journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

The Hague Conference of 1969 and the United Kingdom’s Accession 121of that deadline which was the main reason why the Hague summit was eventuallyheld in that month. Foreign Office hopes strayed even further however. Theyenvisaged that even if Britain had not become a member-state by then it would havetravelled sufficiently far towards that goal that it would be allowed some say inwhat the final settlement of the Community’s dispute over own resources would be.Sir Con O’Neill, who had served for three years as ambassador to theCommunity and had made several reasoned criticisms of the United Kingdom’searlier negotiating tactics told a Benelux committee luncheon at The Hague inJanuary 1966,“I hold that the Common Market agricultural policy is difficult to be adopted byBritain, but I do not say that it could never be adopted. In fact, we accepted it inprinciple three or four years ago”. 3His remark brought a speedy rebuke from Thomas Balogh, Wilson’s economicadviser, and an opponent of Britain’s attempted entry into the Community. In ahand-written note Wilson commented,“I think this is very unfortunate esp[ecially] the reference to ‘accepting’ agriculturalpolicy. I never have: we attacked it, on import not farm grounds. There would be nomore speeches now”. 4There seems to be no evidence that Wilson changed his mind about this. Ratherit appears to be the case that he persisted in thinking that to enter the Communitywith no modification of Britain’s expected contribution to the Community budgetmight be a risky venture, was certainly not to be undertaken without very carefulthought, and that every effort should be made to plot a negotiating procedurethrough which that contribution could be modified.When he initiated on 21 March 1967 what was in reality a series of Cabinetmeetings on the subject of a second application and its nature and objectives,although the cabinet secretary did not keep written notes of them as was the normalpractice, the first meeting called for a list of further submissions on the likelyposition of British agriculture in the Community, including one which shouldattempt to show the probable impact on the balance of payments of the CAP, itsprobable impact on agricultural production, and its probable impact onCommonwealth agriculture. These were to allow some determination of how farthe CAP could be modified if all these “impacts” were to be made “tolerable”. 5 Aparliamentary Select Committee on Agriculture sought the same information. “Itwas”, so the officials servicing the unscripted Cabinet meetings recorded, “fullyrecognized that we could not hope to abolish the C.A.P., but, if we had entered theEEC by 1968, we might be in a position to modify its operation when it came to berenegotiated in 1969”. 63. PRO, PREM 13/893, Note of Sir Con O’Neill’s remarks.4. Ibid., Note by Wilson, 19 January 1966.5. PRO, CAB 130/316, MISC 143(67) 1 st meeting. ‘Cabinet. Europe.’ Minutes of a Meeting of Officialsheld 2 March 1967.6. PRO, CAB 130/316, MISC 143(67) 2 nd meeting. ‘Cabinet. Europe’, 3 April 1967.