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16 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Compendium of the <strong>NRO</strong>’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory Documents Figure 18. Mercury Rocket Source: CSNR Reference Collection
Chapter II - A National Space Station 17 studies in this category, or vice versa, would inevitably involve an unduly complicated technical monitorship and unwarranted delays. 5 On 27 April McNamara and Webb met to discuss their differing interpretations of the DoD-NASA agreement and they reached a compromise of sorts. That is, the space agency head agreed that funded space station studies “should be jointly sponsored by the Department of Defense and NASA.” Webb also accepted the argument that DoD and NASA would proceed with hardware development “only by mutual consent.” 6 Air Force Proposes a National Space Station Meanwhile, the Air Force recommended that a national space station project be initiated. In a memorandum to McNamara on 18 April, Secretary Zuckert suggested that—in view of NASA’s “explicit interest” in an orbital station and USAF studies of the MODS concept—a near-earth space station project would involve an effort of major magnitude and consequently “should be undertaken as a national, rather than a departmental endeavor.” He thought responsibility for such a program should be assigned to DoD “on behalf of all national interests.” He said the assignment was logical “both because of the primary commitment of the NASA to the manned lunar landing program and because of the important military interests in near earth orbit. 7 The USAF proposal struck a responsive chord in OSD. On 25 May, Secretary McNamara advised Zuckert that he considered “the Orbital Space Static Program as one requiring a new national mission to be assigned by the President on behalf of all national interests.” He agreed that since the lunar landing assignment previously had been given to NASA, “the near-earth interests of the DoD might be considered a logical reason for assigning to the DoD this undertaking.” However, he said the program needed careful consideration before the President and Vice President were approached on the subject. He expressed confidence that, if such an assignment were made to the DoD, “the Air Force could carry out its management responsibilities cooperatively with the NASA. 8 To decide on an approach to the national space station, McNamara on 25 May proposed to NASA that the two agencies organize a “Manned Orbital Test Station Program Planning Group.” He said its primary functions would be to monitor and, where necessary, to study potential manned orbital test static programs to insure that there was no duplication of effort. He suggested that the group report to the co-chairmen of the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board (AACB). 9 On 7 June, Webb noted that the AACB had already directed its Manned Space Flight Panel to study the best method of insuring DoD-NASA coordination of studies which might lead to a manned orbital space station development. He suggested they await the outcome of the AACB staff work already underway before considering creation of a new planning group. 10 While these top-level discussions were underway, USAF and NASA representatives met and agreed informally to exchange information and requirements for their space station studies. NASA subsequently submitted to the Air Force descriptive material on all its space station studies and also provided certain of its requests for proposals. The Air Force in turn provided NASA data based on its MODS proposals. On 10 June 1963, referring to his agency’s pending study contract negotiations,Dr. Joseph F. Shea, NASA Deputy Director for Manned Space Flight (Systems), also asked General Ritland to submit those “definitive requirements” which would meet the Air Force’s space station needs in the near future. 11 On 18 June Col Donald Heaton, Director of Launch Vehicles and Propulsion, Headquarters AFSC, advised Dr. Shea that since there was general agreement one national program would serve the needs of both agencies, it appeared logical for each to sponsor separate preprogram definition studies. That is, he suggested NASA’s studies concentrate on the configuration preferable to it but supporting DoD requirements to the maximum extent possible, and vice versa. “The product of either study”, he said, ‘’should be an adequate point of departure for a national program definition phase.” Heaton also proposed that their pre-program definition studies be coordinated and that neither agency launch a program definition phase “without mutual agreement. 12 Dr. Shea agreed to more direct contact between their study programs as well as a further exchange of space station data. He informed Heaton, NASA would continue to provide the Air Force copies of all significant documents related to those studies and he requested copies of USAF requirements documents and RFP’s as they became available. In addition, he asked arrangements be made for NASA representatives to sit in on SSD briefings on its space station studies. 13 Subsequently, NASA named Dr. Michael I. Yarymovych, Assistant Director of Manned Satellite Studies, Office of Manned Space Flight, to serve as its focal point for coordinating exchange of data with the Air Force.
Page 1: The DORIAN Files Revealed: A Compen
Page 4: Center for the Study of National Re
Page 7 and 8: Contents v Contents Foreword.......
Page 9 and 10: Contents vii Chapter XII: Congress,
Page 11 and 12: Foreword ix I am pleased to see the
Page 13 and 14: Preface xi The Dorian Files Reveale
Page 15 and 16: Introduction xiii President Lyndon
Page 17 and 18: Introduction xv as determining the
Page 19 and 20: Chapter I - Early Space Station Pla
Page 33: Chapter II - A National Space Stati
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Page 43 and 44: Chapter III - DYNA-SOAR KILLED, MOL
Page 52 and 53: Chapter IV: PLANNING THE MANNED ORB
Page 54 and 55: 36 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Com
Page 64 and 65: Chapter V: EVOLUTION OF THE MOL MAN
Page 68 and 69: Chapter VI: RESULTS OF THE PRE-PHAS
Page 76 and 77: Chapter VII: THE LABORATORY VEHICLE
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66 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Com
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Chapter VIII: THE MOL PROGRAM DECIS
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Chapter IX: ORGANIZING FOR CONTRACT
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Chapter X - THE MANNED/UNMANNED SYS
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Chapter XI - BUDGET, DEVELOPMENTAL,
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Chapter XII: CONGRESS, MOL SECURITY
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Chapter XIII: AIR FORCE/NASA COORDI
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Chapter XIV: NEW FINANCIAL AND SCHE
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Chapter XV: THE PROJECT TERMINATED
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Chapter XVI: POST-MORTEM
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Supplemental Documents InDeX
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