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70Claudia Hiepelmeeting that had obviously started in a strained atmosphere, when Schumanncomplained about the ingratitude towards a suggestion that he regarded as a Frenchconcession.The September Council of ministers meeting thus served to clarify the variouspoints of view without coming to a real agreement. A stocktaking of Germanforeign policies, written by Brandt’s close staff member and confidant Egon Bahr,clearly demonstrated the dilemma of German European policy. 35 It presumed thatthe French would not hinder enlargement à la longue but that the applicants’ entrymight not be expected before the end of the next German legislative period, whichwould then take place at the end of 1973. The Federal Republic could thereforechoose between two alternatives. Firstly, it could continue its existing policies offlexibility: acting in consensus with all six members and in so doing trying toprogress step-by-step in the process of European integration. The advantages ofthis alternative were seen in Germany’s partnership, demonstrating its espritcommunautaire. This option implied a refusal of power politics and was regardedas a proof for the credibility of German foreign policy. The disadvantages werereflected in the emergence of a seesaw policy, with France ultimately setting thepace. Secondly, the Germans could put their national interests in the foreground byinsisting on a linkage between completion and enlargement. It seemed absurd, andnot only to Bahr, that the basic and ultimate goals of the Common Market would beestablished only to be modified again in the enlargement negotiations. It washowever clear, that such an attitude put Germany in danger of becoming alienatedfrom its French ally and, should the enlargement negotiations fail, from its Britishally as well, on whose good will it depended for the success of the Ostpolitikenvisaged by Brandt and Bahr. In addition, this course of confrontation would nothave promoted the European integration process at all. 36The devaluation of the French Franc in August only exacerbated these alreadycomplicated matters. The definite regulation of the CAP seemed unattainable.Consequently, the enlargement negotiations were jeopardised which could finallylead into disintegrating Europe. This was a scenario that was seriously expected inthe German Foreign Office in the following 12 or 18 months. Once more, Franceseemed to be blocking the European Community, not politically as under Charlesde Gaulle but economically. 37 The second working lunch meeting that took placeon 17 October in Luxembourg, with the absence of the German Foreign minister,did not lead to a way out of the European impasse. Schumann rejected a linkagebetween enlargement and completion, the other five member states insisted that thesummit conference should give a date for the start of negotiations. 388When the new government took over its official duties in October 1969, theGerman attitude towards the European integration process in general and towards35. Überlegungen zur Außenpolitik einer künftigen Bundesregierung. Aufzeichnung desMinisterialdirektors Bahr, 21.09.1969, in: AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.296, pp.1047-1057.36. Ibid., pp.1056 ff.37. Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Frank, 26.08.1969, betr.: Europäische Politik, in: AAPD,1969, vol.II, document no.267, pp.929 ff.