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Chapter IV - PLANNING THE MANNED ORBITNG LABORATORY December 1963-June 1964<br />

43<br />

<strong>MOL</strong> Pre-Phase I Go-Ahead is<br />

Approved<br />

On 10 April Dr. Flax forwarded to Dr. Brown two copies<br />

of the AFSC plan and requested funds and authority to<br />

proceed with pre- Phase I <strong>MOL</strong> activities. The Defense<br />

Research Director, after reviewing the document,<br />

reported to Secretary McNamara on 21 April that OSD-<br />

Air Force discussions had clarified the <strong>MOL</strong> experiments<br />

approach and that the Air Force had requested go-ahead<br />

authority for the pre-Phase I studies only, with funding<br />

listed as follows: 36<br />

Millions<br />

6 Experiment Study Contracts<br />

(USAF to Industry)<br />

$1.0<br />

3 Experiment Studies<br />

(Navy in-house)<br />

0.5<br />

6 Support Studies of Laboratory<br />

Subsystems<br />

1.2<br />

Gemini B. Detailed Study<br />

(McDonnell)<br />

1.0<br />

Titan III Interface Study (Martin) 1.0<br />

Apollo Applications Study<br />

(North American)<br />

0.2<br />

One-Man Gemini Applications Study<br />

(McDonnell)<br />

0.1<br />

Aerospace Corporation Support 1.0<br />

Total $6.0<br />

So that McNamara might know the spectrum and detail<br />

of the experiments already selected by the Air Force,<br />

Dr. Brown listed the 12 primary and 18 secondary<br />

experiments. He explained that the advantages of<br />

having a man in space vehicle were in his ability to<br />

recognize patterns, interpret them in real time, and report<br />

the results, and his ability to point a sensor (telescopecamera)<br />

and provide image motion compensation. He<br />

said the proposed <strong>MOL</strong> experiments should provide<br />

answers to the question whether better results could be<br />

obtained by using a man as compared to an unmanned<br />

system of the same weight. He advised he planned to<br />

release $6 million of deferred fiscal year 1964 funds<br />

for the Air Force to begin the studies-if the Defense<br />

Secretary did not object. 37<br />

On 27 April, Dr. McMillan also reported to McNamara on<br />

USAF plans for reconnaissance studies, experiments,<br />

and possible developments connected with the <strong>MOL</strong><br />

project, and <strong>NRO</strong> actions. He advised that the “black”<br />

effort was being handled within the BYEMAN control<br />

system, while certain other studies were carried out<br />

openly as part of the <strong>MOL</strong> program under normal<br />

classification. He said:<br />

Should the <strong>MOL</strong> experiments<br />

demonstrate satisfactorily that a<br />

man may be able to make important<br />

contributions to the effectiveness of<br />

satellite reconnaissance missions,<br />

it will be necessary to compare<br />

carefully the potential cost and<br />

performance of very high resolution<br />

systems, manned and unmanned. Such<br />

comparisons will require complete<br />

access to the present unmanned<br />

satellite reconnaissance program.<br />

They will be carried out exclusively<br />

by the (S) <strong>NRO</strong> as Project DORIAN. 38<br />

Based upon this information from two of his top scientific<br />

and technical advisors, Secretary McNamara authorized<br />

the start of pre-Phase I activities. Whereupon, on 29<br />

April Dr. Brown advised Zuckert of the release of the<br />

$6 million for the <strong>MOL</strong> studies. However, he laid down<br />

certain conditions by requiring the Air Force to: (1) delay<br />

contract negotiations for Apollo and one-man Gemini<br />

studies until his office had approved the proposed work<br />

statements; (2) delete experiment P-9 unless the -Air<br />

Force could show its compelling importance; and (3) give<br />

special emphasis to ground simulation testing during all<br />

experimental studies. 39<br />

On 4 May, Dr. Flax forwarded Brown’s instructions to<br />

the Vice Chief of Staff for “action as directed,” noting<br />

that AFSC would have to obtain advance approval of<br />

all work statements. AFSC and SSD, however, found<br />

the latter requirement irksome since the procedure was<br />

time-consuming and would delay the letting of contracts.<br />

The OSS study contracts were an example. The work<br />

statements, first submitted to Headquarters USAF on 19<br />

February, were not approved until 12 March, the D&F was<br />

not signed until 13 April, and authority to proceed with the<br />

contracts was not given until 20 May. Actual letting of three<br />

contracts—to Douglas, Martin-Marietta, and General<br />

Electric—was not accomplished until 27 May 1964. 40<br />

As expected, there were long delays which served to<br />

extend the contracting process through the spring and<br />

summer months. Thirteen additional contracts were<br />

awarded on the following dates: 8 June, the Gemini B

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