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Swan Song or Cock Crow? 37as, presumably, the other delegations. 31 Pompidou, however, gave the Germanproposals his full support.Dutch Finance minister Witteveen was only partly convinced. He deemed theEMU set-up too far-reaching, advocating informal exchanges of opinion among theEEC Finance ministers instead. Luns’ view that France being ‘demandeur’ on themonetary issue was ‘convenient’ and should be put to good bargaining use won theday. 32 As late as June 1970 Witteveen complained about the pressure the Foreignministry had exerted on him to accept the EMU compromise at the Hague summit,six months previously. 33Thus, at The Hague, the EMU decision laid the foundation for the subsequentheated discussions its corollary, the October 1970 Werner report would give rise to.In prescribing communitarisation of economic and fiscal policies, the report wouldgo well beyond what was acceptable for the rank and file Gaullists, led by MichelDebré, necessitating Pompidou and his Finance minister Giscard d’Estaing todistance themselves hastily from its contents. This made The Economist cast doubton the sagacity of Pompidou’s earlier stance at the Hague summit:“Then, in what can only be regarded as a political fluke, the French president at the nowfamous summit meeting at The Hague a year ago picked up the ball of monetary unionand ran like a bull with it for the line. There is good reason to believe that PresidentPompidou would not have done what he did if he had realised where it might lead”. 34Further talks on “the best way of achieving progress in the matter of politicalunification” were to take place “within the context of enlargement”, as worded inthe communiqué. This formula was reassuring for – and indeed insisted upon by –the Dutch government as far as the struggle for British membership and against acontinental ‘third way’ was concerned. But its vagueness made this formula utterlyunsatisfactory in terms of the hoped-for strengthening of Community institutions,the Commission and European Parliament (EP) in particular. Much likeCommission president Jean Rey, the Dutch government regretted that there hadbeen “hardly any mention of political union and no discussion on strengthening theCommunity institutions”, such strengthening deemed “crucial to the progress of the31. A. WILKENS, Westpolitik, Ostpolitik and the project of the Economic and Monetary Union. Germany’sEuropean policy in the Brandt era (1969-1974), in: Journal of European Integration History,5(1999), pp.80-81. More generally, Wilkens argues (p.80), “[t]he program Brandt finally presentedin The Hague […] was much more extensive than his former communication to Pompidou”.The contributions of Cl. Hiepel and M.-T. Bitsch to this volume provide more detailed treatmentsof the Franco-German bilateral contacts and preparations for the Hague summit.32. J.W. BROUWER and A.G. HARRYVAN, Les Pays-Bas et la coopération monétaire …, op.cit.,p.98. Notulen MR, 7 November 1969 and 5 June 1970.33. J.W. BROUWER and A.G. HARRYVAN, Les Pays-Bas et la coopération monétaire …, op.cit.,p.98. Notulen MR, 7 November 1969 and 5 June 1970. At the first Ministerraad meeting followingthe Hague summit, Witteveen blamed Luns and De Koster for the allegedly “unbalanced composition”of the national delegation at the conference: Foreign affairs had been over-represented,while the departments with more specialised know-how had not been allowed to attend sufficiently,Notulen MR, 5 December 1969.34. The Economist, 21 November 1970.