journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

34Anjo Harryvan and Jan van der Harstregarded monetary integration as a potential coping stone, i.e. final phase, of theeconomic integration process rather than an issue of immediate political concern.Moreover, Finance minister H.J. Witteveen was anxious not to throw good moneyafter bad and, with some justification, suspected France of attempts to makeGermany and the Netherlands foot the bill for its own financial and monetaryproblems. At the same time, the government realised that a flat refusal of the Snoyplan was tactically inexpedient. It therefore decided to a ‘forward escape’,announcing that the plan was acceptable if accompanied by closer co-operation oneconomic and financial policies and real parliamentary control; “if this wasaccepted, one should also add the social and income policies”. 21As we have argued elsewhere, 22 the prospect of the Hague summit did have animportant impact, in that it brought traditional Dutch reluctance to monetarycooperation outside the Bretton Woods institutions (including the Bank forInternational Settlements and the Group of Ten) to a close. Monetary co-operationwithin a European framework was no longer considered an issue for some distantfuture but from now on a valid topic for present-day political discussion and anacceptable mid-range policy goal. As before, sound economic and fiscal policiesby all countries involved were deemed an essential precondition for Dutchco-operation on this issue. Under no circumstances should intra-Europeansolidarity foot the bill resulting from a lack of financial discipline by nationalgovernments. Thus, Witteveen viewed mutual credit mechanisms as proposed inthe Barre plan with caution. Emphasis on preceding harmonisation of economicand fiscal policies characterised Witteveen’s policy at The Hague, as well as duringthe subsequent negotiations leading to the Werner report.Meeting in The Hague: completion, widening and deepeningOn 1 and 2 December 1969 the long awaited conference took place on theBinnenhof in The Hague. Although the Foreign ministry had to cope with a numberof logistical problems and setbacks, most of them could be solved in time. Theefforts of the French embassy to convince the owner of the local pub ChezPompidou to change the name of his establishment were, however, to no avail. 23While the background noise of demonstrations by ardent federalists and theirclashes with the police heightened the spirits, deliberations in the Ridderzaal21. Notulen MR, 28 November 1968. For a more elaborate discussion of Dutch European policy withregard to the monetary integration issue: J.W. BROUWER and A.G. HARRYVAN, Les Pays-Baset la coopération monétaire européenne, 1968-1972, in: MINISTÈRE DE L'ÉCONOMIE, DESFINANCES ET DE L'INDUSTRIE, Le rôle des ministères des Finances et de l’Economie dans laconstruction européenne (1957-1978), Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de laFrance, Paris, 2002, pp.85-108.22. Ibid.23. F. ITALIANER, Terugblik op een ambtelijke loopbaan, in: H.J. LABOHM (ed.), De waterdragers vanhet Nederlandse Europabeleid. Terugblik op 40 jaar DGES, Sdu uitgevers, Den Haag, 1997, pp.53-81, 66.