The Effects of Sanction Intensity on Criminal Conduct - JDAI Helpdesk

treatment and control groups after two years. When we controlled for other factors that
could affect re<strong>of</strong>fending, such as <strong>of</strong>fenders’ demographic characteristics, criminal
histories, and time at risk for re<strong>of</strong>fending, assignment to LIS was associated with no
differences in the odds <strong>of</strong> recidivism. On the other hand, age, SES, and gender were
strongly associated with both the probability and number <strong>of</strong> new <strong>of</strong>fenses.
Although no difference in the prevalence <strong>of</strong> new <strong>of</strong>fenses was observed, it is still
possible that the frequency <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fending could be affected by the experimental
supervision strategy. In particular, in an analysis where our controls for post-random
assignment time at risk are relatively weak (see above), any impact on <strong>of</strong>fending
frequency might be telling because the proportion <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fenders failing will be attenuated
by the fact that some did not have the opportunity to do so because <strong>of</strong> incarceration. Of
course, time in jail restricts the number <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fenses that could be committed too, but it
allows us to examine whether those who had the opportunity to <strong>of</strong>fend and received LIS
did so at a higher rate than those assigned to regular supervision. Further, <strong>of</strong>fending
frequency is more informative about the longer-term effects <strong>of</strong> treatment than prevalence,
which measures the more immediate impact <strong>of</strong> LIS. However, in our analysis we found
little difference in <strong>of</strong>fending frequency between groups. Some <strong>of</strong> the effect sizes were
moderate, but did not reach statistical significance.
Our third alternative outcome measure was time to failure. We examined whether
assignment to LIS might have caused <strong>of</strong>fenders to commit a new <strong>of</strong>fense more or less
quickly than their control group counterparts. A potential danger <strong>of</strong> reducing supervision
is that <strong>of</strong>fenders may then be on a ‘free rein’ to engage in <strong>of</strong>fending, whereas those under
closer scrutiny may have an incentive to wait until their period <strong>of</strong> supervision comes to
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