CONTRADICTION, CRITIQUE, AND DIALECTIC IN ADORNO A ...

claim; namely, that the Hegelian system is incomplete (thus, not absolute) because it can
as a whole be set in dialectical opposition with an element that actively mediates it and
yet eludes it from within: namely, the element of ‘nature’ or the ‘non-conceptual.’ In
this section, I will discuss Adorno’s critique of Hegel with respect to two elements of the
Hegelian system only: 28 first, with respect to the Hegelian philosophy of history (section
1.2.1), and then with respect to Hegel’s view of the relation between concept and object
(section 1.2.2.). Then I will return to the more general point that Adorno deploys against
Hegel, and I will analyze what consequences Adorno’s critique of Hegel has for
Adorno’s own notion of determination negation.
1.2.1 Critique of the Hegelian philosophy of history
The first and perhaps most famous of Adorno’s arguments against Hegel’s self-
contained, teleological system is his critique of Hegel’s conception of Geist’s
externalization in world history. It is well known that Adorno takes the Hegelian
philosophy of history to be untenable after the experiences of the Shoah. The idea is that
any of a variety of terrible and irrational experiences from that historical period is
sufficient to refute Hegel’s idea that world history is in essence rational. 29 But ‘refute’ in
28 Later chapters of the present study elucidate other ways in which Adorno’s critique of Hegel can
be formulated. Chapter 3 frames Adorno’s critique of Hegel’s social philosophy in terms both of an
internal critique of Hegel’s position and the claim that Hegel’s conception of the social order as a whole
has to be seen as mediated by nature. Chapter 4 in turn shows how Adorno’s conception of the social order
makes the sublation of the concepts of ‘essence’ under “the Concept” impossible because the sphere of
essence is mediated by a natural element that resists sublation under concepts and requires a different form
of interpretation. Chapters 5-6, which concentrate on Adorno’s view of how non-rational nature mediates
individual and social consciousness, can be read as an elucidation of Adorno’s critique of Hegel’s
philosophy of consciousness, as well as a critique of his conception of history.
29 Recall Hegel’s (in)famous statement that “Alles was vernünftig ist, ist wirklich, und alles was
wirklich ist, ist vernünftig” [the rational is actual, and the actual is rational].
29