journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

28Anjo Harryvan and Jan van der HarstSuch positive results, however, did not conceal the fact, that by the end of the decadedisagreement between France and the other five member states on a number ofinstitutional, financial and foreign policy issues had led to a virtual standstill of theCommunity’s integrative momentum.The Hague summit of heads of state and government of December 1969 isgenerally regarded as the diplomatic breakthrough that ended this stagnation. Thisessay analyses Dutch European policy with regard to the Hague summit and theextent to which this summit was deemed instrumental for re-launching Europeanintegration.Signs of hope and reappraisalsCharles de Gaulle’s resignation as French president in April 1969 raised newexpectations among advocates of European integration and co-operation, both inthe Netherlands and abroad. De Gaulle’s successor Georges Pompidou clarified hisintentions to re-launch Europe soon after his inauguration in mid-June. On 29 June,exactly two weeks after Pompidou’s coming to power, the Dutch cabinet referred tothe announcement of a French plan for a European summit to be held in the autumnof 1969. Although the plan obviously needed further elaboration and clarification,the Netherlands welcomed it as the first signal of a changing climate in France. 3Apparently, Pompidou realised the importance of keeping the European integrationprocess alive and attractive for West Germany. In this respect, Chancellor WillyBrandt’s Ostpolitik constituted an obvious success for the Federal Republic as wellas a challenge for France. Fear of a German Alleingang appeared to make palatablewhat had been unacceptable for Pompidou’s predecessor. The degree to whichFrance would be willing to commit itself to enlargement and British membership,however, remained to be seen. 4At an earlier stage, at the Rome conference of 1967, Foreign minister JosephLuns had raised objections to summit conferences in general. In the Dutch politicalsystem he and not the Prime minister was to be responsible for the country’sforeign policy. Traditionally, the Dutch Prime minister is a primus inter paresrather than the government’s political boss. Consequently, Luns rather than DeJong represented the country at international conferences. Also, summitry smackedof undermining – à la Fouchet – the communitarian system. Thus, the fact thatLuns did eventually acquiesce in the Hague summit is an indication of the value heattached to a breakthrough from the integrative impasse. Institutionalisation ofsummitry, however, was a phenomenon to be guarded against. Dutch and, for thatmatter, Benelux agreement necessitated a Council resolution stating that “cetteconférence des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement ne doit pas être considérée comme3. Notulen MR, 27 June 1969.4. J.H. MOLEGRAAF, op.cit., p.261.