journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

112Maria Eleonora Guasconipolitical co-operation in the context of enlargement and then to present theirproposals during the month of July 1970.After the ConferenceThe comments of the European leaders who took part in the summit were, althoughnot enthusiastic, characterised by a cautious optimism. The summit had not given lifeto a spectacular re-launching of European construction, but had generated a new climateamong the European partners. The impasse which the Community had reachedin the Sixties was overcome and the final communiqué indicated the ways to followon the road of integration. The binomial deepening-enlargement announced for thefirst time in the French triplet, would become the railroad line along which the Europeanintegration process would run forward. Even if during the Seventies some radicalchanges in the international system would inevitably influence the life of theCommunity, and would alternate between periods of serious crisis and staticmoments in the integration process (such as the end of the Bretton Woods System inAugust 1971 or the oil crisis following the Yom Kippur War of October 1973), someof the projects launched at The Hague were to become more important only in themid or long term. All this is demonstrated by, for example, the first enlargement ofthe EC, the similarities between the Werner Plan and the Delors Reports of 1989, 46the strengthening of European institutions through the autonomous determination ofbudget resources and the first reform of the Social Fund.Georges Pompidou had paid great attention not to damage his country’s owninterests when determining the position to be taken in the process of integrationboth before and during the conference. In this complex game of do ut des WillyBrandt also played a central role. In fact, he carried out a difficult mediationbetween German objectives on one hand, and the French goal of defining thefinancing of the CAP before the entry of the UK, on the other. The chancellor hadmeasured with extreme attention the requirements and the concessions to make. Hedeveloped an independent political action in the more general picture of theOstpolitik towards Eastern Europe and had been careful not to arouse alarm amongEuropean countries. In this context the space for manoeuvre left for other 'minorpartners', such as Italy, was narrowed down and the Italian delegation was obligedto accept French conditions.Prime minister Rumor appeared cautious and went not further than defining as«positive» the outcome of the summit. An article published in the Sole 24 Ore on 4December pointed out that the deal which had emerged during the summit was notparticularly advantageous for Italian agriculture. Important sectors such as wine,46. See A. VERDUN, The Political Economy of the Werner and Delors Reports: Continuity amidstChange or Change amidst Continuity, in P. MAGNUSSON and B. STRATH (eds.), From theWerner Plan to the EMU. In Search of a Political Economy for Europe, Peter Lang, Brussels,2001, pp.73-82.