journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

In Search of the Greatest Common Denominator 73Only two days later, in a conversation with the new German Foreign ministerWalter Scheel, Schumann substantiated the French view and even offered Germanya solution to the problem of surplus production. 500 Two incidents may have beenresponsible for this change of mind on the part of France. Firstly, the revaluation ofthe German Mark on 24 October coming on the heels of the French devaluation inAugust posed another threat to the CAP, showing a lack of esprit communautaire.Secondly, Scheel, in a provocative remark in the German Bundestag on 6November, had claimed that the Common Market had dispersed. As a result of theunilateral monetary decisions of the French and German governments, Francehence was strictly speaking no longer a member of the Common Market, whereasGermany remained a member by virtue of its complicated system of monetarycompensation for German farmers. The Common Market as the core of Europeanintegration was only kept alive by “technical manipulations”. 51 Whether or not itwas a calculated attack to bring France out of her shell, the fact remains thatSchumann reacted immediately. Deeply worried, he initially consulted CarloSchmid 52 and then referred to the Scheel speech in his conversation with theGerman Foreign minister. Schumann denied Scheel’s interpretation and stressedfirmly that to him and the French, the CAP would mark “the most unifyingelement” of the Community. 53Scheel and Brandt did not hesitate to make the French reorientation known tothe other partners. 54 The third foreign ministers’ preparatory working lunchmeeting on 10 November thus took place in a more harmonious and constructivemanner. According to German records it was Schumann who seemed to dominatethe discussions. He insisted on realising completion as the absolute Frenchpréalable, the fulfilment of which would determine France’s future membership inthe Common Market. Modifications should only be accepted unanimously and ifnecessary, later on in the course of enlargement negotiations. These terms weregenerally well received. Only Luns and Scheel insisted on a sort of linkage, addingthat the summit should avoid giving the impression that the negotiations oncompletion would have to be finished before other problems such as agrarianpolicy and enlargement could be discussed. 5550. AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.352, pp.1237-1246.51. Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestages. Stenographische Berichte, vol.71, Bonn 1969, p.281.52. See the note of German ambassador Freiherr von Braun, 7 November 1969, mentioned in: AAPD,1969, vol.II, document no.352, p.1240.53. Ibid.54. Scheel to Harmel in Brussels on 10 November, in: AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.353,pp.1247-1250 and one day later Brandt to the Italian ambassador Luciolli, in: AAPD, 1969, vol.II,document no.358, p.1263-1268.55. AAPD, 1969, vol.II, document no.356, pp.1258-1260.