8by Jan van <strong>de</strong>r HarstLooking at the seven contributions to this volume, all four <strong>of</strong> the aboveinterpretations have an element <strong>of</strong> validity in them. The start <strong>of</strong> the customs unionand the acceptance <strong>of</strong> CAP in 1968 were necessary precursors for further EC<strong>de</strong>velopment. Moreover, all the authors emphasise the disappointment among most<strong>of</strong> the actors concerning the concrete results booked in The Hague. Especially theDutch and Italian <strong>de</strong>legations, as well as the Commission, threw doubts upon theimmediate relevance and practicability <strong>of</strong> the summit’s outcomes. France andBelgium seemed more pleased with the wordings used in the final communiqué,while Germany took up a position in between. British observers wereun<strong>de</strong>rstandably puzzled by the lack <strong>of</strong> a formalised date nee<strong>de</strong>d for the start <strong>of</strong> theenlargement negotiations. But, even if the summit itself left room for doubts, it isalso true that the immediate aftermath was promising and the medium-term impactsubstantial. Three weeks after The Hague, at the Brussels Council meeting <strong>of</strong> 21and 22 December, a solution was found for the problems <strong>of</strong> agricultural financing(by introduction <strong>of</strong> a system based on 1% <strong>of</strong> national VAT receipts), the EC’s ownresources, as well as the long-<strong>de</strong>bated budgetary powers <strong>of</strong> the EuropeanParliament. In the spring <strong>of</strong> 1970, a date was fixed for the start <strong>of</strong> the enlargementnegotiations and the Davignon and Werner committees soon succee<strong>de</strong>d inproducing reports on EPC and EMU. In line with interpretation number three, TheHague’s final communiqué was still a rather shaky construction, but it had thepotential <strong>of</strong> <strong>de</strong>livering results in the medium term, and this potential was used.Having said that, one should not neglect the longer-range implications, as<strong>de</strong>monstrated by Milward’s contribution on Britain. The <strong>de</strong>cisions taken at TheHague and Brussels concerning agricultural financing encumbered the EC with aheavy mortgage, which became particularly onerous during the protractednegotiations on the British budget during the Thatcher years.Was there a clear winner in The Hague? Which country got the best out <strong>of</strong> theresults achieved during and after the summit? Even after perusing the variouscontributions to the volume, these questions are still difficult to answer. It seemsthat, in line with the best European traditions, each <strong>de</strong>legation found something toits liking. As said above, France and Belgium could boast that they reached most <strong>of</strong>their aims, Paris being particularly happy with the ‘completion’ <strong>of</strong> the Community,in the form <strong>of</strong> a secure system <strong>of</strong> guaranteed financing for agricultural production(see the Marie-Thérèse Bitsch article). Paymaster Germany, as highlighted byClaudia Hiepel, had to make a substantial concession on this score, but, on theother hand, cajoled France into <strong>of</strong>fering the long-awaited opening towards Britain.The German <strong>de</strong>legation also ensured that monetary <strong>integration</strong> would not take theform <strong>of</strong> an open-en<strong>de</strong>d commitment to countries with a less solid financialreputation than the FRG itself. To French and Belgian regret, the implementation <strong>of</strong>a European reserve fund was postponed and economic <strong>integration</strong> was to takeprece<strong>de</strong>nce over progress in the monetary area. The new German lea<strong>de</strong>r WillyBrandt was universally admired for his forceful début on the European stage,thereby overshadowing presi<strong>de</strong>nt Pompidou, whose performance in The Hague –also as a <strong>de</strong>butant – was generally consi<strong>de</strong>red disappointing. Chairman the
y Jan van <strong>de</strong>r Harst 9Netherlands largely shared Germany’s ambitions, strongly emphasising the needfor British entrance and slowing the urge for monetary union. From Anjo Harryvanand Jan Van <strong>de</strong>r Harst’s contribution, it appears that interpretation number three(above) particularly applied to the Dutch position. At the end <strong>of</strong> the meeting PietDe Jong and Joseph Luns proved ambivalent and insecure, but their mood soonchanged when the positive after-effects <strong>of</strong> The Hague became visible, including thegranting <strong>of</strong> new powers to the EP. Italy, as shown by Eleonora Guasconi, scored onthe issues <strong>of</strong> British membership and social policy, but ma<strong>de</strong> concessions onagricultural financing. Britain became aware that France no longer blocke<strong>de</strong>nlargement but, as said above, the terms on ‘completion’ were, in the longerperspective, unsatisfactory to London. For the Commission, the obtaining <strong>of</strong> ownresources was a substantial result, but presi<strong>de</strong>nt Jean Rey could not prevent theHague conference from opening a new episo<strong>de</strong> in the <strong>de</strong>velopment <strong>of</strong> ‘summitry’,eventually resulting in the creation <strong>of</strong> the European Council in 1974. Piers Ludlowrightly conclu<strong>de</strong>s that the Commission’s future “did not look like being a rapidadvance to wi<strong>de</strong>-ranging political power”. All in all, the summit’s outcome was apackage <strong>de</strong>al with gains and losses for all the parties involved. There could be notalk <strong>of</strong> an evi<strong>de</strong>nt, undisputed winner.Yet, if we need to mention one, then we might opt for precisely themember-country not <strong>de</strong>alt with in this volume. Luxembourg was in favour <strong>of</strong>completion and enlargement, but cautious – at least more ‘economist’ oriented thanneighbour Belgium – as far as monetary union was concerned. Hence, the carefullydrafted EMU provisions in the final communiqué were fully compatible withLuxembourg’s ambitions on this score. Moreover, Prime minister Werner wasappointed chairman <strong>of</strong> the prestigious committee charged with <strong>de</strong>veloping a planon economic and monetary union. Although only mo<strong>de</strong>stly involved in thediscussions with his colleagues, the lea<strong>de</strong>r <strong>of</strong> the smallest country had every reasonto look back on the meeting with satisfaction. However, as said above, the <strong>de</strong>finitestory on Luxembourg and The Hague has yet to be written.