journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

In Search of the Greatest Common Denominator 77of the summit, Germany had put its cards on the table. Pompidou did not hesitate toanswer, only one day later, in a more informal note in which he did not only stressthe importance of the Franco-German relationship but also referred to the necessityof good personal relations between him and Brandt which could help to solveEurope’s problems. Concerning the enlargement question he asserted to be openfor a solution but he refused to fix a date for starting negotiations. He welcomed acloser economic and monetary cooperation and promised to think about the projectof a European Reserve Fund. 72 The last bilateral contact between Brandt andPompidou before the conference confirmed the recently discovered compromisesand served to improve the climate between the two partners. Both were spared toexperience any real surprise on the summit in The Hague.The ConferenceDutch Prime minister Piet de Jong started the conference off by discussing theenlargement issue, which also stood at the centre of Willy Brandt’s speech in thefirst session. 73 Brandt presented an ambitious European action program, whereasPompidou, as previous speaker, delivered more of a summary of the status ofEuropean integration and avoided referring to the enlargement issue. Brandt and deJong succeeded in circumventing Pompidou’s obvious tactic of marginalizing theenlargement issue at the Conference. Referring to German public opinion and theBundestag, Brandt clearly stated that he was expected not to leave the conferencewithout a concrete outcome on the enlargement issue. In addition, he surprisinglyopenly cited Germany’s dominant economic position:“Whoever fears that the economic power of the Federal Republic would bedisadvantageous for the balance within the Community, should for that reason be infavour of the enlargement”. 74This argument alluded to France’s fear of German economy and, indeed, theFrench took note of it. 75 Brandt also mentioned the European PoliticalCooperation, which he did not consider the most important topic of theConference, but at least the Foreign ministers would be instructed to discuss it “inthe hypothesis” of enlargement. 76 Only in the afternoon, did Brandt speak aboutcompletion. He underscored the German consent to a definite financing of72. Unsigned note of Pompidou from 28 November, in: AsD, Depositum Egon Bahr 441/1. A “projetde réponse” from 29 November mentioned in: M.-T. BITSCH, Le sommet …, op.cit., p.558.73. The German records of the Summit Conference, in: PAAA, Ministerbüro 334. The Brandt text waspublished on the whole, in: Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung 146,2 December 1969, pp.1241-1243.74. Ibid., p.1241.75. «Il a même évoqué le contre-poids qu’offriraient les Britanniques a ceux qui pouvaient craindre lapuissance économique allemande!». Quotation from the French records of the Conference in theSGCI archive, 900568, Art. 386, pp. 250 ff. (kindly made available by Piers Ludlow).76. Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, op.cit., p.1242.