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In Search of the Greatest Common Denominator 67concessions and claimed that Germany was willing to make sacrifices once theirpurpose was clear. As a guideline to the German ambassadors in Western Europeancapitals Willy Brandt claimed:“We must have our proposals ready and constantly be in search of the greatestcommon denominator in order to prove that we are ready and able to take the nextpossible step”. 18On 8 July, Willy Brandt first stopped at The Hague to meet Dutch Foreignminister Joseph Luns. Only four days after his Paris visit, Brandt was not entirelyoptimistic. What struck him most, was the less ideological attitude of the newFrench president and a “more harmonised presentation” of Pompidou and MauriceSchumann. 19 A new aspect of the discussion seemed to be that the French realisedthat they could not get around the resumption of enlargement negotiations if theysought to break the current impasse. Brandt now took on the role of conciliatorbetween France and the other four EC member states, striving to fosterunderstanding and patience. Schumann’s warning not to exercise any pressure onFrance, was not explicitly directed at Germany but at “minor governments and lessimportant countries”. 20 Consequently, Brandt advised Luns not to push the Frenchtoo much. He thus tried to prevent him from discussing direct elections and thequestion of responsibilities of the European Parliament (EP) at his forthcomingvisit in Paris. On the other hand, sharing the goals of the Dutch ‘declaration ofintent’ that proposed 1 January 1970 as the date of opening enlargementnegotiations, 21 Brandt agreed that Luns submit this proposal to Pompidou. At thesame time, he made it clear that he would not comment on this point in public, toavoid duping the French so briefly after his own conversations in Paris. Brandtclearly saw that France feared that its own negotiating position would be weakenedunless the ruling of the Common Market was definitely fixed before entering intonegotiations with the applicant states. 22Late August/early September, Brandt met the Italian Foreign minister AldoMoro in Rome, 23 and subsequently discussed the matter in Brussels with theBelgian Foreign minister Pierre Harmel. 24 As expected, Moro rejected “anexclusive political cooperation of the Six that was expressed in summit17. Ibid. See also the earlier pro-European statements of Willy Brandt in the Foreign PolicyAssociation in New York (1964), in Rome (1965) and on the Congress of European SocialistParties (1966): WBA, Bestand Publizistische Äußerungen 180, 211, 243.18. Ibid.19. Botschafter Arnold, Den Haag, an das Auswärtige Amt, betr.: Gespräch Außenministers mitniederländischem Außenminister Luns, 08.07.1969, in: AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.229,pp.802-805.20. As Schumann said to Brandt in their conversation on 4 July in Paris, in: AAPD, 1969, vol.II,document no.220, p.773.21. See the article of Harryvan and Van der Harst in this volume.22. Brandt to Luns, op. cit., pp.803 ff.23. Reported in: PAAA, B 150, vol.160, pp.4782 ff., Fernschreiben aus dem Auswärtigen Amt an dieVertretungen in den europäischen Hauptstädten, 02.09.1969.24. A copy of the records, in: WBA, Bestand Außenminister und Vizekanzler 29.