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CONTRADICTION, CRITIQUE, AND DIALECTIC IN ADORNO A ...

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with this view too and, in fact, he finds it still too idealistic, because it attributes to the<br />

concept the structure of reality and downgrades nature to an indeterminate substratum<br />

that is in itself without cognitive significance, without meaning. It thus follows the<br />

model of an all-powerful subject (even if the subject is conceived as social praxis rather<br />

than pure mind) whose activity determines the structure of the world, on the one hand,<br />

and an indeterminate nature that serves solely as the substratum for classification, on the<br />

other.<br />

A radical philosophical materialism, in Adorno’s view, is one that takes objects to<br />

be significant in their own right: one that first of all acknowledges a radically non-<br />

conceptual core of objectivity in the object, and that, second, takes it to be not inert but<br />

rather a center of meaning that actively contributes to cognition. The first requirement<br />

distinguishes Adorno’s materialism from any type of idealism, and the second sets it<br />

apart from any physicalism or mechanism. Adorno’s materialism is rather a form of<br />

naturalism, where nature is taken to be radically non-conceptual, meaningful in-itself, and<br />

a necessary contributor to cognition. For Adorno, the view of the object that defines his<br />

materialism is the only one that places that element in the object which is the opposite of<br />

mind (i.e., its non-conceptual nature) at the center of cognition, and only this view of the<br />

state of society, indeed in the sense that it is a historical product, the result of the activity of a<br />

number of generations, each of which stands on the shoulders of the preceding one, developing the<br />

industry and its intercourse, and modifying its social order in response to changing needs. Even<br />

the objects of the simplest ‘sense certainty’ are given to the human being only through social<br />

development, industry and commercial exchange/ intercourse.<br />

This does not mean that for Marx nature is eliminated. Rather, as Habermas rightly argues in<br />

Knowledge and Human Interest ((Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), esp. pp. 29-40), Marx adheres to the idea<br />

of something like a “nature in itself,” whose existence must be presupposed for epistemological reason, but<br />

which is disclosed only within the historically determined dimension of social labor. Habermas argues,<br />

correctly in my opinion, that Marx preserves a distinction between form and matter where the matter is an<br />

unknown and indeterminate natural substratum that acquires form through subjective activity, so that the<br />

world that we know is known only as formed through subjective labor.<br />

332

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