CONTRADICTION, CRITIQUE, AND DIALECTIC IN ADORNO A ...

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own to account for the ontological-logical structure of reality as a whole, and, on the basis of the inadequacies revealed, gives rise to a new, logically more complex and determinate, item of thought. Again, the transition from the derived inadequacies or “contradictions” to the new item of thought is ontologically necessitated by the form and content of the contradiction. The “deductions” that make dialectical movement from one basic item of thought to the next are possible because they are instances of determinate negation. And the possibility of advancing through determinate negation toward a completed system of all basic forms of thought is guaranteed by the idea that the completed system is already implicitly contained in every form of thought from the start, and that in the end nothing remains external to the system itself. In other words, the dialectical movement of the Logic presupposes the absoluteness of the Hegelian system. This is why the transitions in Hegel’s system are not only transcendental arguments moving from a specific conception x to the necessary conditions for x but are rather supplemented by an argument that x, in order to be fully actualized in the world, or in order for it to work as an all-encompassing account of reality, must be supplemented by y. But this is a teleological strategy, 24 and the teleology is grounded in the idea that the whole system is implicitly present in each form of thought under consideration from the start. The goal of the Logic as a whole is in fact to argue that, in order to think anything at all, the whole system of pure concepts presented in the text must be presupposed, and the dialectical movement developed in the Logic ultimately 24 See Frederick’s Neuhouser short discussion of the methodology involved in Hegel’s transitions in Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2000), fn. 27, p. 29. Neuhouser argues that Hegel’s arguments make use of both transcendental and teleological arguments, and, if the latter are ignored, key points of Hegel’s dialectical “derivations” are lost. 24
corresponds to the self-determining movement of “the Concept,” 25 which actualizes itself in philosophical thought as the self-determining teleological movement of Reason. The operation of determinate negation, which “necessarily” develops each individual concept into the one that follows, is possible only because the complete system of concepts is already internal to any concept that is applicable to reality, and because there is no thinkable content that stands outside “the Concept.” So, both in the Phenomenology and in the Logic, the operation of determinate negation that makes dialectical movement possible presupposes that the Hegelian system is complete (that it encompasses all positions of consciousness or of pure thought) and that it is not itself open to external negation. In other words, determinate negation presupposes the absoluteness of the Hegelian system. The system’s absolute status makes possible the teleological order that pushes determinate negation forward in a unique direction to develop every finite element that is made an object of reflection into a new element, whether it be a form of consciousness (in the Phenomenology), a basic item of thought (in the Logic), a finite element of the Concept’s externalization in nature (in the Philosophy of Nature) or a finite moment in the development of spirit (in the Philosophy of Spirit). The main points to take from this discussion of Hegel’s philosophy are the following: Dialectical movement presupposes determinate negation, and determinate negation presupposes the completed Hegelian system, specifically the idea that all 25 Here, as in the rest of the chapter, I use the standard capitalization of “the Concept” to refer to the totality of thought-determinations in the Logic, which for Hegel is connected into a complete dialectical system that is in turn internal to any finite concept at all because it is only by virtue of the system of thought-determinations that any concept has determinate content and is thus applicable to the object-world. 25
Page 1 and 2: CONTRADICTION, CRITIQUE, AND DIALEC
Page 3 and 4: CONTRADICTION, CRITIQUE, AND DIALEC
Page 5 and 6: For my parents, Luz Marina and John
Page 7 and 8: 4.3 Adorno’s resolution of the di
Page 9 and 10: FIGURES Figure 4.1: Inner contradic
Page 11 and 12: ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First and foremost,
Page 13 and 14: CHAPTER 1: THE PROBLEM OF DETERMINA
Page 15 and 16: in the present study, and which I t
Page 17 and 18: inadequate. In my view, O’Connor
Page 19 and 20: system, and Adorno rejects both the
Page 21 and 22: and instead examining only the assu
Page 23 and 24: In Hegel, there are three stages in
Page 25 and 26: dialectical movement in act. 16 Phi
Page 27 and 28: According to Hegel, the philosopher
Page 29 and 30: dialectic is driven forward from on
Page 31 and 32: observing consciousness has already
Page 33 and 34: consciousness to perform the operat
Page 35: and makes possible the successive a
Page 39 and 40: And yet, as I hope to have shown in
Page 41 and 42: claim; namely, that the Hegelian sy
Page 43 and 44: the system’s inability to express
Page 45 and 46: Hegel’s idea that history is in e
Page 47 and 48: irremediably caught in a situation
Page 49 and 50: defined in its essence by rationali
Page 51 and 52: zum Entsetzen verifiziert und auf d
Page 53 and 54: 1.2.2 Hegelian dialectics as a form
Page 55 and 56: objectivity, but rather as an empha
Page 57 and 58: as thought, is a form of thought th
Page 59 and 60: conceptual element. It is thus ulti
Page 61 and 62: It is clear, however, that (2) is n
Page 63 and 64: ultimately blind to this problem. H
Page 65 and 66: Aber Denken darf auch nicht bei der
Page 67 and 68: The first contradiction is internal
Page 69 and 70: world, and the nature of the subjec
Page 71 and 72: undertaking of giving an account of
Page 73 and 74: eflection. 62 The idea is that, ins
Page 75 and 76: of subject and object characterizin
Page 77 and 78: then, will be to take a suitable ex
Page 79 and 80: in it as providing a stable view of
Page 81 and 82: 2.2 The subject’s mediation of an
Page 83 and 84: It might be thought, then, that the
Page 85 and 86: the subject as, on the one hand, an
Page 87 and 88:
of consciousness that are then said
Page 89 and 90:
Note the radical nature of Adorno
Page 91 and 92:
tasks of ideology: first, to mask t
Page 93 and 94:
more intelligible but also to lead
Page 95 and 96:
empirical subject. The transcendent
Page 97 and 98:
something external to the individua
Page 99 and 100:
Even the individual who explicitly
Page 101 and 102:
others, and even her own self-under
Page 103 and 104:
is “contradictory” and “false
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Moreover, even modern critiques of
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Einzelmensch, so wie er zu agieren
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says that the “fixity and invaria
Page 111 and 112:
the subject-object relation. I cons
Page 113 and 114:
the concrete living individual, exp
Page 115 and 116:
Clarifying Adorno’s notion of ant
Page 117 and 118:
structure of modern society maximiz
Page 119 and 120:
the following points to be relative
Page 121 and 122:
accordance with its own autonomous
Page 123 and 124:
orthodox Freudianism, Adorno takes
Page 125 and 126:
In this situation, autonomous ego-c
Page 127 and 128:
Civil Society Let us now turn to an
Page 129 and 130:
den Mann zu bringen, das heißt in
Page 131 and 132:
elations of production inherently l
Page 133 and 134:
according to which any one individu
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The State Finally, we need to consi
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The forces of production have indee
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Gewalt, der von Repression, wie ein
Page 141 and 142:
political and even its military pow
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economic activity for global capita
Page 145 and 146:
that social freedom, or the freedom
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and nature has actually become a th
Page 149 and 150:
epression and domination for their
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case, Hegel’s model would remain
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how the potential can be fulfilled
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antagonistic relation to internal n
Page 157 and 158:
Adorno’s conception of the antago
Page 159 and 160:
The question I pursue in this and t
Page 161 and 162:
local heteronomy, or total determin
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selbst waltende” [not merely the
Page 165 and 166:
efusal to acknowledge social factor
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There is therefore a sort of social
Page 169 and 170:
their own autonomously defined ends
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available to thought. By bringing t
Page 173 and 174:
durch ihre einzelnen Momente hindur
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eality by the principle of exchange
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If a critical form of thought expos
Page 179 and 180:
The following diagram illustrates t
Page 181 and 182:
appearance and essence characterist
Page 183 and 184:
Adorno’s famous statement that
Page 185 and 186:
false or delusory. So, the idea tha
Page 187 and 188:
it is also not merely ‘logically
Page 189 and 190:
Hegel’s Science of Logic begins w
Page 191 and 192:
In my view, the sublation [Aufhebun
Page 193 and 194:
contingent historical development,
Page 195 and 196:
further interpretation. This need f
Page 197 and 198:
Marcuse’s builds his conception o
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essence gives way to a more develop
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(2) that there are tendencies alrea
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eality as a whole does not result i
Page 205 and 206:
asking them to choose their prefere
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eality “in itself,” or essentia
Page 209 and 210:
Since the contradiction between app
Page 211 and 212:
appearance to essence. But the empi
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eflection to the study of social re
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nature, which constitutes social re
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objects, for the constitution of ob
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However, we do not yet know how the
Page 221 and 222:
CHAPTER 5: A FREUDIAN INTERPRETATIO
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objects only to the extent that the
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it does not follow the rules of thi
Page 227 and 228:
mechanism, namely paranoid projecti
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civilization and enlightenment has
Page 231 and 232:
Adorno and Horkheimer see the Shoah
Page 233 and 234:
thought has experienced a loss of e
Page 235 and 236:
any objective appreciation and judg
Page 237 and 238:
der Menschheit im Bann der technisc
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imagination exists that ‘reality
Page 241 and 242:
esults in the radical creation of s
Page 243 and 244:
of Adorno’s negative dialectics i
Page 245 and 246:
that human beings on the average ca
Page 247 and 248:
5.4.1 Development of civilization A
Page 249 and 250:
The first stage of distance that Ad
Page 251 and 252:
persuade it or “convince” it to
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much greater control over nature, b
Page 255 and 256:
Threatening, wild nature is pushed
Page 257 and 258:
stronger, and so became the exertio
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advanced capitalist societies is ne
Page 261 and 262:
In his Vorlesung über Negative Dia
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Denken ineinsgesetzt, ohne dessen f
Page 265 and 266:
instrumental reason. Stepping outsi
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een totally “civilized,” of all
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nature from the world; they repeat
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5.5 Conclusion This chapter has dev
Page 273 and 274:
teleologically ordered structure th
Page 275 and 276:
CHAPTER 6: THE DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHT
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6.1 The dialectic of enlightenment
Page 279 and 280:
development of the modern period an
Page 281 and 282:
necessitated by the very mechanism
Page 283 and 284:
The interpretation of Dialektik der
Page 285 and 286:
doing without society provides no a
Page 287 and 288:
conception of historical developmen
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of the system and perhaps also taki
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alone, seemingly for its own sake.
Page 293 and 294:
accordance with which social realit
Page 295 and 296:
(3) Therefore, the result of regres
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from its beginnings in animism to h
Page 299 and 300:
subsection (6.2.2), I briefly expla
Page 301 and 302:
constraints to bring about the emer
Page 303 and 304:
Just like the social-historical lev
Page 305 and 306:
6.2.3 Adorno’s historical method:
Page 307 and 308:
dans sa force et sa faiblesse, la s
Page 309 and 310:
emplacements et de déplacements, d
Page 311 and 312:
individual as ailing from a weak eg
Page 313 and 314:
this point is worth emphasizing bec
Page 315 and 316:
element is a necessary component of
Page 317 and 318:
exchange). Moreover, I said that, f
Page 319 and 320:
within, and constructs the world as
Page 321 and 322:
would be the case if exchange was a
Page 323 and 324:
But the relation of nature to socie
Page 325 and 326:
neither can be understood as more f
Page 327 and 328:
The ‘natural history’ of a phen
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Verschlingungen; darum sind ihr so
Page 331 and 332:
given to the structural order of so
Page 333 and 334:
principle of exchange’s primacy o
Page 335 and 336:
contradiction between appearance an
Page 337 and 338:
introduced in chapter 3: the elemen
Page 339 and 340:
When we consider the relation betwe
Page 341 and 342:
The main goal of this chapter and t
Page 343 and 344:
each of the Concept (beyond the rea
Page 345 and 346:
object leaves room for an idea of c
Page 347 and 348:
context of the object’s origin is
Page 349 and 350:
each element of Kant’s theory on
Page 351 and 352:
precisely through the interpretatio
Page 353 and 354:
problems of the text (or other obje
Page 355 and 356:
Ängste auskennt, das ist auf der e
Page 357 and 358:
The world of empirical experience,
Page 359 and 360:
Adorno interprets Kant’s division
Page 361 and 362:
interpretation as the dissolution o
Page 363 and 364:
demonstrates that the contradiction
Page 365 and 366:
ist—der Begriff des Widerspruchs
Page 367 and 368:
a. The first component corresponds
Page 369 and 370:
historical context. But this way of
Page 371 and 372:
The concern with retrieving the non
Page 373 and 374:
object, which necessarily exceeds i
Page 375 and 376:
the problem seems to be inherent in
Page 377 and 378:
However, this society is pathologic
Page 379 and 380:
sufficiency the “Schein des Ansic
Page 381 and 382:
The category of ‘inner nature’
Page 383 and 384:
fragments and their rhetorical form
Page 385 and 386:
TABLE 7.1 DISCURSIVE-CONCEPTUAL V.
Page 387 and 388:
moreover, a critique that simply ig
Page 389 and 390:
The two philosophical strands, or s
Page 391 and 392:
experience of suffering or damage,
Page 393 and 394:
CHAPTER 8: PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE A
Page 395 and 396:
adicalization of the materialist st
Page 397 and 398:
Adorno’s words, nature is that wh
Page 399 and 400:
One important point in Benjamin’s
Page 401 and 402:
After the fall, “the judging word
Page 403 and 404:
Importantly, however, language afte
Page 405 and 406:
particular object is preserved in o
Page 407 and 408:
that, “Was aber solche Namen als
Page 409 and 410:
Die platonische Anamnesis steht die
Page 411 and 412:
elements in the exemplary particula
Page 413 and 414:
hat Geschichte nur noch als einen G
Page 415 and 416:
Das Echte - jenes Ursprungssiegel i
Page 417 and 418:
It is not my purpose here philosoph
Page 419 and 420:
Adorno takes the idea of constellat
Page 421 and 422:
The notion of onomatopoeia is strai
Page 423 and 424:
Ausdruck kommt, in sehr entrückten
Page 425 and 426:
evelation of this symbolic dimensio
Page 427 and 428:
anders als in der Sprache nicht ged
Page 429 and 430:
an aesthetic (artistic) ability to
Page 431 and 432:
The constellation provides a field,
Page 433 and 434:
constellation succeeds, and in the
Page 435 and 436:
Again in agreement, Benjamin and Ad
Page 437 and 438:
Adorno’s basic disagreement with
Page 439 and 440:
immediately related to the economic
Page 441 and 442:
[B]eide sind die auseinandergerisse
Page 443 and 444:
illumination of the phenomenon that
Page 445 and 446:
Adorno says that “Die Formel daß
Page 447 and 448:
echen: Ihre eigene, die rücksichts
Page 449 and 450:
which nature mediates social realit
Page 451 and 452:
concept,” and chapter 8 gave a fi
Page 453 and 454:
eality—that is, the structure of
Page 455 and 456:
conceptual tensions in the object a
Page 457 and 458:
conceptual oppositions that arise f
Page 459 and 460:
object,” as well as in the “con
Page 461 and 462:
element and in terms of its interpr
Page 463 and 464:
The logical structure of paranoid p
Page 465 and 466:
I do want to conclude with some ref
Page 467 and 468:
If Adorno is right, this abstract l
Page 469 and 470:
that they repress the non-conceptua
Page 471 and 472:
BIBLIOGRAPHY Works by Adorno in the
Page 473 and 474:
---. Negative Dialectics. Translate
Page 475 and 476:
---. “On Some Motifs in Baudelair
Page 477 and 478:
---. “Neurosis and psychosis.”
Page 479:
---. Capital, Vol. I. Translated by
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