journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

80Claudia HiepelThe Federal Government enthusiastically hailed the Summit as a decisive steptowards a common European future. For Willy Brandt, it marked the mostimportant event of his recently inaugurated government. 89 The reactions of theGerman public to this first political action of the Brandt government in the area offoreign policy were on the whole positive and even enthusiastic. Most of the pressreports pointed out Brandt’s significant role in helping to break down the Frenchresistance to enlargement. 90 What was striking to the majority of observers at theconference was the very positive atmosphere, in which it, however, took place. 91This ‘spirit of The Hague’ seems to have been durable and it also characterised thefollowing Council of ministers negotiations that had the summit’s decisions torealise. The atmosphere and the tone had improved tremendously. According totelegrams from members of the German delegation, the meetings werecharacterised by matter-of-factness, an open attitude towards the positions ofothers, mutual consideration and even amicability. 92As the detailed reconstruction of the preparations has shown, most of thenegotiation positions had been clarified before the conference and the agreementson the sensitive issues had been outlined. A summit would be the ideal occasion toconfirm and reinforce the recent solutions at the highest possible level. The Hagueconference thus served to forge commitments, which were required by Pompidou,on the one hand, to justify his European policy towards the French Gaullists, andby the other member states’ governments on the other, to make the Frenchpresident hold true to his promises. In fact, the Conference had broken theEuropean impasse by opening the door to the applicant states. There was no reasonto doubt Pompidou’s word of honour. The Hague summit itself did not deliver anyreal surprise. It served to stage the compromise for the public. Brandt’s role in thisscenario was to offer Pompidou a face-saving solution to the enlargement issue.The decisive change, however, happened in the French administration beforethe conference. First indications for Pompidou’s willingness to give up the negativeGaullist position regarding British entry turned out during the election campaign.Further evidence for Pompidou’s change of mind will be provided by Frenchfiles. 93 But it is true, that the French president’s attitude towards Europeanintegration policy finally appeared in the Franco-German bilateral contacts.89. See the exposé for a lecture of parliamentary secretary Focke, in: AsD, Depositum KatharinaFocke 191, Die europäische Situation nach Den Haag in der Sicht der deutschen Regierung; M.-T.BITSCH, Le sommet …, op.cit., p.562.90. According to the carefully reported German press reactions in the archives of the British ForeignOffice (kindly made available by Alan S. Milward). See also DER SPIEGEL, op.cit.91. See, for instance, the interim report of Focke about the second day of the conference, in: AAPD,1969, vol.II, document no.385, pp.1357-1359.92. AsD, Depositum Katharina Focke 199, Fernschreiben aus Brüssel, 09.02.1970, betr.: 102. Tagungdes Rates der Europäischen Gemeinschaften am 05/06/07. Februar 1970.93. M.-T. Bitsch mentions two ‘Conseils des ministres restreints’ on 21 October and on 17 November,in which Pompidou admitted that the French position had become “intenable” and - in case ofmaintaining the French position - the Common Market would disappear (M.-T. BITSCH, Lesommet …, op.cit., p.548).