy the requirement for a high level statement
of national policy. 24
†† Colonel Mahoney was from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Public Affairs. Major Hermann from the USAF Office of Information.