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160 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Compendium of the NRO’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory Documents in addition, would require approximately $550 million to $575 million in fiscal years 1971 and 1972. If this proved unacceptable, Stewart suggested continuing work on the camera system only aiming toward a possible unmanned application. In this case,.he would need up to $20 million in fiscal year 1969 funds to terminate work on all MOL contracts except for the camera. Another $200-$300 million would be needed in fiscal year 1970, depending on whether a decision would be made to proceed with an unmanned system. Still another option was to “terminate the entire program.” This would require up to $30 million in additional funds to pay termination costs during the current fiscal year. 27 In a separate attachment on MOL funding experiences and the schedule slips, Stewart remarked that: FY 1970 will mark the third straight year that MOL will have been funded at a level $84 million or below program needs for a reasonable development pace, and the third straight year that development will have been stretched out and finances manipulated on the premise that adequate funding would be available “next year.” To minimize past development stretchouts and their related net increases in total program cost, the MOL Program has gradually moved toward an expenditure funding basis, and the maximum non-critical work (from a technological difficulty standpoint) has been deferred as far as possible into the future. As a result, there is no financial flexibility whatsoever in the program and the planned future workflow balance can be described as somewhat marginal. 28 The above material was subsequently reviewed by OSD and Air Force officials, as well as other possible alternatives, including melding the DORIAN and HEXAGON equipment into a single system. They finally decided that a memorandum should be prepared for the President in a final effort to save the manned system. The draft of this memorandum, worked on by Drs. Seamans and McLucas and General Stewart, sought to make the point that astronauts in a manned system would increase the likelihood of obtaining very high resolution photographs sooner, that targets would be covered in a more timely manner, and that the United States would have additional flexibility not practical in an unmanned system. 29 As reworked toward the end of April, the proposed Laird memorandum to the President—sent to Packard by Seamans—began : Your expressed desire, as reported by Mr. Mayo, that we fund MOL at less than the $525 million now requested of the Congress for FY 1970 has resulted in our making a careful reappraisal of the program. I conclude that we either should fund MOL at a level commensurate with reasonable progress for the large amounts involved, or terminate the overt manned MOL program and continue only the covert very high resolution (VHR) camera system toward future use in an unmanned satellite... 30 Meanwhile, General Stewart—who had become quite pessimistic about prospects for survival of the program—began drafting letters to be sent by Laird to chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees announcing MOL’s termination. He also wrote draft letters to be forwarded for Senators and Representatives from states that would be most seriously affected by termination. 31 While these activities were underway in the Pentagon, Budget Director Mayo and his staff were writing their own memorandum to the President urging that MOL be terminated. In this memorandum, which Mayo submitted to the President on 21 April 1969, he recalled that Mr. Nixon—before making his decision on the 9th (to terminate HEXAGON and slow down MOL)—had reviewed the option of “continuing the HEXAGON search system and the cancellation of MOL.” On reflection, Mayo wrote, there might be additional reasons for reconsidering this option. “Politically,” ‡‡ it might be desirable “to have the better performance of the HEXAGON search system to provide greater assurance, for example, to members of Congress who would be most concerned about our ability to police a strategic arms limitation agreement.” In terms of added intelligence value, he said, “the MOL is the more questionable. Cancellation of MOL and continuation of HEXAGON would provide about the same savings below the presently proposed programs, both in FY 1970 and over the next five years, as your current decision.” 32 ‡‡ Mayo’s emphasis.
Chapter XV - THE PROJECT TERMINATED 161 In an attachment to his memorandum, Mayo argued further that the urgency of achieving MOL objectives “has never been fully established.” Therefore, he thought it would not be “a serious penalty to the nation” to defer the first manned launch by a year or more ($-165 million) or to reduce the MOL effort to that of optics and payload vehicle technology ($325 million). In this paper, Mayo listed comparative costs between GAMBIT, GAMBIT-3, and MOL for each launch, which indicated that each MOL mission would run about; $150 million a year as compared to GAMBIT-3’s cost for each mission of $23 million. “The incremental value of the MOL {anticipated best} resolution,” he concluded, “is not enough of an improvement over the present spotting system (GAMBIT-3) to justify the additional cost.” 33 The White House Meeting of 17 May 1969 While the President reviewed these papers, there was a brief interregnum in early May. But news that the program ‘was in possible danger reached at least one professional journal and members of Congress. On 5 May, in a story headlined “Budget Cuts Threaten MOL Project,” Aviation Week reported that: “New financial digs into funding for Air Force’s manned orbiting laboratory (MOL) reconnaissance satellite are raising questions as to the program’s future as a whole. Dearth of funding as well as technological progress since the project’s inception could spell an end or severe readjustment to the program...” 34 The following day, during an appearance before the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Dr. Seamans commented on MOL’s financial problems. He said: It is my view that the MOL... has been underfunded the past few years. It is very difficult to run a program on a reduced budget and still have it meaningful, and it is even more difficult when the budgets are continually reduced to change the program to suit the budgetary needs. I believe that if the funding is reduced much below the present level, it would be very difficult to maintain progress and to keep up morale and achieve any meaningful results. So when this first came up after I joined the Department of Defense, the question was, should we not reduce the budget below President Johnson’s level of $576 million. I raised the question, should we not increase the budget. 35 Not long after, OSD advised Seamans that the President had agreed to receive a personal briefing on the program at the White House before making his decision. On 9 May the Air Force Secretary met with members of the MOL Policy Committee to review the entire program. Among those in attendance were Dr. McLucas, {a NRO Representative}, and Generals Ferguson, Stewart, and Bleymaier, and several others. Ferguson reported he recently had directed a Board of Air Force officers— representing the best space management talent he had available—to review the program §§ . Their conclusion, he said, was that MOL “was ready to go but it lacked the dollars necessary to proceed efficiently.” Bleymaier, in a presentation of MOL’s status, declared that the program was almost completely defined, test results to date had met or exceeded Air Force expectations, and that no technical or facility problems stood in the way of launching the first manned vehicle in mid-1972. He requested the Committee’s support for “a firm commitment” to provide him $525 million in fiscal year 1970 and $625 million in 1971. 36 Under the circumstances, Bleymaier’s request was entirely unrealistic. {The NRO Representative} later remarked that he didn’t think “anyone would give the program a firm commitment for $625 million for FY 71 in the present environment.” He pointed out that they had sought budgets of over $600 million for a number of years “but the program had never made it.” Toward the close of the meeting, Dr. Seamans requested he be provided copies of all the briefing charts for his meeting with the President. There would be no point in discussing budget details at the White House, he said, since his first job was “to save the program.” 37 On 17 May—a Saturday—Secretary Laird, Dr. Seamans, and General Stewart rode over to the White House to submit to. Mr. Nixon “the counter-case to the BOB proposal to terminate MOL.” Among those attending this meeting were Mr. Mayo and an aide, and Dr. Henry Kissinger, the President’s adviser on international affairs. Laird opened the session by stating he believed responsible DoD officials should have the opportunity to state their case to the President on difficult, complex issues, which was why Dr. Seamans and General Stewart had been called in. After this introduction, the Air Force Secretary began his briefing. He reviewed the historical events leading to Dyna-Soar’s cancellation in 1963, the initiation of the MOL program, and the two years of study §§ Ferguson organized the Board in April 1969. The MOL Policy Committee Meeting of 9 May was convened at his request to hear the results of its review.
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The DORIAN Files Revealed: A Compen
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Center for the Study of National Re
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Contents v Contents Foreword.......
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Contents vii Chapter XII: Congress,
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Foreword ix I am pleased to see the
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Preface xi The Dorian Files Reveale
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Introduction xiii President Lyndon
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Introduction xv as determining the
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Chapter I - Early Space Station Pla
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Chapter II - A National Space Stati
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Chapter III - DYNA-SOAR KILLED, MOL
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Chapter IV: PLANNING THE MANNED ORB
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Chapter V: EVOLUTION OF THE MOL MAN
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Chapter VI: RESULTS OF THE PRE-PHAS
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Chapter VII: THE LABORATORY VEHICLE
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Chapter VIII: THE MOL PROGRAM DECIS
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Chapter IX: ORGANIZING FOR CONTRACT
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Chapter XI - BUDGET, DEVELOPMENTAL,
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