journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

40Anjo Harryvan and Jan van der Harstoutcome: the French promise to go along with enlargement negotiations withBritain in the near future. At least, that was what the French president had accededprivately. Otherwise, in the short run, the Hague results were to be considered ratherdisappointing: little or nothing of substance had been agreed upon in terms ofprogress towards European economic union on a communitarian footing. Theempowerment of the European Parliament fell short of Dutch wishes and furtherintergovernmentalisation of the decision-making process was looming.In the greater scheme of things, however, ‘The Hague’ would turn out to be thesummit that initiated both – the first attempt at – EMU as well as EPC, plus theactual beginning of the first enlargement, all three to become of the greatestimportance in the Communities’ development during the 1970s and later decadesto come. Moreover, at the Brussels conference of 21 and 22 December, agreementwas reached to give some budgetary powers to the European Parliament.Thus, the historical importance of the Hague summit is by large to be attributedto the subsequent implementation and follow-up of the conclusions it arrived at.Had the Brussels conference, the Werner and Davignon committees and theenlargement negotiations been unsuccessful, the by now famous triptych‘completion, widening and deepening’ would have remained null and void. In thisrespect the ‘spirit of The Hague’ appears to have been of more importance than theactual wording of the compromises arrived at in the Ridderzaal.What is fundamentally new about the Hague summit was the decisive roleplayed by the West-German government, led by chancellor Brandt. The Germancontribution went well beyond its advocacy of EMU. As worded by Kersten:“Die Regierung Brandt hatte sich zugunsten der Erweiterung und Vertiefung entschiedenund nicht versucht, die Gegensätze innerhalb der EWG durch einen vagen Kompromisszu vertuschen, der den Anschein eines französischen Sieges gehabt hätte”. 48As such, the German performance heralded a new era in European integration. TheBundesrepublik definitely freed itself of its historically determined reticence inpost-war European affairs and, thus emancipated, was ready and willing to lead theCommunity towards further integration and against future attempts at dominance.It had excellent reasons to embark upon this course since international support forits Ostpolitik was both required and on offer. In this respect, one can agree withDerek Urwin’s statement that with“the exception perhaps of de Gaulle’s dramatic press conference vetoes of Britishentry, the Hague summit was the most significant event within the Community sinceits inception”. 49For the Netherlands, now that the préalable anglais was about to be fulfilled,such further European propositions were again open for consideration.48. A.E. KERSTEN, Das Europäische Gipfeltreffen in Den Haag 1969, in: J.W.F. WIELENGA (ed.),Nachbarn. Niederländer und Deutsche und die Europäische Einigung, Presse- und Kulturabteilungder Kgl. Niederländischen Botschaft, Bonn, 1997, pp.45-49, 49.49. D.W. URWIN, The Community of Europe. A History of European Integration since 1945, Longman,London, 1993, p.138.