NRO-MOL_2015

Chapter IV - PLANNING THE MANNED ORBITNG LABORATORY December 1963-June 1964
41
Policy for the Conduct of the MOL
Program
At the end of March 1964, Dr. McMillan issued a
statement of policy to govern the conduct of the
early phases of the MOL program. Once again he
emphasized that the primary objectives of the program
were experimental: “To obtain authoritative data, in an
economical way, on the possible contributions of man
to the performance of military missions in space, and to
obtain data on man’s performance sufficient to form a
basis for design and evaluation of manned systems.” He
further directed that:
No requirement to develop an
operational system will interfere
with the requirements imposed by the
experiments to be performed; cost
and schedules will be defined by the
needs of the experimental program.
Experiments will be performed on
orbit only after prior tests on
the ground and, if necessary, in
aircraft, adequately define and
justify orbital tests.
Granted that an orbital flight is
justified by its primary experimental
purposes, such secondary experiments
as are desirably and conveniently
carried along may also be included. 28
Among experimental areas of military interest, McMillan
listed “observations of the earth and earthbound events,
and detection of an interaction with other space vehicles,
both cooperative and uncooperative.” The basic function
of man was to search for and select targets or subjects
for observation, to navigate precisely, adjust and
maintain equipment, and summarize and report data. It
was expected that man would facilitate various missionrelated
experiments including detection, classification,
identification, and tracking of such targets as fixed
installations at known locations; fixed installations
having varying degrees of ambiguity as to location; and
ground vehicles, ships, space vehicles, missile launches,
explosions including nuclear, etc. 29
Like Dr. McMillan, the Director of Defense Research and
Engineering also emphasized at this time that ground
simulation is and thorough advance study would have to
precede any experimental MOL effort in space and that
orbital experiments would be designed to test man and
determine just what he could do. Dr. Brown explained
this approach during an appearance before the Senate
Committee on Aeronautics and Space Sciences:
If you just send a man up there
without knowing what experiments he
is going to do when he gets there,
what you are likely to find is that
everything he can do you have a
machine that can do just as well.
I am gradually becoming convinced
that there are some things he can
do better, but I want the experiment
specified first so when he goes up
there he will actually be able to
show he can do better.
I think I can give you one specific
example: I think a man can probably
point a telescope more accurately
than automatic equipment can.
However, unless you design the
equipment to measure that before you
send a man up, and unless you give
him a piece of equipment that will
answer that question...you are not
going to get the answer. 30
Headquarters AFSC, meanwhile, had reconciled itself
to the fact that the MOL development plan would not
be approved until it had presented to the Secretary
of Defense “a convincing account of MOL program
experiments which will satisfy the objectives of
demonstrating qualitatively and quantitatively the military
usefulness of man in space.” On 9 March General
Funk was instructed to submit a preliminary technical
development plan (PTDP)—to include descriptions of
proposed experiments—that could serve as the single
authoritative MOL reference document. 31 In a separate
letter sent to General Funk under the BYEMAN security
system, the SSD commander was advised that the
reconnaissance mission remained extremely sensitive
and that the PTDP should avoid any reference to it. 32
Several weeks before receiving this guidance, SSD
had set up a working group under General Bleymaier
to identify the proposed MOL experiments. Designated
the MOL Experiments Working Group and headed by
Col William Brady, the SSD System Program Director for
MOL, it had a membership of several dozen military and
industrial representatives. During February and March
1964 the group examined more than 400 proposed
experiments submitted by various defense and industrial