The Effects of Sanction Intensity on Criminal Conduct - JDAI Helpdesk
The Effects of Sanction Intensity on Criminal Conduct - JDAI Helpdesk
The Effects of Sanction Intensity on Criminal Conduct - JDAI Helpdesk
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violati<strong>on</strong>s first went before a judge who reminded them <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> their resp<strong>on</strong>sibilities <strong>on</strong><br />
probati<strong>on</strong> in a manner that reinforced the desire <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> the whole criminal justice system to<br />
see <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fenders succeed rather than fail. <strong>Criminal</strong> justice programming that emphasizes a<br />
combinati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> treatment and accountability, and incentive/sancti<strong>on</strong>-based models, has<br />
shown promise in other settings, such as drug courts (Marlowe, 2003; MacKenzie,<br />
2006b). Given the extent to which ISP programs have been directed toward druginvolved<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fenders, it may be particularly informative to draw comparis<strong>on</strong>s with drug<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fending research. Gendreau, Goggin, and Fult<strong>on</strong> (2001) also lend more support to the<br />
general c<strong>on</strong>tenti<strong>on</strong> that such a balanced approach to <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fender supervisi<strong>on</strong>, emphasizing<br />
relati<strong>on</strong>ship-building, incentives, and adherence to the PEI, is effective.<br />
One striking element <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> both programs just discussed is the lack <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> any emphasis<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> specific alterati<strong>on</strong>s to program intensity. Whereas prior experiments have searched for<br />
optimal caseload sizes or mandated certain numbers <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>tacts or drug tests, these more<br />
recent studies seem to focus <strong>on</strong> the c<strong>on</strong>tent <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> supervisi<strong>on</strong> and resp<strong>on</strong>ses to violati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
This is in c<strong>on</strong>trast to the surveillance-based programs in which (at their most extreme),<br />
probati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>ficers “go out in the field actively looking for violati<strong>on</strong>s” (Pears<strong>on</strong>, 1988).<br />
This begs the larger questi<strong>on</strong>: what do probati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>ficers actually do when required to<br />
supervise <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fenders more closely? <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> present study has not brought us much closer to<br />
answering that questi<strong>on</strong> than when Clear and Hardyman (1990) c<strong>on</strong>sidered it twenty<br />
years ago. A reducti<strong>on</strong> in caseload size is not automatically accompanied by a guarantee<br />
that <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>ficers will actually be able to spend more time with their clients. Fewer cases do<br />
not necessarily equate to more intensive treatment <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> probati<strong>on</strong>ers. Indeed, for all the<br />
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