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CONTRADICTION, CRITIQUE, AND DIALECTIC IN ADORNO A ...

CONTRADICTION, CRITIQUE, AND DIALECTIC IN ADORNO A ...

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The logical structure of paranoid projection thus defines the object of thought (the<br />

historically determined state of reality) and grounds the form of contradiction in negative<br />

dialectics (the “contradiction in the object” and the “contradiction in the concept”) as<br />

well as the movement that restlessly moves from one form of contradiction to the other in<br />

a never-ending dialectical progression. Without understanding the logical structure of<br />

paranoid projection, I maintain, we cannot understand the ground for either form of<br />

contradiction in negative dialectics, nor the relation between them.<br />

I started this dissertation with the question of what makes contradiction, or<br />

“negation,” determinate in Adorno’s negative dialectics: what drives the contradiction<br />

forward so that it does not simply collapse into mere formal contradiction but rather gives<br />

rise to a new interpretation of the object. I argued that negation in Adorno cannot be<br />

made ‘determinate’ in the same way that the Hegelian negation is determinate, because,<br />

in Hegel, what makes the negation determinate is that contradictions are driven by a<br />

substantial interpretation that leads to their resolution in a position that sublates them: the<br />

interpretation is, briefly put, that Reason drives thought and being forward in a direction<br />

of the its ever growing actualization because the self-determining movement of “the<br />

Concept” is the ultimate structure of all thinkable and experienceable reality. Since<br />

Adorno rejects Hegel’s view of reality as essentially and fully determined by the self-<br />

determination of Reason, the “contradiction” that impels negative dialectics forward<br />

cannot be grounded in the Hegelian “absolute” conception of Reason. The question arose<br />

in chapter 1 of whether this entails that negation in negative dialectics is therefore simply<br />

“abstract” in the Hegelian sense—that is, a negation that is nothing but sheer<br />

contradiction and does not have an immanent principle driving it toward a specific and<br />

451

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