journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

66Claudia HiepelWhile the German Foreign minister did agree to the French initiative, he and hisadministration nonetheless continued to analyse it critically. First of all, they sawthe French proposal as a means to integrate the French president into theCommunity’s decision-making process at a time they were about to begin planningfor the future. 13 They also asked why it did not provide a special agenda. Why werepreparations not clearly outlined in the Council and by the Foreign ministers? Andwhy did the French government want regular summits at this stage? All those itemswere regarded as “vehicles of a tactic” to prevent a possible summit of the Sevenand to play for time until the British elections had taken place in early summer. Theproposal to hold regular meetings on a senior level was reminiscent of the Fouchetplans of the early Sixties and would thus be unacceptable to the small memberstates of the EC in particular. Brandt’s senior official in charge of European affairs,Berndt von Staden, thus recommended that he should react “carefully butpositively”. By protecting both German interests and those of the small states,Brandt should insist on the preparation by the Foreign ministers and not assent toany institutionalisation of summit conferences or at best, connect the possiblerepetition of a summit with the success of the one envisaged. The EuropeanCommission should in any case be included in the preparation process for theconference as far as Community matters were concerned. 14Until the next Council of ministers meeting on 15 September, Willy Brandtembarked on a tour to the member states’ capitals to get a feel for the attitude of theothers and to make up his mind about a German vision for European integration. 15He was firmly convinced that, although it was absolutely necessary for theEuropean unification process to progress, he should under no circumstances givethe impression that Germany wanted to take the lead in the EC. German initiativesshould “not attack the prestige or the sensitivity of others” 16 – which meant bothFrance as well as the small member states. Brandt’s European policy concepts, inthe first place, aimed at enlarging the Community as soon as possible and atdefining the relations to the other European Free Trade Association (EFTA)member states. On the institutional level the strengthening of the competence of theEC’s parliament and its direct elections were of high priority. Political cooperationand the establishment of the Economic Union rounded off the list of urgentactivities. 177 With regard to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) the Germanadministration still had no ideas ready. Willy Brandt only planned to make13. Ibid. The French president was, for technical reasons, not a member of the French government. Aconference with Georges Pompidou as participant could hence not be described as a Councilmeeting but only as a Summit meeting of the EC member states. This procedure tended toundermine the Community institutions as argued a paper of the German Foreign Minister:Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes [PAAA], Ref. I A 1, 736, Vermerk über institutionelleFragen der Sechser-Gipfelkonferenz, 24.07.1969.14. Ibid.15. PAAA, B 150, vol.160, pp.4782 ff., Fernschreiben aus dem Auswärtigen Amt an die Vertretungenin den europäischen Hauptstädten, 02.09.1969.16. WBA, Bestand Publizistische Äußerungen 313, Konferenz der westeuropäischen Botschafter derBundesrepublik, 30.06.1969.