NRO-MOL_2015

More documents

Recommendations

Info

144 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Compendium of the NRO’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory Documents accept “a fund-governed program” tailored to $228 million in fiscal year 1967, $430 million in fiscal year 1968, “and whatever the approved DoD figure is in FY 1969.” Evans suggested MOL officials might consider a possible fourth option: “...decoupling the optics from the first manned flight with [the] objective being to provide a more completely man- rated system when the first- flightqualified DORIAN package becomes available.” 4 He also recommended the MOL Program Office attempt to resolve several other issues, including determining the best approach to funding future contracts (commitment versus an expenditure basis), obtaining a DX priority for the program , and reforming MOL management. This last subject was a sensitive one to Evans. For many months he had believed that existing arrangements—which had black MOL contract, development, management, and financial actions being accomplished by another Air Force activity—were ineffective. “The present management structure,” he said, “is incapable of producing a well-integrated, wellmanaged large program such as MOL.”** 5 Some of the questions posed by Evans were discussed on 10 March 1967 during a management meeting attended by Dr. Flax, General Ferguson, and other MOL officials at Andrews AFB. Systems Office personnel briefed them on proposed funding and schedule revisions which they had been examining with the contractors. They advised that, even if a 12-month schedule slip was acceptable, MOL would require additional funds beyond the $500/600 million “Bogeys” proposed by Dr. Flax. If given only $480 million in fiscal year 1968, they foresaw a slip in the first manned flight of at least 15 months. This discouraging report was subsequently reviewed by Drs. Foster and Brown, who asked that new guidance be sent to the MOL Systems Office. Future funding, the Office was informed on 17 March, was to be on “a commitment basis” and, for planning purposes, totals were not to exceed $480 and $620 million in fiscal years 1968 and 1969. The Systems Office was directed to prepare a paper on the impact of those funding levels for presentation to Pentagon officials in Washington in April. 6 The MOL schedule was reworked by MOL Systems Office personnel. They concluded that the 15-month slip in the first manned launch constituted “an optimum program from the standpoint of fund limitations” and For many months Evans had sought to obtain approval for assignment of a DX industrial priority to the program. The request was never acted upon. ** Gen Martin, previously opposed to Schriever’s plan for integrated management, on 20 April 1967 agreed that “division of management responsibility and authority on the basis of security is totally unworkable.” A major management reorganization followed, which placed all black contracting under the MOL Systems Office, effective 1 July 1967. [Ltr, Martin to Flax, Ferguson, 20 Apr 67, subj: Management Responsibilities for the MOL Program] would ease development and hardware integration problems. However, even if funding was provided on a commitment rather than an expenditure basis, they saw the program requiring $518 million in fiscal year 1968. On 15 April 1967 their conclusions were presented to a MOL management meeting attended by Flax, Ferguson, Stewart, Bleymaier †† , Martin, Berg, and others. Dr. Flax’s response was to challenge the cost estimates presented to him; it was his view that the contractor’s costs were probably inflated, “at least for the scope of work as currently defined.” He warned that the projected overall total MOL program cost rise of about half a billion dollars, if correct, might be “very detrimental” to its future and he directed the MOL Systems Office to take another look at its cost estimates. 7 The cost figures were subsequently reworked on the West Coast and forwarded to Flax and Ferguson on 2 May by General Bleymaier and Colonel Heran. In their message, they stated flatly that the funding levels of $480/600 million in fiscal years 1968 and 1969 “positively eliminate any possibility of establishing a realistic 12 month slip program.” Furthermore, those levels placed in jeopardy their ability to meet a 15-month slip, particularly if there were additional delays in contract negotiations over the new schedule and deciding on deferred items. They said that they had examined all possibilities and nothing could be further gained by efforts to hold the program to a 12-month slip. “The only hope in holding the slip to 15 months,” they said, “lies in proceeding immediately with the negotiations of a 15 month schedule slide.’’ The contractors “firm cost proposals,” based on their detailed analysis of a 15-month slip, indicated a two-year funding need for $524 and $617 million. Accordingly, the $480 million fiscal year 1968 funding limitation would produce a $44 million deficit, Bleymaier and Heran further stated that: If you entertain the possibility of placing increased emphasis on those system elements that are critical technically and schedule wise, you will effectively reduce fund availability to continue the orderly development of the total system. To date, we have proceeded on a balanced funding approach with orderly development of interfaces and testing. To deviate would seriously impair the systems approach. Expediting part of the †† Bleymaier who officially took over as Deputy Director, MOL Program, on 1 July 1967, participated in various planning exercises during the spring of 1967. He was, at this time, serving as Commander, Air Force Western Test Range, Vandenberg AFB, Calif.
Chapter XIV - NEW FINANCIAL AND SCHEDULE PROBLEMS 1967-1968 145 system could not in any case reduce schedule slip since other elements would be out of balance. 8 After reading this pessimistic report, Flax wrote to Stewart: “There must be some schedule slip at which it is cheaper to stop some efforts, but we are informed that this is impossible because it would preclude ‘orderly’ development of everything.” 9 After the two men discussed the situation, General Stewart sent a message to the MOL Systems Office advising that a meeting would be held in Washington on 11 May “to attempt to reach some understanding and agreement” on the program schedule and the ‘’near-term contractual actions to be taken.” The Systems Office would have to justify its unequivocal assertion that “all possibilities have been examined and nothing further can be gained” toward retaining the objective of a first all-up manned flight by the end of calendar year 1970. Stewart said that Dr. Flax desired the Systems Office’s views on “the maximum reasonable curtailment of Martin and McDonnell work in FY 1968, short of termination, which would permit the continuance of minimum essential engineering interfaces and the maintenance of the minimum essential supervisory and technical teams for each.” 10 Further, he stated that while he and Dr. Flax appreciated the Systems Office’s desire to have an “orderly development of the total system” and a balanced funding approach, the program “is now in a financial/schedule constraint not of our making and is in for more jeopardy than I seem to have impressed on you.” If there was any feasible way in fiscal year 1968 to work toward a first manned launch by the end of 1970, he said, “it must be identified and pursued, recognizing its possible effect on ‘orderly development of the total system.’” For their information, Stewart provided them the latest OSD planning NOA figure for fiscal year 1969—$661 million. 11 This message apparently finally convinced both the contractors and the MOL Systems Office that $480 million was all that would be made available in fiscal year 1968. At the 11 May 1967 management meeting, they agreed they could live with it. However, $480 million was still $50 million shy of the amount the President requested from Congress. Dr. Flax indicated that at least a portion of the sum ($10 million) would be obtained from Air Force internal reprogramming action and the balance sought from the congressional appropriations committees. Concerning the two alternative schedule slips—12 or 15 months—Brown, Flax, and Stewart the next day—12 May— decided to proceed with a “compact 12” schedule, pointing toward the first all-up manned flight in December 1970 and working against fiscal year 1968 and 1969 “Bogeys’’ of $480 and $661 million. The three officials agreed that the Phase II contracts and appropriate supplements should be signed as soon as possible to put the program on a sound basis. Instructions to this effect went out to the MOL Systems Office the same day. 12 On 22 May—after all the contracts had been signed—the Department of Defense announced to the public a total award of $855,072,744 to the McDonnell- Douglas Corporation for MOL engineering development work ‡‡ . The Douglas contract was for $674,703,744 and covered work on the manned laboratory vehicle; the $180,469,000 award to McDonnell covered preliminary design, development, and production of the Gemini B. On 29 May the contract award of $110,020,000 to General Electric for MOL experiment integration work also was announced. Even as this important milestone was reached, OSD and Air Force officials became increasingly concerned over the effects of the war in Southeast Asia on the DoD budget. At a meeting of the MOL Policy Committee on 1 June 1967, Secretary Brown mentioned the possibility the Air Force would face severe cuts in its research and development funds. General Stewart interjected that, based on comments made to him during his recent MOL briefing to the chairman and staff of the House Appropriations Committee, he did not think Congress would reduce the MOL budget request. However, in reviewing for the Policy Committee the status of the program, he noted that overall program costs had risen to $2.35 billion. 13 McNamara Visits Eastman Kodak During the summer of 1967 MOL officials began planning a proposed visit by McNamara to Eastman Kodak. An orientation and briefing on sensor development and the overall program was scheduled. To insure there would be no press coverage of his visit to Rochester, MOL, and other security personnel made extensive advanced preparations. One” cover” action was release of a short news item to the press stating that the Secretary of Defense would be inspecting various military installations over several weeks. The actual flight to Rochester was to ‘be made under tight security wraps. Also, to help make a case for continuation of the program, Colonel Battle and MOL Program Office personnel prepared a two volume report, titled “High Resolution Photography,” to be provided the defense chief. The report analyzed the results of all G-series of unmanned reconnaissance satellite flights and the expected MOL product. The best photos from the KH-7 ‡‡ During 1966 Douglas Aircraft ran into financial difficulties. McDonnell offered to merge with it and the corporate marriage was formally consummated late in the year.
Page 1:
The DORIAN Files Revealed: A Compen
Page 4:
Center for the Study of National Re
Page 7 and 8:
Contents v Contents Foreword.......
Page 9 and 10:
Contents vii Chapter XII: Congress,
Page 11 and 12:
Foreword ix I am pleased to see the
Page 13 and 14:
Preface xi The Dorian Files Reveale
Page 15 and 16:
Introduction xiii President Lyndon
Page 17 and 18:
Introduction xv as determining the
Page 19 and 20:
Chapter I - Early Space Station Pla
Page 21 and 22:
Page 23 and 24:
Page 25 and 26:
Page 27 and 28:
Page 29 and 30:
Page 31 and 32:
Page 33 and 34:
Chapter II - A National Space Stati
Page 35 and 36:
Page 37 and 38:
Page 39 and 40:
Page 41 and 42:
Page 43 and 44:
Chapter III - DYNA-SOAR KILLED, MOL
Page 45 and 46:
Page 47 and 48:
Page 49 and 50:
Page 52 and 53:
Chapter IV: PLANNING THE MANNED ORB
Page 54 and 55:
36 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Com
Page 56 and 57:
Page 58 and 59:
Page 60 and 61:
Page 62 and 63:
Page 64 and 65:
Chapter V: EVOLUTION OF THE MOL MAN
Page 66 and 67:
Page 68 and 69:
Chapter VI: RESULTS OF THE PRE-PHAS
Page 70 and 71:
Page 72 and 73:
Page 74 and 75:
Page 76 and 77:
Chapter VII: THE LABORATORY VEHICLE
Page 78 and 79:
Page 80 and 81:
Page 82 and 83:
Page 84 and 85:
Page 86 and 87:
Page 88 and 89:
Chapter VIII: THE MOL PROGRAM DECIS
Page 90 and 91:
Page 92 and 93:
Page 94 and 95:
Page 96 and 97:
Page 98 and 99:
Chapter IX: ORGANIZING FOR CONTRACT
Page 100 and 101:
Page 102 and 103:
Page 104 and 105:
Page 106 and 107:
Page 108:
Page 111 and 112: Chapter X - THE MANNED/UNMANNED SYS
Page 125 and 126: Chapter XI - BUDGET, DEVELOPMENTAL,
Page 134 and 135: Chapter XII: CONGRESS, MOL SECURITY
Page 136 and 137: 118 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Co
Page 144 and 145: Chapter XIII: AIR FORCE/NASA COORDI
Page 160 and 161: Chapter XIV: NEW FINANCIAL AND SCHE
Page 172 and 173: Chapter XV: THE PROJECT TERMINATED
Page 184 and 185: Chapter XVI: POST-MORTEM
Page 192 and 193: Supplemental Documents InDeX
Page 212 and 213:
194 The Dorian Files Revealed: a Co
Page 214 and 215:
Page 216 and 217:
Page 218 and 219:
Page 220 and 221:
Page 222 and 223:
Page 224 and 225:
Page 226 and 227:
Page 228 and 229:
show all

NRO-MOL_2015

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?