The Effects of Sanction Intensity on Criminal Conduct - JDAI Helpdesk
The Effects of Sanction Intensity on Criminal Conduct - JDAI Helpdesk
The Effects of Sanction Intensity on Criminal Conduct - JDAI Helpdesk
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all, resulting in a large number <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> zero counts in our data, we explore whether zeroinflated<br />
Poiss<strong>on</strong> or negative binomial models fit the data better. 10<br />
Zero-inflated models<br />
correct for the large share <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> zero observati<strong>on</strong>s by allowing the zeros to be predicted by<br />
two different theoretical processes (e.g., Sarkisian, 2009): the “always zeros” (<str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fenders<br />
who will never re<str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fend, regardless <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> changes in other c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s); and the “possible<br />
zeros” (those who might have re<str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fended but did not do so during the follow-up period).<br />
We present the results <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> several diagnostic tests used to assess the appropriateness <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
each model. All the models c<strong>on</strong>trol for baseline <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fender characteristics, and account for<br />
time at risk according to the time during which <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fenders were not in jail <strong>on</strong>e year preand<br />
<strong>on</strong>e year post-random assignment. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se features are described in detail below.<br />
Time to failure and survival analysis<br />
An alternative approach to assessing experimental outcomes is to look at the time<br />
to failure (time to first <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fense) rather than simple proporti<strong>on</strong>s or counts <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> new <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fenses.<br />
An experimental interventi<strong>on</strong> may affect time to failure as well as, or even independently<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>, its effect <strong>on</strong> participati<strong>on</strong> and frequency. In a probati<strong>on</strong> agency, an understanding <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
how quickly probati<strong>on</strong>ers tend to recidivate after the probati<strong>on</strong> term begins may be<br />
important for the allocati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> supervisi<strong>on</strong> resources. Whether we analyze participati<strong>on</strong><br />
or frequency, we can <strong>on</strong>ly say that the treatment group was more or less likely to <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fend<br />
than the c<strong>on</strong>trol group. We lose important informati<strong>on</strong> about the timing <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> events, and<br />
cannot account for the participants who did not re<str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>fend. As Allis<strong>on</strong> (1984) notes: “One<br />
might suspect … that some<strong>on</strong>e arrested immediately after release [from pris<strong>on</strong>] had a<br />
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