The Effects of Sanction Intensity on Criminal Conduct - JDAI Helpdesk

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treatment and control groups after two years. When we controlled for other factors that could affect re<strong>of</strong>fending, such as <strong>of</strong>fenders’ demographic characteristics, criminal histories, and time at risk for re<strong>of</strong>fending, assignment to LIS was associated with no differences in the odds <strong>of</strong> recidivism. On the other hand, age, SES, and gender were strongly associated with both the probability and number <strong>of</strong> new <strong>of</strong>fenses. Although no difference in the prevalence <strong>of</strong> new <strong>of</strong>fenses was observed, it is still possible that the frequency <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fending could be affected by the experimental supervision strategy. In particular, in an analysis where our controls for post-random assignment time at risk are relatively weak (see above), any impact on <strong>of</strong>fending frequency might be telling because the proportion <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fenders failing will be attenuated by the fact that some did not have the opportunity to do so because <strong>of</strong> incarceration. Of course, time in jail restricts the number <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fenses that could be committed too, but it allows us to examine whether those who had the opportunity to <strong>of</strong>fend and received LIS did so at a higher rate than those assigned to regular supervision. Further, <strong>of</strong>fending frequency is more informative about the longer-term effects <strong>of</strong> treatment than prevalence, which measures the more immediate impact <strong>of</strong> LIS. However, in our analysis we found little difference in <strong>of</strong>fending frequency between groups. Some <strong>of</strong> the effect sizes were moderate, but did not reach statistical significance. Our third alternative outcome measure was time to failure. We examined whether assignment to LIS might have caused <strong>of</strong>fenders to commit a new <strong>of</strong>fense more or less quickly than their control group counterparts. A potential danger <strong>of</strong> reducing supervision is that <strong>of</strong>fenders may then be on a ‘free rein’ to engage in <strong>of</strong>fending, whereas those under closer scrutiny may have an incentive to wait until their period <strong>of</strong> supervision comes to 99
an end. On the other hand, research on intensive supervision programs has indicated that increased supervision may result in increased detection <strong>of</strong> new <strong>of</strong>fenses or violations. We found no differences in the time to failure for LIS and control <strong>of</strong>fenders, regardless <strong>of</strong> whether or not other covariates were controlled. In reality, the probability <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fending in both groups <strong>of</strong> low-risk <strong>of</strong>fenders was so low that any differences that might have existed are probably too minor to detect. Our survival analyses confirmed that the average lowrisk <strong>of</strong>fender has a very low probability <strong>of</strong> failure over time. A limitation <strong>of</strong> our entire analysis that is particularly important here and has already been discussed at length is that we were not able to account for <strong>of</strong>fenders’ time on the streets and ability to re<strong>of</strong>fend on a daily basis. We found no evidence that the substantial non-delivery <strong>of</strong> treatment affected the results we find elsewhere in our analysis. We predicted actual treatment take-up based on assigned treatment and its interactions with <strong>of</strong>fender characteristics that might predict non-delivery. <strong>The</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> the treatment for ‘compliers’ who were randomly assigned to and actually received LIS was even closer to zero than it was in our ITT-based analyses. This provides further support for LIS as an appropriate strategy for dealing with low-risk <strong>of</strong>fenders. Many <strong>of</strong> those who did not receive the treatment as assigned were likely to have been higher risk <strong>of</strong>fenders. <strong>The</strong> majority were excluded because <strong>of</strong> factors that occurred before random assignment but were not discovered until afterwards, such as noncompliance, absconding, or placement in intensive treatment-based caseloads before random assignment. <strong>The</strong>se <strong>of</strong>fenders may have been more likely to <strong>of</strong>fend regardless <strong>of</strong> the type <strong>of</strong> supervision they received, and their inclusion in the ITT analyses may have led to the slightly higher prevalence <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fending we saw in the treatment group. 100
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University of Penn
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In memory of Edwar
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Janel McCaffrey and Knakiya Hagans,
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traditional practice, we find no ev
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Methodology .......................
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LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1: Effect
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intensity makes no difference to re
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isk of committing
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impact of probatio
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which perhaps suggests that ISP is
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program intended to reduce the stra
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supervision with probation
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3. To what extent do the risk/need
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Methods Scale (SMS: Farrington et a
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Types of Outcomes
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Description of met
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actual behavior. We analyze technic
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Treatment of quali
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treatment group, and those to the r
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Discussion of Resu
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were evaluated in the same report (
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direction of effec
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To what extent does program philoso
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Which other components of</
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.450; technical violations: Q B < .
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it should be noted that those progr
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up in unpublished reports than thos
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violations first went before a judg
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2 One U.S. estimate indicates that
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Tables Table 1.1: Characteristics <
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Table 1.3: Moderator Variable <stro
Page 63 and 64: Table 1.4: Moderator Variable <stro
Page 65 and 66: Figures Figure 1.1: Effect
Page 67 and 68: Figure 1.5: Effect of</stro
Page 69 and 70: CHAPTER 2. ‘Low-Intensity
Page 71 and 72: What Works in Probation Supervision
Page 73 and 74: to do with it. Furthermore, the mor
Page 75 and 76: to the New York City and Oregon stu
Page 77 and 78: Barnes et al. (forthcoming) have su
Page 79 and 80: paradox.” He suggests that ‘not
Page 81 and 82: fatal shootings in Philadelphia are
Page 83 and 84: the proportions of
Page 85 and 86: Interventions and Follow-Up Probati
Page 87 and 88: officers more <str
Page 89 and 90: 1. Does the effect of</stro
Page 91 and 92: all, resulting in a large number <s
Page 93 and 94: Differential treatment take-up and
Page 95 and 96: control group members who received
Page 97 and 98: effect of LIS on r
Page 99 and 100: incarcerated must also be removed f
Page 101 and 102: offenders in our s
Page 103 and 104: ecidivists in the sample, 77 commit
Page 105 and 106: (IRR = 1.41, p ≤ .107). SES did n
Page 107 and 108: probability of fai
Page 109 and 110: The count model ou
Page 111 and 112: estimate is also practically identi
Page 113: twice the risk of
Page 117 and 118: low-intensity supervision would imp
Page 119 and 120: Conclusion The aim
Page 121 and 122: We found that low-risk of</
Page 123 and 124: 7 LIS participants who were transfe
Page 125 and 126: Tables Table 2.1: Sample Characteri
Page 127 and 128: Table 2.3: Frequency of</st
Page 129 and 130: Table 2.5: Instrumental Variables M
Page 131 and 132: Table 2.7: Prevalence of</s
Page 133 and 134: Table 2.9: Time to Failure (Violent
Page 135 and 136: Table 2.12: Treatment Effect by Sub
Page 137 and 138: Table 2.14: Frequency of</s
Page 139 and 140: Table 2.16: Instrumental Variables
Page 141 and 142: Figures Figure 2.1: Risk-Based Allo
Page 143 and 144: Figure 2.5: Survival Time for LIS E
Page 145 and 146: CHAPTER 3. Risk Prediction for Effe
Page 147 and 148: sensitivity of the
Page 149 and 150: Programs should be designed to adhe
Page 151 and 152: weight information in an appropriat
Page 153 and 154: statistical model that would predic
Page 155 and 156: The Philadelphia m
Page 157 and 158: assignment pool. Backfill probation
Page 159 and 160: Little research has been done on th
Page 161 and 162: already predicted to be at low risk
Page 163 and 164: It assumes that if of</stro
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involved. Crimes that obviously met
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We examine the potential interactio
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age is based on this date regardles
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obberies. The only
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of low-intensity s
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classified as low risk. The
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All the risk ratios in Table 3.9 in
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0.55. Raising the threshold results
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are partly selected on the basis <s
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make up the majority of</st
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strategy allows probation o
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Notes 1 In this study, murder, atte
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Table 3.2: Sample Characteristics (
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Table 3.6: Predictive Ability at Al
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Table 3.9: Post-Random Assignment O
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APPENDICES Appendix A: Systematic R
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combination. The s
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B. ELIGIBILITY CHECKLIST B1. First
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Other: txcxloth C6d. Additional pro
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D. SAMPLE LEVEL CODING SHEET Instru
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E. DEPENDENT VARIABLE CODING SHEET
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F14. Comparison group sample size f
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weight w is then recalculated (6),
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Study Sheffield (Males) 1976 (Folka
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Study Dallas TX 1992 (Turner & Pete
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Study Minnesota ISR 1995 (Deschenes
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Study Clark WA 2003 (Barnoski, 2003
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Study Whatcom WA 2003 (Barnoski, 20
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Study Los Angeles CA 2005 (Zhang &
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Fed. Prob., 56, 12-17. Turner, Pete
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Study Reference Benekos & Sonnenber
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Study Reference Giblin (2002) Using
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Study Reference Lasater et al. (n.d
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Study Reference Robertson (2000) Co
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Study Reference Turner & Greene (19
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Appendix E: Philadelphia APPD Low-<
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Prevalence of Reci
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Frequency of Recid
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Instrumental Variables Model: Preva
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Instrumental Variables Model: Preva
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Post-RA Months in Jail and Probabil
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Scaled Schoenfeld Residuals Time =
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Chapter 1 ** Denotes t
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Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. T. (197
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Glaze, L. E, & Bonczar, T. P. (2009
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MacKenzie, D. L. (2006a). What work
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Petersilia, J., Turner, S., & Desch
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safety first: 13 strategies for suc
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Wilson, D. B. (2010). Meta-analysis
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Angrist, J. D. (2006). Instrumental
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Clear, T. R., & Hardyman, P. L. (19
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period266.pdf Lowenkamp, C. T., Lat
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Rosch, J. (2006). Deviant peer cont
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Taxman, F. S., & Thanner, M. (2006)
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statistical learning. Journal <stro
Page 275 and 276:
Federal Bureau of
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Marsh, K., & Fox, C., (2008). <stro
Page 279:
Sherman, L. W. (1993). Defiance, de
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