journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

Swan Song or Cock Crow? 39for both EP control over CAP financing and the Community’s own resources, as well asdirect elections for the Parliament, but these desiderata had remained largelyunfulfilled. Likewise, the summit had failed to widen the possibilities for majorityvoting in the Council of ministers, as the government had hoped for. De Jong diagnosedthat the conference “had been neither a resounding success, nor a failure”. Statesecretary De Koster blamed the French president for having shown lack ofcommitment, deeming the latter’s European debut “disappointing”. On the other hand,he gave high praise to the Federal chancellor, complimenting Brandt for having “savedthe meeting”. 43 In Albert Kersten’s analysis,“only at the Hague summit of December 1969 did Luns become convinced thatBonn dared to confront Paris. Thus his long-time perception of the Federal Republicas a hesitant supporter of further European integration finally fell apart”. 44In other European capitals Dutch summit diplomacy was looked back upon withequally mixed feelings. The Belgian government felt that Luns had overreacted againstthe negative attitude of Pompidou, with the lamentable result that on the first eveningthe conference was in disarray. On the other hand there was general praise for Primeminister De Jong and the way he had presided over the conference. 45Conclusion“How should the summit be typified: as a swan song or cock crow”? 46 In an effortto assess the results of the meeting, State secretary De Koster brought up thisquestion during a parliamentary debate at the end of December. It was another signof the government’s initial ambivalence regarding the outcomes. To what extent didthe Ridderzaal event constitute a real breakthrough in European integration or “had[it] all been rather more like a normal council meeting than a summit”, as Foreignaffairs delegate Karel Hartogh lamented? 47 In the immediate aftermath of theconference, this was still far from clear.The Netherlands’ original condition for agreeing to a summit of the Six turnedout to be eventually, from the government’s perspective, its most important43. Notulen MR, 5 December 1969.44. A. KERSTEN, De langste. Joseph Antoine Marie Hubert Luns (1952-1971), in: D. HELLEMA,B. ZEEMAN and B. VAN DER ZWAN (eds.), De Nederlandse ministers van Buitenlandse Zakenin de twintigste eeuw, Sdu uitgevers, Den Haag, 1999, pp.211-227, 224.45. PRO, Telegram Sir J. Beith no.408 to Foreign and Commonwealth Office London, 3-12-1969(with thanks to Alan Milward); J.W. BROUWER and J. VAN MERRIËNBOER, Van buitengaats…, op.cit., pp.199-200. Possibly, some of the Belgian irritation was aggravated by the bleak pictureoffered by Benelux foreign policy cooperation before and during the summit. Attempts at Belgian-Dutchco-operation were scarce and unsuccessful.46. Handelingen Staten Generaal Tweede Kamer zitting 1969-1970, 36e vergadering, 23 December1969, p.1751.47. PRO, Telegram Sir P. Garran no.626 to Foreign and Commonwealth Office London, 3-12-1969(with thanks to Alan Milward).