CONTRADICTION, CRITIQUE, AND DIALECTIC IN ADORNO A ...

ecause essence and appearance are revealed to be one-sided determinations of a
third concept—‘ground’—which in turn is, like the initial determinations, merely
a moment in the self-determined movement of pure thought (i.e., of “the
Concept”). In my reconstruction of Adorno’s conception of the dialectic between
appearance and essence, however, I have argued that the initial determinations are
subsumed under appearance. In terms of Hegel’s view of the dialectic, this
reconstruction seems to constitute a regression to one of the simple, one-sided
determinations, rather than a dialectical progression to a more developed concept
that subsumes the initial determinations under a third concept.
In this section, I take up these objections and explain Adorno’s position in response to
them. This discussion culminates with an explanation of the reason and philosophical
significance of my reconstruction of Adorno’s conception of the dialectic between
appearance and essence as culminating with a more developed concept of appearance,
independent of any underlying concept of essence.
I begin with (1) the Kantian objection. The charge here is that the subsumption of
the one-sided conceptions of appearance and essence characteristic of reified reality into
a more developed conception of appearance is incoherent because at the end of the
process we are left with an appearance that has no essence underlying it. The assumption
buttressing this objection is that the concept of appearance requires a further concept of
essence, of which appearance is mere appearance, to be coherent at all. And, second, the
more developed concept of appearance at the end of the dialectic is according to my
reconstruction apprehended as delusory: a “sham” or a “spell” (this is the point of
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