05.10.2013 Views

CONTRADICTION, CRITIQUE, AND DIALECTIC IN ADORNO A ...

CONTRADICTION, CRITIQUE, AND DIALECTIC IN ADORNO A ...

CONTRADICTION, CRITIQUE, AND DIALECTIC IN ADORNO A ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

what sense? Adorno’s position is often represented as grounded in an ethical assessment<br />

that the belief that history is rational and meaningful constitutes an unacceptable apology<br />

for the terrible events of the Shoah, so that it is in order to avoid the morally deplorable<br />

position of the apologist that one ought to reject the Hegelian philosophy of history. I<br />

believe this kind of argument does capture a strand in Adorno’s thought, 30 but it presents<br />

only the polemical and by no means philosophically deepest layer of his argument against<br />

the Hegelian philosophy of history. Adorno’s main theoretical point against Hegel’s<br />

philosophy of history is that the latter is theoretically one-sided and undialectical.<br />

Reflection on Auschwitz is important because it presents this one-sidedness in the<br />

experience of thinking. In this sub-section, I aim to reconstruct Adorno’s argument<br />

against the Hegelian philosophy of history as a charge of dialectical one-sidedness due to<br />

30 See Adorno’s Vorlesung über Negative Dialektik, in Nachgelassene Schriften, Vol. 16<br />

(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2003), 35:<br />

Aber daß man nach Auschwitz nicht im Ernst mehr davon reden kann, daß eine Welt, in der das<br />

möglich gewesen ist und in der es jeden Tag aufs neue in anderer Gestalt droht und in ähnlicher<br />

Gestalt, ich erinnere an Vietnam, wahrscheinlich in dieser Sekunde geschieht, —daß man von<br />

einer solchen Gesamtverfassung der Realität soll behaupten können, daß sie sinnvoll sei, das<br />

scheint mir ein Zynismus und eine Frivolität, die einfach im Sinne, ja, lassen Sie mich sagen: der<br />

vorphilosophischen Erfahrung nicht zu vertreten ist. Und eine Philosophie, die dem gegenüber<br />

sich blind machte und mit der törichten Arroganz des Geistes, der die Realität nicht in sich<br />

aufgenommen hat, behaupten würde: trotz allem, dennoch ist ein Sinn, —das scheint mir wirklich<br />

einem Menschen, der noch nicht vollkommen durch Philosophie verdummt ist (denn Philosophie<br />

kann unter vielen anderen Funktionen auch die der Verdummung ohne alle Frage mit Erfolg<br />

ausüben), nicht zumutbar zu sein.<br />

English translation by Rodney Livingstone in Lectures on Negative Dialectics (Cambridge: Polity Press,<br />

2008), 19:<br />

[T]he idea that we can say of the world as a whole in all seriousness that it has a meaning now that<br />

we have experienced Auschwitz, and witnessed a world in which that was possible and that<br />

threatens to repeat itself in another guise or a similar one—I remind you of Vietnam—to assert<br />

such an idea would seem to me to be a piece of cynical frivolity that is simply indefensible to what<br />

we might call the pre-philosophical mind. A philosophy that blinds itself to this fact and that in its<br />

overweening arrogance fails to absorb this reality and continues to insist that there is a meaning<br />

despite everything—this seems to me more than we can reasonably expect anyone who has not<br />

been made stupid by philosophy to tolerate (since as a matter of fact, alongside its other functions,<br />

philosophy is capable of making people stupid).<br />

30

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!