journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

Swan Song or Cock Crow? 31proposed to organise the conference in The Hague. At the Cabinet meeting of 24July, the discussion centred on the preferred location for the summit: either thehistoric buildings of the Binnenhof in the centre of town or the more modern andspacious but lesser charming Congresgebouw (Conference hall). For securityreasons, the eventual decision turned out in favour of the Ridderzaal (Knights’Hall) located on the Binnenhof. The government emphasised that the meetingshould be held in mid-November at the latest and, that in the meantime theEuropean Commission should not waste time, but continue its work on updatingthe 1967 advice on enlargement. The government also stipulated a proper and equalCommission representation at the summit meeting. This was another bone ofcontention with Paris, the latter preferring a much lower Commission profile duringthe conference.Concerning agriculture, the Cabinet supported minister Lardinois in hisresistance to a coupling of agricultural financing and enlargement; a paralleltreatment of the two issues was to be preferred. This seemed to confirm both theimportance of CAP’s implementation to the national economy and the prominentposition the minister of Agriculture held in the Cabinet. 8 As Lardinois worded it,linking CAP financing and enlargement“would not constitute a problem for a country like Italy. The Netherlands’ interest ina common agricultural policy, however, [was] way too large for such a course ofaction”. 9After all, he argued, the country topped the bill of intra-EEC agriculturalexports, making a speedy CAP arrangement of vital importance. Issue linkagewould, at the very least, lead to adverse effects on the level of national contributionto CAP. In spite of Lardinois’ protestations, it was agreed that for tactical anddiplomatic reasons, minister Luns would be allowed to use the word “coupling”during the negotiations with France and the other European partners. 10 Lardinoisfelt uneasy about this, and urged Luns continuously to be very reticent in using theterm. 11In August 1969, the ‘honeymoon’ in the Dutch approach of the new Frenchgovernment was suddenly over, when Paris announced a devaluation of the Frenchfranc, without prior consultation with the European partners. Apart from irritationsabout French unilateralism, the Netherlands feared a substantial increase in farmprices, particularly of dairy products as a result of the French decision. In thecontext of enlargement, this was seen as unpropitious. Eventually, the pain waseased by the introduction of an intricate system of import subsidies and exportlevies for France during a period of three months (lasting till December) which8. This had also been the case with Lardinois’ predecessor Biesheuvel, who had a dominant impacton EC discussions within the Cabinet, for example during the Empty Chair crisis of 1965; see A.G.HARRYVAN and J. VAN DER HARST, For once a united front. The Netherlands and the EmptyChair crisis in the mid-1960s, in: LOTH (ed.), Crises and Compromises …, op.cit., pp.173-192.9. Notulen MR, 4 July 1969.10. Notulen MR, 4 July 1969 and 24 July 1969.11. Notulen MR, 24 October 1969.