NRO-MOL_2015
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Chapter IV - PLANNING THE MANNED ORBITNG LABORATORY December 1963-June 1964<br />
43<br />
<strong>MOL</strong> Pre-Phase I Go-Ahead is<br />
Approved<br />
On 10 April Dr. Flax forwarded to Dr. Brown two copies<br />
of the AFSC plan and requested funds and authority to<br />
proceed with pre- Phase I <strong>MOL</strong> activities. The Defense<br />
Research Director, after reviewing the document,<br />
reported to Secretary McNamara on 21 April that OSD-<br />
Air Force discussions had clarified the <strong>MOL</strong> experiments<br />
approach and that the Air Force had requested go-ahead<br />
authority for the pre-Phase I studies only, with funding<br />
listed as follows: 36<br />
Millions<br />
6 Experiment Study Contracts<br />
(USAF to Industry)<br />
$1.0<br />
3 Experiment Studies<br />
(Navy in-house)<br />
0.5<br />
6 Support Studies of Laboratory<br />
Subsystems<br />
1.2<br />
Gemini B. Detailed Study<br />
(McDonnell)<br />
1.0<br />
Titan III Interface Study (Martin) 1.0<br />
Apollo Applications Study<br />
(North American)<br />
0.2<br />
One-Man Gemini Applications Study<br />
(McDonnell)<br />
0.1<br />
Aerospace Corporation Support 1.0<br />
Total $6.0<br />
So that McNamara might know the spectrum and detail<br />
of the experiments already selected by the Air Force,<br />
Dr. Brown listed the 12 primary and 18 secondary<br />
experiments. He explained that the advantages of<br />
having a man in space vehicle were in his ability to<br />
recognize patterns, interpret them in real time, and report<br />
the results, and his ability to point a sensor (telescopecamera)<br />
and provide image motion compensation. He<br />
said the proposed <strong>MOL</strong> experiments should provide<br />
answers to the question whether better results could be<br />
obtained by using a man as compared to an unmanned<br />
system of the same weight. He advised he planned to<br />
release $6 million of deferred fiscal year 1964 funds<br />
for the Air Force to begin the studies-if the Defense<br />
Secretary did not object. 37<br />
On 27 April, Dr. McMillan also reported to McNamara on<br />
USAF plans for reconnaissance studies, experiments,<br />
and possible developments connected with the <strong>MOL</strong><br />
project, and <strong>NRO</strong> actions. He advised that the “black”<br />
effort was being handled within the BYEMAN control<br />
system, while certain other studies were carried out<br />
openly as part of the <strong>MOL</strong> program under normal<br />
classification. He said:<br />
Should the <strong>MOL</strong> experiments<br />
demonstrate satisfactorily that a<br />
man may be able to make important<br />
contributions to the effectiveness of<br />
satellite reconnaissance missions,<br />
it will be necessary to compare<br />
carefully the potential cost and<br />
performance of very high resolution<br />
systems, manned and unmanned. Such<br />
comparisons will require complete<br />
access to the present unmanned<br />
satellite reconnaissance program.<br />
They will be carried out exclusively<br />
by the (S) <strong>NRO</strong> as Project DORIAN. 38<br />
Based upon this information from two of his top scientific<br />
and technical advisors, Secretary McNamara authorized<br />
the start of pre-Phase I activities. Whereupon, on 29<br />
April Dr. Brown advised Zuckert of the release of the<br />
$6 million for the <strong>MOL</strong> studies. However, he laid down<br />
certain conditions by requiring the Air Force to: (1) delay<br />
contract negotiations for Apollo and one-man Gemini<br />
studies until his office had approved the proposed work<br />
statements; (2) delete experiment P-9 unless the -Air<br />
Force could show its compelling importance; and (3) give<br />
special emphasis to ground simulation testing during all<br />
experimental studies. 39<br />
On 4 May, Dr. Flax forwarded Brown’s instructions to<br />
the Vice Chief of Staff for “action as directed,” noting<br />
that AFSC would have to obtain advance approval of<br />
all work statements. AFSC and SSD, however, found<br />
the latter requirement irksome since the procedure was<br />
time-consuming and would delay the letting of contracts.<br />
The OSS study contracts were an example. The work<br />
statements, first submitted to Headquarters USAF on 19<br />
February, were not approved until 12 March, the D&F was<br />
not signed until 13 April, and authority to proceed with the<br />
contracts was not given until 20 May. Actual letting of three<br />
contracts—to Douglas, Martin-Marietta, and General<br />
Electric—was not accomplished until 27 May 1964. 40<br />
As expected, there were long delays which served to<br />
extend the contracting process through the spring and<br />
summer months. Thirteen additional contracts were<br />
awarded on the following dates: 8 June, the Gemini B