The Effects of Sanction Intensity on Criminal Conduct - JDAI Helpdesk

their clients (Petersilia & Turner, 1990). However, these studies showed little difference
in recidivism rates by caseload size, and technical violations increased for those <strong>of</strong>fenders
receiving more supervision (e.g., Neithercutt & Gottfredson, 1974; Banks et al., 1976;
Carter & Wilkins, 1976). <strong>The</strong> caseload variation strategy was deemed unsuccessful.
<strong>The</strong> re-emergence <strong>of</strong> ISP in the 1980s was largely independent <strong>of</strong> prior interest in
the topic. ISP at this time was at the forefront <strong>of</strong> an array <strong>of</strong> so-called ‘intermediate
sanctions’ intended to provide a cost-effective but punitive alternative to incarceration.
<strong>The</strong> focus <strong>of</strong> these programs was on crime deterrence through surveillance and control,
which was effected through small caseloads and frequent face-to-face contacts and drug
testing. A study <strong>of</strong> this model in Georgia, U.S.A., in the early 1980s showed early
promise (Erwin, 1986), and in 1986 the Bureau <strong>of</strong> Justice Assistance (BJA) funded the
RAND Corporation to conduct a multi-site randomized controlled trial <strong>of</strong> the ‘new’ ISP
in comparison to regular probation or incarceration (Petersilia & Turner, 1993). Again,
the results were disappointing: programs had little impact on recidivism, and technical
violations and re-incarcerations increased due to increased surveillance.
Thus, intensive supervision probation appears to be an ineffective way to
supervise <strong>of</strong>fenders (Sherman et al., 1997; MacKenzie, 2006). <strong>The</strong> early ISP models
were designed on the assumption that probation supervision in itself is ‘good’ for
<strong>of</strong>fenders, so more <strong>of</strong> it must be better. However, it appears that no theoretical basis for
this assumption was ever articulated (Bennett, 1988). Clear and Hardyman (1990)
suggest that the early experiments in caseload size variation failed because <strong>of</strong> a lack <strong>of</strong>
knowledge about how probation supervision could serve the ultimate goal <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fender
treatment. Probation <strong>of</strong>ficers had more time to spend with clients, but did not know what
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