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413047-Underground-Commercial-Sex-Economy

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With an availability of child pornography and a culture encouraging information sharing, offenders found<br />

it easy to learn where to get more material. As one offender recounted: “It’s all sharing of info; you pick up<br />

bits and pieces and figure out what to do” (A6). Contacts would share websites and other sources of child<br />

pornography: “I traded with folks, almost from the beginning. I can’t remember any websites I went to on<br />

my own. I met guys on Yahoo, met them on different chat rooms” (C7). A Spanish-speaking offender<br />

received guidance about file sharing programs and chat rooms in Russian:<br />

Some people from Russia sent me programs in Spanish and instructions in Russian and<br />

told me to use a translation program to translate the instructions. They sent it for free.<br />

You go to one chat room and they send you to another and then another and it goes on<br />

from there. I went to the Latin chat rooms for adult pornography. They told me where to<br />

find more stuff. (C6)<br />

As users were accepted into the child pornography culture, they became privy to other websites, which<br />

would constantly change locations in order to evade discovery from law enforcement:<br />

The bulletin board—Felixxx—will disappear and come up. 4Chan was a way to find it.<br />

Every day it would move to a different site. You learn when you get on the board how it<br />

will work—you can scroll forwards and backwards and figure out when it would<br />

disappear. I understood it would disappear because it was illegal and a way to evade law<br />

enforcement detection. (G2)<br />

Jenkins (2001, 181) reports that vigilantes, private hacking groups dedicated to eliminating child<br />

pornography, may embed viruses in child pornography files. This threat often resonates more strongly<br />

than the danger of law enforcement detection: “Though viewing child porn sites might, theoretically,<br />

attract massive punishment from the federal government, the odds of detection are felt to be slim, say,<br />

one chance in many thousands. In contrast, the odds of encountering a virus or Trojan planted by a<br />

vigilante are very strong indeed, perhaps 10 or 25 percent, and this high likelihood of damage is clearly<br />

enough to make one stop and think.”<br />

One 60-year-old offender, who collected for a year, found that many images were not actually child<br />

pornography, but corrupt files:<br />

I don’t think most of the images downloaded were child pornography. Sometimes when<br />

you get a file that’s not corrupt and it looks like a functional video, you could put it in a<br />

queue and it would download similar things. When you find something that is not<br />

corrupted, you’d have to manually put it in the queue. About 10 percent of child<br />

pornography was corrupt, but it could infect the whole machine. (F5)<br />

Offenders varied in how often they would go online to download child pornography. One respondent<br />

would always search for three to four hours on Fridays. Another would go online between 15 to 20 hours a<br />

week, generally on the weekends or late at night. With peer-to-peer trading, a user does not need to<br />

actively send files. For this reason, one offender would leave his computer running at all times for trading.<br />

Collections<br />

The size of offenders’ collections varied greatly, with many offenders only learning the exact size after law<br />

enforcement involvement. Collections ranged from less than a dozen to hundreds of thousands of images.<br />

The largest collection reported in the sample contained between 300 to 400 gigabytes. Similarly, Webb,<br />

Craissati, and Keen (2007) found that offenders in their sample of 90 Internet offenders had between 2 to<br />

921,000 images, with a median of 318 images.<br />

Offenders built their collections for different amounts of time before getting caught. Seven (33 percent)<br />

offenders collected for a year or less, seven (33 percent) collected for 1.5 to 5 years, four (19 percent)<br />

collected for 5.5 to 10 years, and three (14 percent) collected for over ten years.<br />

Three offenders (14 percent) went through periods of building and deleting their collections. These<br />

offenders would vow to stop collecting and erase their images and videos. After time, however, they would<br />

start collecting again. For some longtime offenders, this cycle repeated numerous times: “Through the<br />

years, I'd copy the images onto CDs and then I’d feel guilty and destroy them” (B2).<br />

261

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