CONTRADICTION, CRITIQUE, AND DIALECTIC IN ADORNO A ...

antagonistic relation to internal nature (to the instincts) that became dissociated from a
human purpose in modernity and continued to grow for its own sake alone, and which
stands at the basis of the modern order’s pathology. But, if the development of
rationality itself is conceived as problematic when it becomes divorced from a telos
defined in terms of value, then rationality alone cannot be the standard by which a new
social ideal is proposed—that is, unless rationality itself is understood in a new way that
incorporates a different relation to the instincts. And a relation that would circumvent
descent into repression and irrationality would have to give up the goal of a radical
autonomy of reason because it would have to acknowledge the inevitable intertwinement
of socio-historical development with non-rational, psycho-dynamic ‘natural’ elements.
3.3 Conclusion: Adorno’s conception of antagonism
In concluding, I want to return to the concept that this discussion was first
intended to elucidate: that is, Adorno’s conception of antagonism. The opening question
for our discussion was the meaning of Adorno’s claim that modern social reality is
inherently antagonistic. The above reconstruction of Adorno’s position in terms of his
critique of Hegel’s social theory of ‘reconciliation’ now places us in a position to answer
the question. I have reconstructed this critique as a denial of three Hegelian claims: (1)
the internal autonomy of the central institutions of modernity, (2) the preservation of
private freedom, and (3) the autonomy of the social order as a whole. The denial of (2),
as I showed, is already entailed by the denial of (1). So, we can characterize Adorno’s
position as the denial of (1) internal and (2) global autonomy.
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