journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

32Anjo Harryvan and Jan van der Harstsucceeded in keeping prices under control. Despite this quick solution, thegovernment’s suspicions regarding French intentions started to become moreevident and contributed to a hardening of tone regarding EC matters.At the same time, the political situation in Italy was a matter of concern. InAugust, Mariano Rumor was appointed Prime minister of a Christian Democraticminority government, dependent on parliamentary support of the Socialist andRepublican parties. The Hague feared political instability in Italy, not so muchbecause of the abundant size of the Rumor government (consisting of 33 ministersand 55 state-secretaries, as Luns could not resist telling his colleagues) but mainlybecause of the seemingly unstoppable rise of the Communist party. Communistpresence in a future government was no longer to be excluded. 12 In spite of thesemisgivings, Italian support for British membership was deemed as important as ever.In September, the government discovered that France was not prepared toco-operate on any European issue (including enlargement), as long as a definiteagreement on agricultural financing was not secure. However, Luns thought that theMinisterraad should allow the summit to take place – in mid-November – on thestrict condition that, during the meeting, a positive decision would be taken onBritish entry. It was then still unclear when the negotiations on UK membershipwould begin. In July, France had rejected the date of 1 January 1970, and March1970 was also considered as too early. The cabinet deliberated on the minimumconditions to be fulfilled before it could agree on holding the conference. Mostmembers wondered whether a rigid approach was realistic, given that theNetherlands, being the host of the meeting, should “not incur the odium oftorpedoing the negotiations”. Luns remarked that Italy’s stance on enlargement wassimilar to that of the Netherlands and he therefore preferred to “pass the buck” (forcriticising the French position and promoting enlargement) to the Italian Foreignminister Aldo Moro. 13 This is what eventually happened.New developments broadened the projected summit’s agenda. The cabinetmeeting of 3 October centred on the expected revaluation of the German mark, as thefluctuating exchange rate of the Mark caused great anxiety in the Netherlands. 14 Acouple of weeks later, at the end of October, the cabinet proved apprehensive ofrumours concerning a revaluation of the Belgian franc. 15 Monetary problems inEurope proved persistent and eventually induced the Belgian government to developa plan for monetary co-operation to be presented at the conference in The Hague.In mid-October, the Council of ministers convened in Luxembourg and agreedon a common trade policy, implying that after 1 October 1970 bilateral tradearrangements with third countries were no longer to be allowed. Although theMinisterraad was pleased with this important result, it also worried about theexceptional provision accepted in Luxembourg that for a period of three years and12. Notulen MR, 22 August 1969.13. Notulen MR, 12 September 1969.14. Notulen MR, 3 October 1969.15. Notulen MR, 31 October 1969.