NRO-MOL_2015

Chapter VII - THE LABORATORY VEHICLE DESIGN COMPETITION January-June 1965
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NASA’s full cooperation. Thus the space agency acted
promptly when—advised that Evans would be in charge
of coordinating DoD studies—it designated Mr. Robert F.
Garbarini as his counterpart, responsible for exchanging
pertinent data and guiding preparation of NASA reports.
Evans and Garbarini met on 13 January and formed
a six-member DoD/NASA ad hoc study group which
discussed exchange of data and submission of USAF
descriptions of proposed MOL experiments. 23
Figure 37. Saturn Booster
Source: CSNR Reference Collection
During the next several months the Evans-Garbarini
group conferred on at least eight more occasions. The two
officials also engaged in an extensive correspondence,
agreeing on guidelines and ground rules for mutually
acceptable formats for submission of cost estimates and
a study plan. On 1 March General Evans delivered to
NASA two SSD reports on proposed MOL primary and
secondary experiments and two other documents on
MOL performance and design requirements. Other data
requested by Garbarini—on the proper ordering of MOL
experiments with respect to priority, interdependence,
number of flights, orbit altitudes and inclinations, and
flight duration—also were provided. 24
Even before most of this data was in hand, NASA
organized a MOL-Apollo task tea to prepare the space
agency report. It also contacted its various centers
for assistance and let three contracts (to Grumman,
Boeing, and North American Aviation) to help identify
and define proposed scientific experiments which might
be conducted aboard the MOL. A total of 84 NASA
experiments were identified and a report describing
them was sent to OSD on 17 March 1965. Included were
a number of “earth viewing” experiments which NASA
proposed to conduct using various high performance
optics, infrared, or radar sensors.
In evaluating the various material provided it by the
Air Force, the MOL-Apollo task team quickly noted that
not all information on planned USAF experiments had
been made available. For example, it had been given
no information on two primary experiments—P-14
(manned assembly and service of large antennas) and
P-15 (assembly and service of a large telescope). On 17
March Seamans brought this matter to Brown’s attention.
He reported that NASA had only six weeks remaining
to complete its study and that it was “imperative” that
experiment descriptions on P-1 and P-15 and other
USAF experiments be forwarded. 25
But, of course, OSD was unable to comply with this
request because of security. In view of the decision that
all references to sensor or reconnaissance payloads
would be controlled under Project DORIAN and the
BYEMAN security system, NASA was officially informed
that the P-15 experiment had been deleted § . Dr.
McMillan, however, did agree to release information on
Experiment P-14 and a description of it was forwarded
to NASA on 22 March. Thus, with the primary MOL
experiment, P-15, being withheld, the MOL-Apollo task
team could only reach the erroneous conclusion that all
USAF experiments could be accommodated by certain
Apollo configurations which it shortly proposed. 26
The fact that NASA had been going through a
somewhat unreal exercise became apparent to Dr.
Michael Yarymovych in mid-March, when he was
detailed to General Evans as a technical advisor from
the space agency. After he was briefed on P-15 as
the primary MOL experiment, Dr. Yarymovych strongly
urged that Mr. Garbarini and other NASA staff members
be informed since they were “just wasting their time.” In
April Garbarini and several other members of the MOL-
Apollo committee were given a DORIAN briefing on the
“black” aspects of the program by Maj Harvey Cohen,
the MOL security officer. This new information—while it
enlightened them—could not be considered in the NASA
report, which was to be based entirely on the “white”
data submitted earlier. 27
Another major handicap NASA faced in promoting the
Saturn/Apollo configuration involved schedules and
costs. Because of the priority commitment to the lunar
landing program, the space agency found it would be
§ NASA’s top officials, Dr. Seamans and Mr. Webb—given DORIAN
clearances in the fall of 1964—apparently were briefed on the reasons why.