The Effects of Sanction Intensity on Criminal Conduct - JDAI Helpdesk
The Effects of Sanction Intensity on Criminal Conduct - JDAI Helpdesk
The Effects of Sanction Intensity on Criminal Conduct - JDAI Helpdesk
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To what extent do the risk/need levels <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> program participants affect their resp<strong>on</strong>se to<br />
changes in supervisi<strong>on</strong> intensity?<br />
Based <strong>on</strong> the principles <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> effective interventi<strong>on</strong> (PEI), we speculated that<br />
supervisi<strong>on</strong> may be more effective if more intensive programs are targeted at the highest<br />
risk/need <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fenders, and vice versa. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re are several impediments to assessing this<br />
questi<strong>on</strong> in great detail. First, we could not examine whether low-intensity probati<strong>on</strong> is<br />
effective for low-risk probati<strong>on</strong>ers across a range <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> studies. Sec<strong>on</strong>d, very few studies<br />
included needs assessments, and those that did lacked detail. Thus, we decided not to use<br />
the need variable in our analysis. Finally, many <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the studies discussed the PEI or<br />
evaluated programs that had made an attempt to target higher-risk <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fenders, so we do not<br />
have much variati<strong>on</strong> in our data. We are <strong>on</strong>ly able to examine whether programs<br />
including either all or a majority <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> high-risk <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fenders were more or less likely to<br />
prevent re<str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fending than those including <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fenders <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> any risk level or not utilizing a risk<br />
assessment. A further caveat related to this final point is that programs that did not<br />
formally assess participants for risk may still have had inclusi<strong>on</strong> criteria that targeted<br />
more serious <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fenders.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> results in Table 1.3 may lend some support to this caveat. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is no<br />
difference between programs that targeted higher-risk <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fenders and those that accepted<br />
any <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fender type (Q B < .01, p ≤ .981), and neither risk category is associated with<br />
recidivism outcomes. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> odds ratio for studies involving higher risk <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fenders was .96<br />
(N = 11, p ≤ .798), and for all risk levels .97 (N = 27, p ≤ .735). For technical violati<strong>on</strong>s,<br />
there is also very little variati<strong>on</strong> in the odds <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> failure by risk level (Q B = .04, p ≤ .836;<br />
high risk: N = 10, OR = 1.59, p ≤ .092; mixed risk: N = 6, OR = 1.45, p ≤ .292).<br />
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