journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

Italy and the Hague Conference of December 1969 115«The report is extremely disappointing, especially on the question of European politicalconsultation, if compared to the Hague outcome. It will disappoint our publicopinion. There is nothing which points to political decision making: only two meetingsof political talks», 56and Altiero Spinelli wrote that the Committee of the Political Directors hadproduced the «mouses» of the political concertation. 57In the mid term, Italian attempts to play a role in European re-launching wouldbe most affected by its serious domestic economic, political and social situation.Since 1972, the government had to face growing opposition from the left wingparties, a difficult economic situation and a social crisis which forced Italy to adopta 'low profile' approach in the Community. This was demonstrated by the fact thatthe reference to the development of a European social policy made in the finaldeclaration of the Paris summit of October 1972, was a German initiative, and bythe decision to leave the “snake” in February 1973.ConclusionsThe Hague conference of 1969 certainly represented an important turning point inthe integration process at the end of the Sixties. 58 Although the French-Germandeal played a central role during the conference, it seems restrictive to affirm thatthe outcome of the Hague summit was only a compromise answering to French andGerman conditions. The so-called minor partners, like Holland and Italy, alsoplayed an active role; they exerted pressure for negotiations on Great Britain's entryto begin at the earliest possible date and tried to pursue specific national interests;among these were the reform of the European Social Fund, the development of anembryonic European social policy or the re-launching of the project of politicalco-operation, in the Italian case.Italy was forced to accept Pompidou's triplet, in particular the CAP completionà la française, the introduction of VAT and the EMU, through a system of fixedparities, fearing the negative consequences for its economy. Italy’s diplomaticgames before the summit, in particular its unrealistic attempt to build an ententewith Germany to offset French goals, clearly showed the limits of its diplomaticleverage, and confirmed the image of a weak negotiator. Furthermore, in the longterm Italian domestic political instability seriously affected its capability to pursuethe goals developed at The Hague, forced the country to adopt a 'low profile'56. HAEC, CSM, Minutes of the Bagnaia Meeting, May 29 th 1970, secret.57. HAEC, CSM, Letter by Spinelli to Scarascia Mugnozza, September 22 nd 1970.58. Derek Urwin’s statement that “with the exception perhaps of de Gaulle's dramatic press conferencevetoes of British entry, the Hague summit was the most significant event within the Communitysince its inception” is acceptable, only if taking account of the long term consequences of theHague Conference. See D. URWIN, The Community of Europe. A History of European Integrationsince 1945, Longman, London, 1995, p.128.