The Effects of Sanction Intensity on Criminal Conduct - JDAI Helpdesk
The Effects of Sanction Intensity on Criminal Conduct - JDAI Helpdesk
The Effects of Sanction Intensity on Criminal Conduct - JDAI Helpdesk
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above. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> random assignment sequence was designed so that the West and Northeast<br />
LIS groups each c<strong>on</strong>tained 400 <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fenders. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>trol group c<strong>on</strong>tained slightly more<br />
cases from the West than the Northeast (52.8 per cent <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the c<strong>on</strong>trol group was from the<br />
West regi<strong>on</strong>al unit).<br />
Table 2.1 shows basic demographic and <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fending history characteristics for the<br />
two groups. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re are no statistically significant differences between the treatment and<br />
c<strong>on</strong>trol groups <strong>on</strong> any measure, indicating successful random assignment. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> sample is<br />
predominantly male (67.0%), n<strong>on</strong>white (60.1%), and <strong>on</strong> average 41 years old at the time<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> random assignment. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> majority (91.8%) <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fenders lived in zip code areas with an<br />
average household income <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> $20,000 or more. As we might expect from a sample<br />
already predicted to be low-risk, prior <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fending rates are low. Approximately 12 per<br />
cent (N = 193) members <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the sample were incarcerated at any time post-random<br />
assignment, for an average <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1.1 m<strong>on</strong>ths. Members <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> both groups committed 1.3<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fenses per m<strong>on</strong>th at risk <strong>on</strong> average in the year prior to random assignment, with much<br />
lower rates for violent and drug <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fending. Post-RA, the marginal first year difference<br />
between the treatment and c<strong>on</strong>trol groups reported above disappears by year two.<br />
C<strong>on</strong>trol group members tended to engage in violent recidivism more than the treatment<br />
group in the first year post-RA (4.1% vs. 2.9%), but by the sec<strong>on</strong>d year the gap has begun<br />
to close (5.4% vs. 4.5%). Treatment and c<strong>on</strong>trol group participants committed new drug<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fenses in similar proporti<strong>on</strong>s in the first year post-RA (treatment: 6.4% vs. c<strong>on</strong>trol:<br />
6.5%), but slightly more <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the c<strong>on</strong>trol group had failed by the sec<strong>on</strong>d year (c<strong>on</strong>trol:<br />
10.1% vs. treatment: 8.9%). In all, 21.5 per cent (N = 335) <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1,559 <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fenders in the<br />
sample committed a new <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fense <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> any kind two years post-RA. Am<strong>on</strong>g the 335<br />
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