CONTRADICTION, CRITIQUE, AND DIALECTIC IN ADORNO A ...

eflection. As is also well known, dialectical thinking moves from one position to
another by developing tensions or “contradictions” within the first position, which
contradictions then gives rise to the next position, the latter is then developed to the point
of contradiction, and so on. However, for this movement to be possible, the
“contradiction” developed at any given point must be determinate, which means that it
must have a logical form and content that enable it to be resolved into a new position of
thought that is not a mere denial of the initial position but rather encompasses it and
corrects its insufficiencies. If the contradiction is not determinate in this way, but rather
merely “abstract” or skeptical—that is, if the contradiction is a mere logical
contradiction—then it cannot give way to a new position of thought, and we achieve no
dialectical motion. Thus, in order for negative dialectics to be in fact a form of
dialectical reflection, the contradictions that it develops must be determinate rather than
abstract. The central question I will be addressing in the present study is whether the
contradictions at the heart of negative dialectics can be understood as determinate rather
than abstract, and, if so, on what grounds.
This first chapter explains why it is essential that contradictions (or ‘negations’) in
negative dialectics be determinate rather than abstract, and why it is initially difficult to
see how this might be the case. Adorno himself emphasizes the centrality of determinate
negation to his account of negative dialectics, and, insofar as he discusses the
determinacy of his account of contradiction, he claims to be taking over the Hegelian
conception of determinate negation. I will argue, however, that the Hegelian account
cannot be the same account at work in negative dialectics. The problem is that the
Hegelian notion of determinate negation presupposes the complete Hegelian teleological
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